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DIRECTION OF THE COURT
High Court's Course Debated After Rulings Two Key Civil Rights Decisions Mark
Shift From Conservatism
The Boston Globe
June 30, 2003
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON A Supreme Court
with a well-developed reputation for
conservatism took its cues in the closing
week of its term from an era of the
court's liberal past, heating up the culture
war over its future direction and
membership. Two momentous rulings on
civil rights on the final two decision
days a solid endorsement of affirmative
action in college admissions, and a
declaration of the right for gays and
lesbians to form intimate partnerships
seem likely to define the term's legacy.
"This was a reversal, or at least a pause,
in the court's rightward march," said
Thomas C. Goldstein, a Washington
lawyer who has an active practice before
the Supreme Court and keeps a log on
the results and trends of its work.
"On issues that are very important to
cultural conservatives states' rights,
affirmative action, gay rights, and others
they suffered very serious and
genuinely unexpected defeats," he said.
No one outside the court can know why,
but in deciding those major rulings the
court looked back to decisions handed
down during one of its most liberal
periods. In the affirmative action case,
the court reached back to Brown v.
Board of Education, the basic school
desegregation ruling in 1954. On gays'
right to intimate relationships, it returned
to a 1965 ruling, Griswold v.
Connecticut, that started the modern
trend toward decisions that expand
individual rights, including Roe v.
Wade, which legalized abortion.
And few things were more telling about
the just-ended term than the fact that the
two most influential occupants of the
court's philosophical center Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M.
Kennedy - wrote the two historic rulings
at the end: O'Connor authored Grutter v.
Bollinger on affirmative action,
Kennedy wrote Lawrence v. Texas on
gay rights.
Those rulings were denounced by
conservative groups such as Concerned
Women for America, a legal advocacy
group. Its chief counsel, Jan LaRue,
protested about "an extreme activist"
court, dominated by justices "who
believe in a 'living' and 'evolving' theory
of the Constitution as if the Founders
wrote it on a blackboard and gave them
an eraser and chalk." She spoke of
"vaporous law" emerging from the court.
The rulings were lauded on the other
side of the cultural divide.
"The affirmative action and gay rights
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decisions are tremendous victories for
civil liberties," said Steven R. Shapiro,
national legal director of the American
Civil Liberties Union. "We are an
increasingly diverse society and the
court, to its credit, recognized that
America's diversity represents a strength,
not a weakness."
Neither side in the culture war over the
court's future is suggesting it is time for
a cease-fire. If anything, the term-
closing decisions energized both sides
the conservatives in their campaign to
change the court as soon as possible, the
liberals in their desire to keep the court
from changing and perhaps even push it
more toward their view.
Each side has a rallying cry for its
followers as they await a vacancy on the
court. Conservatives are saying "no
more Souters," the liberals are saying
"no more Scalias or Thomases."
Justice David H. Souter, nominated to
the court by President George H.W.
Bush, voted in the majority in both the
affirmative action and gay rights rulings.
Justices Antonin Scalia, a nominee of
President Ronald Reagan, and Clarence
Thomas, also nominated by George
H.W. Bush, dissented in both cases.
Souter has been a consistent member of
the moderate-to-liberal voting bloc on
the court. As Goldstein put it, "He is
permanently divorced from the
conservative camp."
Goldstein's statistics show Souter voted,
in all cases taken together, 89 percent of
the time with the court's most liberal
member, John Paul Stevens, and the
least with one of its most conservative
members, 65 percent with Thomas.
Conservative activists are determined
that President Bush not appoint justices
who would follow Souter's path on the
court. President George H. W. Bush's
chief of staff, John Sununu, had assured
conservatives at the time that Souter
would be a conservative on the court.
Liberals are just as determined that no
president appoint justices who would
follow Scalia or Thomas, the two most
consistent conservatives on the high
bench and the two whom President Bush
said during his run for the White House
are his favorites on the court. Goldstein's
statistics show the two voted together 95
percent of the time, taking all of the
term's cases together. That affinity,
Goldstein said, has been deepening.
The two major rulings at the end of the
term did not produce identical lineups.
The law school admissions case was
decided by a 5-to-4 vote, with O'Connor,
Souter, Stevens, Stephen G. Breyer, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the majority,
and Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist dissenting.
In the case striking down a Texas
sodomy law aimed at gay couples,
Kennedy was joined in full in the
majority by Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Stevens. O'Connor wrote a separate
opinion agreeing with the result, but not
with Kennedy's denunciation of the
court's 1986 ruling against privacy rights
for gays, a decision O'Connor had
joined. Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
dissented.
But the final rulings were not the entire
story of the term. In much of the court's
work over the past nine months, the
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outcomes followed its dominant pattern
of conservatism especially in rulings
allowing the government to require
libraries to put filters on computers to
block sexually explicit websites,
upholding "three- strikes-and-you're-out"
criminal punishment laws, allowing
states to list sex offenders on the
Internet, and permitting the government
to hold indefinitely immigrants facing
deportation after criminal convictions.
That continuing trend, pleasing to
conservatives, drew protests from
liberals. Shapiro of the ACLU said:
"This court remains fundamentally
conservative in its judicial outlook. Its
conservative instincts were evident in
rulings involving criminal defendants
and immigrants that were low points for
civil liberties."
Copyright @ 2003 Bell & Howell
Information and Learning Company. All
rights reserved.
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A Timeout For Conservative Agenda;
Despite Burst Of Progressive Rulings, Pillars Of Rehnquist Court Stand.
Legal Times
June 30, 2003
Tony Mauro
In the annals of the Rehnquist Supreme
Court, June 26 will stand apart from any
other day -- counterintuitive, almost
otherworldly.
In rapid-fire announcements from the
bench, the Supreme Court seemed to
travel back in time to the days of the
Warren Court.
The Court handed down decisions that
supported the interests of sex offenders
(Stogner v. California), homosexuals
(Lawrence v. Texas), Democrats
(Georgia v. Ashcroft), death row inmates
(Wiggins v. Smith) and consumer
advocates (Nike v. Kasky) -- none of
them the typical beneficiaries of
Rehnquist Court decision making.
As he sat in the courtroom that day, Paul
Smith, the Jenner & Block partner who
argued in favor of gay rights in
Lawrence, was increasingly amazed as
the opinion announcements proceeded.
"I thought, 'This is really interesting,"'
says Smith, in a typical understatement.
"The Court was not in its more
conservative mode that day."
But in looking back at the decision
making for the term that ended last
week, it is hard to decide what mode it
was in -- except to say that it seemed
bent on upending the expectations of
those who watch and analyze it. It was
as if, after nine years of togetherness --
the longest period of stability in the
history of the nine-member Court -- the
justices became restless and decided to
rearrange the furniture, at least
temporarily.
And at week's end, it appeared the
Supreme Court may well remain stable
for another term or more, as much-
anticipated retirements failed to
materialize.
As recently as last year, most observers
thought that the key legacies of the
Rehnquist Court were its support of
states in the federalism divide, its reining
in of Congress, its support of the First
Amendment, and, whenever possible, its
avoidance of deciding hot-button social
issues.
None of those Rehnquist pillars toppled
this term -- but they also did not gain
girth or deeper foundations.
"This was a term of more progressive
victories," says University of Southern
California law professor Erwin
Chemerinsky. "I don't want to overstate
that. I still painfully feel the outcome in
Andrade. But it was remarkable how
many cases had progressive versus
conservative outcomes." Chemerinsky
was counsel for Leandro Andrade, the
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loser in March in Lockyer v. Andrade, in
which the Court upheld California's
"three strikes" law.
With last week's decisions fresh in mind,
many analysts attributed the term's
idiosyncratic trends to the dominance of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and her
brand of pragmatic, almost legislative,
problem solving. O'Connor was in the
majority of all 13 of the term's clear-cut
5-4 decisions.
"What is most striking is the assurance
with which this formerly obscure state
court judge effectively decides many
hugely important questions for a country
of 275 million people," said former
Acting Solicitor General Walter
Dellinger in Slate late last week.
Florida International University law
professor Thomas Baker sees O'Connor
as a legal realist like her friend and
mentor, the late Justice Lewis Powell Jr.
O'Connor, Baker says, uses her vote to
express her "attitudinal preferences in
close cases, to seek compromise."
Assessing O'Connor's crucial influence
on the current Court, Thomas Goldstein
of D.C.'s Goldstein & Howe says, "A
retirement by O'Connor would be
thermonuclear war."
O'Connor's centrist approach, as much as
any other factor, may explain why many
of the Court's trends seemed to stall this
term.
"Outside of the criminal law area, we
don't have a particularly conservative
Court," says Northwestern University
School of Law professor John McGinnis.
"They stand by their precedents, by and
large."
Except, as it turned out June 26, when it
comes to gay rights. Unflinchingly, and
with disdain for its 1986 precedent
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court
responded to -- some critics say
overestimated -- society's growing
acceptance of homosexuality.
In Lawrence and in Grutter v. Bollinger,
which upheld affirmative action, the
Court showed no reluctance to plant
itself in the middle of what Justice
Antonin Scalia derisively called
America's "culture wars." This social
boldness contrasts sharply with the
Rehnquist Court's usual deference to the
elected branches in resolving knotty
policy problems.
Indeed, to some, O'Connor's majority in
Grutter has the tone of a legislative
enactment, adopting the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative
action program with what amounts to a
sunset provision. "We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary,"
she wrote.
"There is a focus-group, finger-to-the-
wind quality to it," says Emory
University School of Law professor
David Garrow. "It's a good public policy
solution, but, I think, not very good
judicially."
On federalism, this was a term in which
the Rehnquist Court's revolution stood
still.
In a speech earlier this month, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said, "Federalism
was the dog that did not bark." Her best
example was Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, in which the
Court -- by a 6-3 vote -- said that the
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1999 federal Family and Medical Leave
Act's family care leave provisions
applied to state employees. But it was
not the only defeat for what Ginsburg
called "states' rights pleaders."
In The Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, a
little-noticed per curiam opinion June 2,
the Court affirmed the authority of the
Federal Arbitration Act over an in- state
commercial loan transaction. The Court
said its 1995 precedent United States v.
Lopez, the touchstone of many of its
later federalism decisions, had been
misread by the Alabama Supreme Court.
And in State Farm v. Campbell, the
Court did not hesitate to rein in Utah and
its state courts on the subject of
excessive punitive damages, imposing
federal due process standards on big
awards.
Federal authority also carried the day in
American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi on June 23. A California law
seeking to force insurance companies to
yield information on Holocaust
survivors, the Court said, "interferes
with the President's conduct of the
nation's foreign policy and is therefore
preempted."
One exception to the trend: In
Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, the
Court gave at least a tentative green light
to Maine's efforts to secure discounts for
drugs for its residents, rejecting claims
that the program interferes with the
federal Medicaid program.
Congress fared relatively well this term,
finding fewer of its enactments tossed
out by the Court.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the congressional
extension of copyrights enacted in the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act won few fans on the Court, but by a
7-2 vote was upheld as a proper exercise
of congressional power.
Federal Communications Commission v.
NextWave Personal Communications
can also be read as a win for the federal
bankruptcy laws over efforts by the FCC
to take back licenses from a bankrupt
telecommunications firm.
Congressional efforts to restrict
pornography on the Internet have not
fared well before, but this term the
justices found a law in this area that it
could approve of: the Children's Internet
Protection Act. In United States v.
American Library Association, the Court
had little trouble endorsing the law's
requirement for filtering software on
computers at public libraries as a
condition for libraries seeking federal
subsidies.
"Maybe it is a conservative Court that is
more comfortable with Congress, now
that Congress is in conservative hands,"
said O'Melveny & Myers partner and
former Clinton administration official
Ronald Klain at a Washington Legal
Foundation review of the term.
The library case was one of several
surprising defeats for free-speech and
association claimants this term -- rare,
coming from a Court that has
consistently favored freedom of speech
and press no matter what its leanings in
other areas. In all eight of the cases
raising First Amendment issues this
term, government restrictions carried the
day.
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Virginia v. Black was the only case in Copyright @ 2003 by American Lawyer
which the free-speech side achieved Media, ALM LLC
partial victory. In that case, the Court
upheld a state law that criminalized cross
burning with the intent to intimidate. But
it struck down a part of the law that said
the act of cross burning itself was prima
facie evidence of the intent to intimidate.
But in other First Amendment cases, the
government won every time: campaign
finance (Federal Election Commission v.
Beaumont); prison visitation (Overton v.
Bazzetta); trespassing laws (Virginia v.
Hicks); telemarketing (Madigan v.
Telemarketing Associates); and
copyright (Eldred v. Ashcroft).
"The First Amendment has not been
advanced in any meaningful way this
term, and this is the first term we've seen
that in a very long time," says Ronald
Collins, a scholar at the Freedom Forum
who keeps extensive records on the high
court's First Amendment docket.
The common thread in many of the
cases, says O'Melveny's Klain, may be
that the Court is increasingly
comfortable with laws of general
applicability that happen to infringe on
speech-related activities. "The First
Amendment had a really lousy year at
the Supreme Court," he says.
But apart from the decisions themselves,
Klain says, the headline of the term is
O'Connor's role. Noting that O'Connor
did not author a single dissent all term,
Klain says, "Her approach is the
dominant one. It really was O'Connor's
term. If we didn't have the tradition of
naming courts after the chief justice, this
would be the O'Connor Court."
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Justices Take a Turn to the Left;
The Supreme Court's rulings for gay rights and affirmative action surprise many -
and leave Justice Antonin Scalia on the margins.
Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON The Supreme Court
was surprisingly empty on the last day of
the term. Only a few dozen lawyers had
gathered for the final decisions. Those
who had were about to hear the rarest of
judicial opinions: an apology for a past
mistake and the promise of a distinctly
new direction.
For the second time in a week, the
normally conservative high court would
proclaim a liberal policy of full inclusion
for all. Monday's unexpectedly broad
victory for affirmative action would be
followed Thursday by a strong
endorsement of gay rights.
A term that had produced some solid
gains for conservatives -- including the
upholding of California's three-strikes
law, new limits on punitive damages
verdicts against corporations and a
ruling that public libraries can be forced
to put pornography filters on their
computers -- would end as the worst
term for conservative causes since 1992.
And one of the court's strongest
conservative justices, Antonin Scalia,
would be left looking isolated and
marginalized.
In a courtroom where silence and
decorum are the rule, what unfolded
Thursday made for a moment of
extraordinary emotion, especially for a
group of mostly young attorneys who sat
in one front row.
They had worked on the pending case
from Texas. At one end sat aging
Harvard Law professor Laurence H.
Tribe, who had argued -- and lost -- a
challenge to Georgia's sodomy law 17
years ago.
Moments after the gavel sounded, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist announced
that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy would
deliver the opinion in Lawrence vs.
Texas.
Kennedy began by saying that the court
had dealt with this issue before, in the
1986 Georgia case of Bowers vs.
Hardwick. Then the court had delivered
a thundering condemnation of
homosexuals. Its opinion spoke of
"heinous acts" and "crimes against
nature." But on Thursday, it soon
became clear Kennedy was not citing the
Bowers precedent to follow it, but to
admit that the court had been wrong --
and tragically so.
As Kennedy spoke, one of the young
lawyers who had been listening intently
peeked up and looked into the eyes of
those down the row, as if seeking
confirmation that they too had heard the
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same words of respect and dignity that
she had heard.
"Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent.
Bowers vs. Hardwick should be and now
is overruled," Kennedy said.
There are no high-fives or applause in
the Supreme Court. But across the front
row could be heard quiet weeping. Tears
flowed amid the smiles.
In one decision from the nation's highest
court, gays and lesbians had gone from
outcasts in the eyes of the law to full-
fledged Americans entitled to the same
rights and respect as others.
Day to day, the Supreme Court decides
legal questions, and usually does so as
narrowly as possible. But it also has a
unique power to speak broadly to the
nation and to proclaim basic principles
of American law. Thursday's opinion
was such a statement.
And it was the second such statement in
a week. On Monday, the court endorsed
the principle of racial diversity as a
"compelling" goal. Race still matters,
said Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and it
is essential that the door to opportunity
remains open for blacks and Latinos.
The message of both opinions was that
liberty and equality are not for some, but
for all Americans. Gays and lesbians are
entitled to be treated with dignity and
blacks and Latinos are entitled to be full
participants in the leadership ranks of the
nation, the court said.
Of course, the Supreme Court does not
by itself change attitudes. More often, it
simply reflects a shift in thinking. In the
case of gays and lesbians, the court
could be said to have caught up with the
generational shift in the public's notion
of homosexuality.
The author of the 1986 Bowers opinion,
Justice Byron White, was a football star
of the 1930s. Then, homosexuality was
seen as a moral failing or a
psychological disorder, best to be
avoided and free to be condemned.
In recent years, homosexuality has come
be viewed by many as akin to being left-
handed, a variation on the norm.
In May, a Gallup poll found that
Americans by a 2-1 margin say sex laws
targeting gays should be repealed. While
the public remains split on same-sex
marriages, the polls suggest a large
majority supports the court's decision
striking down the Texas law against
"deviate" sex acts.
The court's view on affirmative action
reflects elite opinion more than general
sentiment. When asked about who
should be admitted to colleges or law
schools, the public by a large margin
says "merit" should be the sole deciding
factor.
But university officials, military leaders
and corporate executives urged the court
to give them leeway to choose minorities
from the pool of highly qualified
applicants. By a 5-4 vote, the court
agreed and upheld the affirmative action
policy at the University of Michigan
Law School.
For social conservatives, the unexpected
decisions of the 2003 term on
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affirmation action and gay rights brought
back memories of that 1992 term.
Then, the court was dominated by new
appointees of Presidents Reagan and
George H.W. Bush. Eight of the nine
justices were Republican appointees, and
the only Democratic appointee was the
conservative Justice White.
That spring, the court had taken up an
abortion case from Pennsylvania and a
school graduation prayer case from
Rhode Island. Many believed the court
was on the verge of overturning Roe vs.
Wade, the ruling that legalized abortion
nationwide, and the bans on school-
sponsored prayers handed down during
the 1960s.
Instead, in a pair of 5-4 rulings, with
O'Connor and Kennedy in the majority,
the court affirmed the basic right to
choose abortion and the prohibition on
school-sponsored invocations and
prayers. Scalia delivered a vehement
dissent that accused his colleagues of
betrayal.
This spring saw something of a replay.
The court had appeared poised to
overturn the Bakke decision on
affirmative action.
A conservative legal group had won a
ruling knocking down race-based
admissions policies in Texas and
Georgia. It then took on the University
of Michigan and succeeded in bringing
the case before the high court, only to
see the court strongly endorse the Bakke
decision and affirmative action.
The court's new support for gay rights is
not shared by all -- some believe
homosexuality is sinful and should be
illegal.
Scalia spoke for them Thursday.
"Today's opinion is the product of a
court ... that has largely signed on to the
so-called homosexual agenda," Scalia
said in an angry tone. The majority has
joined the "homosexual activists [who
seek to] eliminate the moral opprobrium
that has traditionally attached to
homosexual conduct," he said. Only
Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas
joined him.
As Scalia spoke, his colleagues seemed
determined to ignore him. They gazed
straight ahead or studied the ceiling.
Although Scalia's views resonate with a
large segment of the public, his
influence within the court appears to be
minimal.
Without question, he is smart, quick,
witty and devoted to the law. He is
considered the court's most gifted writer,
and he often dominates the oral
arguments. Yet he rarely writes an
important opinion for the court. Even
when there is a conservative majority,
Rehnquist assigns the court's opinion
elsewhere, such as to Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy.
Scalia has a rigidity and an abrasiveness
that drives away the others. He is known
for his sharply worded dissents -- but
little else.
When he joined the court in 1986, many
assumed the former University of
Chicago law professor would emerge as
the true leader of the court. But from the
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beginning he had a hard time concealing
his disdain for his colleagues.
Now 67, Scalia seems resigned to -- or
perhaps relishes -- the role of the great
dissenter.
Copyright @ 2003 The Los Angeles
Times
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2 justices' influence felt in latest term;
Rehnquist, O'Connor signal they'll be around for awhile
USA Today
June 27, 2003
Joan Biskupic
On a drizzly afternoon this month, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist heaved a
chrome shovel and broke ground for a
$122 million renovation of the Supreme
Court. With him was Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who declared, "Let's dig."
The ceremony was rich with references
to the future and seemed to be a
metaphor for a pair of justices who, in
the twilight of their careers and in the
face of retirement rumors, don't appear
to be going anywhere.
The groundbreaking, their opinions in
the annual term that ended Thursday and
several key cases the court has scheduled
for its next term suggest that the court
led by Rehnquist, 78, and O'Connor, 73,
has unfinished business.
This term underscored the hold that the
conservative Rehnquist and the more
moderate O'Connor have on the
Supreme Court, whose nine members
have been together for nine years --
longer than any high court in U.S.
history. This week's rulings endorsing
racial preferences in college admissions
and overturning anti-sodomy laws were
huge victories for liberals. But day in
and day out, Rehnquist and O'Connor set
the pace for what remains a conservative
court.
In fact, the ruling in the Michigan case
backing affirmative action at colleges
was made possible when O'Connor
voted with the court's liberal wing --
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
David Souter and John Paul Stevens. In
the same dispute, O'Connor then sided
with Rehnquist in a separate opinion that
bans colleges from using scoring
formulas that give automatic points to
minority applicants.
Together, the rulings reflected a
pragmatic conservatism on the court that
stems from O'Connor regularly joining
forces with Rehnquist, her old Stanford
law school classmate, but also breaking
from him in significant ways that push
the court toward the nation's political
center.
"The social fabric of America had
adjusted to affirmative action, as shown
by the number of business, military and
other groups supporting it. She was not
going to make a change," Yale law
school professor Harold Hongju Koh
says. "She's not ready to use the court to
plow new ground. But she's also not
ready to roll back advances made by the
court."
Sometimes, that can mean walking a fine
line. Thursday, O'Connor voted with the
majority to strike down the Texas law
that banned sex between homosexuals.
But she cited grounds that differed from
the majority's, so she, unlike the
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majority, would not be invalidating
precedent set by a ruling in 1986 based
on a limited view of privacy rights.
O'Connor and Rehnquist were in tandem
on other major cases that helped to
define the 2002-2003 term. They backed
rulings that:
* Favored law enforcement. The court's
five conservatives, with O'Connor
leading the way, upheld California's
tough "three strikes" law, which sets
strict prison sentences for a third felony
conviction, regardless of the crime's
severity. In this case, a repeat petty thief
got a 50-year sentence.
The conservatives -- Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas -- were
joined by more liberal Justice Souter in
another ruling that said states can
demand public registration of sex
offenders whose crimes were committed
before "Megan's laws" were passed.
* Deferred to the administration's
restrictions on immigrants in the name of
border security. Over an impassioned
dissent that the court was impinging
individual liberty, Rehnquist wrote that
legal immigrants who face deportation
because of a past conviction and who
have served their sentences can be jailed
automatically without bail. He was
joined by O'Connor and the other
conservatives; the four liberals
dissented.
* Took a detour from the court's
emphasis on states' rights over federal
power. Rehnquist and O'Connor
unexpectedly joined the four liberals in a
family care dispute from Nevada. The
court said in an opinion by Rehnquist
that state workers can sue their
employers for money damages when the
workers are denied time off to care for a
sick relative. The court broadly
interpreted a federal law that gives most
public and private workers up to 12
weeks of unpaid leave to care for
someone.
The case involved a social worker who
lost his job after his wife was hurt in a
car accident and he took time off to care
for her. The decision was a departure
from rulings in which the court had
shielded states from suits brought by
workers who claimed age or disability
discrimination, but it was consistent with
the court's practice of allowing Congress
latitude to prevent sex discrimination.
The law was designed to counter
stereotypes of women as caregivers and
men as wage earners, Rehnquist said.
The Nevada case showed that the court's
conservative leaders occasionally are
willing to step back from what has been
a pattern of curtailing Congress' power
to put demands on the states.
"In a way, they've really just started" to
define such limits, says David Strauss, a
law professor at the University of
Chicago. He says the court has broadly
defined the parameters of state
autonomy but has yet to apply them to a
range of situations that have practical
consequences for many Americans.
Several cases on the docket for the term
that begins in the fall could continue to
shape the legacy of this court. Revisiting
the Miranda warnings that police read to
suspects, the justices will decide whether
evidence obtained from suspects who are
not advised of their right to remain silent
should be admissible in court.
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Rehnquist and O'Connor each have
questioned the constitutional
underpinning of the Supreme Court's
ruling in 1966 that made reading the
rights a requirement for police. Suspects
who are not advised of their Miranda
rights cannot have any of their
incriminating remarks used against
them. The question in the case coming
before the court is whether physical
evidence derived from such statements,
such as guns or drugs, can be used at
trial.
Another new case follows on the court's
approval last year of publicly financed
vouchers for religious schools. That
decision said public money could be
used for parochial school tuition. The
new case tests whether, once a state
offers scholarships or subsidies for
private education, it must offer them for
religious instruction as well. A student
who qualified for a Washington state
college scholarship sued officials when
the state rejected his request to use the
scholarship to get a theology degree at a
private Christian college.
Finally, the court will return to its
marble home Sept. 8, a month earlier
than usual, to consider a case that asks
whether a 2002 law overhauling federal
campaign-finance rules violates free
speech rights. The law includes a ban on
"soft money" donations, the unlimited
checks from corporations and labor
unions that are given to political parties,
which use the money to back specific
candidates.
At the groundbreaking ceremony June
17, Rehnquist and O'Connor were the
featured speakers. Beneath a white
canopy that shielded them and Kennedy,
Ginsburg and Breyer from the rain, the
two senior jurists observed that their 68-
year-old columned building needs new
wiring, heating and cooling systems,
more space and other improvements. A
two-story underground annex is part of
the renovation. Noting that the building
is nearly as old as she, O'Connor
quipped, "The difference is that with a
building, when it gets that age, one can
change all the infrastructure and keep it
going for another 70 years or so."
When the ceremony was over, court
staffers escorted the justices back into
the building, holding umbrellas over
their heads. Striding ahead of the others,
O'Connor carried her own umbrella.
Copyright @ 2003 Bell & Howell
Information and Learning Company. All
rights reserved.
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Civil Liberties Were Term's Big Winner; Supreme Court's Moderate Rulings a
Surprise
The Washington Post
June 29, 2003
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court term that ended last
week will be remembered as the one in
which a court usually considered
conservative decided to play against
type. The court backed gay rights in an
opinion that essentially prohibits the
majority from imposing its notions of
sexual morality. It enshrined racial and
ethnic diversity in higher education as a
compelling goal of government policy,
one important enough to warrant an
exception to the usual race-neutral
constitutional rules. It let gender equality
in employment trump the sovereignty of
a state. And it delivered not one but two
stern rebukes to states over what justices
considered unfair procedures for
sentencing people to death.
The court even delivered a boost to the
Democratic Party, ruling that its strategy
of distributing black voters more evenly
during the redistricting process, to create
additional districts where Democrats
have a better chance of winning, as
blacks on the whole tend to vote
Democratic, does not violate the Voting
Rights Act.
As the court reeled off its final landmark
rulings last week, advocates of liberal
causes seemed almost stunned by the
string of victories they had been handed
by a group of justices who were put on
the bench mostly by Republican
presidents.
"You put it all together, and it's a strong
term for traditional civil rights," said
Steven Shapiro, legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union.
Yet in one crucial respect, this term was
consistent with past years that had
brought such conservative triumphs as
the 5-4 vote in Bush v. Gore. Whatever
ideological characterization may apply
to its decisions, this group of nine
justices, which has been in place longer
than any other nine-member court since
1823, is utterly confident in its own
wisdom and power vis-a-vis all other
governmental institutions, state and
federal.
"They go out and decide these great
national questions and don't feel
compunction about it," Yoo said. "It's
the same mindset that lets them do Bush
v. Gore. They see it as their duty."
The defining event of 2001-2002 term
was the court's 5-4 decision upholding
state-funded vouchers for religious
school education, which culminated a
long- term effort by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, a staunch
conservative, and seemed to underscore
his defining influence.
410
But this term, in addition to the victories
on gay rights, affirmative action and
states' rights, liberals also saw their
recent losing streak on property rights
reversed, as the court, by a 5-4 vote,
upheld a state program that funds legal
aid through accumulated fees on certain
trust accounts. Conservatives had
denounced it as a forced subsidy of left-
wing lawyers.
And, in a 9-0 opinion written by Justice
Clarence Thomas, the court eased the
requirements for proving some claims of
sex discrimination in employment.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor once again
emerged as the pivotal player among the
justices. Her moderate conservative vote
was indispensable to forming a majority.
In all 13 of this term's 5-4 cases,
O'Connor was in the majority. She
dissented only five times in the court's
81 decisions, according to figures
compiled by Washington attorney Tom
Goldstein, who referred to her, only half-
jokingly, as "the most powerful woman
in the history of the universe."
"If we didn't have a tradition of naming
courts after chief justices, this would be
the O'Connor court," said Washington
attorney Ron Klain, a top Clinton
administration aide.
Since her appointment by President
Ronald Reagan in 1981, O'Connor has
done her part to help conservatives build
a new doctrine of states' rights, limit
affirmative action and cut down on
death-row appeals. But this term
highlighted her role as a moderating
force among the court's conservatives.
She joined with the court's four liberals
Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer -- to put the brakes on
each of those conservative trends.
Most importantly, she wrote the 5-4
opinion upholding the University of
Michigan's law school admissions
policy, ruling that its use of race to bring
a "critical mass" of blacks, Latinos and
Native Americans to the campus without
specific quotas for minority students did
not unduly harm the rights of whites or
Asians.
O'Connor voted to allow state employees
to sue their employers for money
damages when their rights to time off for
illness or other family crises under the
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act are
violated. The ruling signaled the court
would give Congress more latitude to
define and prevent discrimination
against women than it has allowed in
cases of age and disability.
While the vote was 6-3, and Rehnquist
wrote the court's opinion, legal analysts
considered O'Connor's role critical. Once
she broke ranks with the usual five- vote
conservative block on the issue, the chief
justice may well have decided to join the
majority and assign the opinion to
himself, rather than permit the liberal
Stevens, who would have been the most
senior member of the majority, to
control the opinion-writing, analysts
said.
O'Connor also wrote the court's 7-2
opinion overturning the sentence of
Maryland death-row inmate Kevin
Wiggins, in a case notable both for its
emphasis on the importance of effective
legal counsel in capital cases -- an issue
O'Connor has highlighted in recent
public speeches -- and for reaffirming
federal court review as a check on state
criminal justice systems.
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In a separate 8-1 case, the justices
ordered lower courts to hear a Texas
death-row inmate's claim of racial bias
in jury selection, which the courts had
previously brushed off.
Legal analysts say that this performance
shows not only O'Connor's moderating
influence, but also how the "O'Connor
Court" functions as a rough barometer of
public opinion, particularly elite opinion.
Ostensibly insulated from political
currents by life tenure and the sheer
physical isolation of quasi-academic
chambers at the court's headquarters in
Washington, the justices nevertheless
incorporate the country's mood into their
rulings, sometimes openly, sometimes
not. That information reaches the court
in a variety of ways -- through the
media, from their own day-to-day
experiences and a regular infusion of
new young law clerks and, crucially, in
friend of the court briefs from interest
groups, which often document the real-
world consequences of potential rulings.
O'Connor -- a former Arizona politician
who travels widely for speaking
engagements and has noted the
importance of "common sense" in
judging -- seems to possess a particular
knack for rulings that translate the
American public's often contradictory
sentiments into workable, if not
necessarily elegant, law.
For example, the public appears to
oppose racial quotas, but also wants
racially integrated elite universities.
O'Connor's ruling in the Michigan law
school case -- and her concurrence in a
companion undergraduate admissions
case -- heavily influenced by the views
of high-ranking corporate, military,
educational and legal officials, offered a
way to get there.
The public is in no mood to abolish
capital punishment, but increasingly
nervous about whether innocent people
may be getting crushed in the wheels of
the death penalty system. O'Connor, in
the Wiggins case, drew on ideas from
the American Bar Association to
encourage states to provide better
lawyers to capital case defendants.
And with women's participation in the
workplace deeply embedded as an
American value, O'Connor ratified
Congress's authority to impose new anti-
gender discrimination rules on the states.
O'Connor's vote was not decisive in the
court's 6-3 decision to overturn Texas's
sodomy statute. She concurred in the
majority's judgment, citing a different
and, for O'Connor, characteristically
narrower constitutional rationale.
In that case, the lead was taken by the
court's other occasional Reagan-
appointed swing voter, Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy.
Kennedy's opinion, too, seemed not only
to lead the country into new
constitutional ground, but also to ratify
wider changes that had already taken
place in public attitudes toward
homosexuality. The last 50 years, he
wrote, "show an emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex."
This seemed evident in the views of the
justices themselves. Seven justices went
on record condemning Texas's statute --
412
including Thomas, who said he would
have voted to repeal it if he were a
legislator rather than a judge. Neither
Rehnquist nor Justice Antonin Scalia,
who bitterly dissented, ventured to say
explicitly that they support the Texas
law.
"These are cases that say less about the
direction of the court than the direction
of the country," the ACLU's Shapiro
said. "Very few Americans want to go
back to a world where great universities
are all white and the government is in
our bedrooms."
There were significant exceptions to the
liberal trend. The court upheld
California's law that metes out life
sentences to three-time felons. It said
that states can post the names of sex
offenders on the Internet without
investigating the danger that each
individual poses.
And a court that has recently been highly
protective of free speech upheld both a
Virginia ban on cross-burning and a
federal law requiring libraries to filter
out Internet pornography.
Still, the affirmative action and gay
rights cases set the tone, and the
disappointment at those rulings among
conservatives was palpable --
comparable, in its own way, to the
disgust liberals expressed with the court
after Bush v. Gore. The court's self-
conscious effort to incorporate modem
attitudes on race and sexuality into
constitutional doctrine was, to the right,
an unpardonable display of judicial
activism.
"The sodomy case is most discouraging
to people such as myself who continue
to fancy the notion that there is
something called law that is different
from politics," said Douglas Kmiec, a
Justice Department official during the
Reagan administration who is the
outgoing dean of the Catholic University
law school.
Though there were no retirements from
the court this term, the liberal victories
in key cases appeared to redouble
conservatives' determination to fight for
a like-minded choice if a vacancy does
occur during President George W.
Bush's tenure.
The fight will be especially bitter if the
seat vacated is O'Connor's. And it is a
battle that may be fiercest within the
administration itself. Republican
conservatives increasingly see White
House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales, a
leading candidate for the job, as a
moderate whose efforts to temper the
administration's views on affirmative
action are blamed by many on the right
for the result in the Michigan cases. But
the notion of scoring points with
Hispanic voters by appointing the first
Hispanic to the court remains attractive
to White House political operatives.
More than once over the last week
conservatives used a historical example
to illustrate why nominations to the high
court are so important to them: The 1987
Senate vote that rejected Robert Bork's
nomination to the court paved the way
for his replacement by last week's hero
of the gay rights movement, Kennedy.
Copyright 0 2003, The Washington Post
Co. All Rights Reserved
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At High Court, How They Rule Is a Matter of Opinion
Los Angeles Times
June 25, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON The Supreme Court, as
with many families, has some members
who believe in setting clear rules and
others who say the right action depends
on the circumstances.
Lawyers who practice before the court
talk about justices who are "rules"
people and others who are "balancers."
The court's decision Monday upholding
affirmative action offers a classic
example of the difference. Justice
Antonin Scalia is a rules person. He once
wrote a law review article titled: "The
Rule of Law Is the Law of Rules."
He relied on a familiar rule Monday. The
Constitution says the government may
not discriminate against any person "by
reason of their skin color," he says.
Therefore, any public program,
including a university's affirmative
action policy, is unconstitutional if it
treats people differently based on their
race.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, however,
is a balancer who strives for a fair result
in each case. For her, the dispute over
affirmative action was not a "yes" or
"no" question. The right outcome
depended on the facts and
circumstances, she reasoned.
Scalia's rigid rule would close the door
of opportunity for too many aspiring
black and Latino students, she said. But
O'Connor has never gone along with the
liberal justices who uphold affirmative
action generally as a type of "benign"
discrimination.
Instead, O'Connor announced a
balanced, middle approach. She voted to
approve the University of Michigan Law
School's use of race as one factor
weighing in favor of minority applicants,
but she voted to strike down the
university's undergraduate admissions
policy because race was too big a factor.
A "highly individual holistic review"
that weighs a student's race is
constitutional, O'Connor said. A
"mechanized selection" system that
assigns points based on a student's race
is not, she said.
Justice Clarence Thomas, like Scalia,
seems to prefer clear rules, and he joined
Scalia in saying that affirmative action is
unconstitutional, no matter how it is
practiced.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, like
O'Connor, is a balancer. He joined
O'Connor in both opinions Monday. He
voted to uphold the law school policy
because it weighs the race of applicants
fairly, but he voted to strike down the
undergraduate admissions policy
because it is too race-driven.
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Legal experts were left debating whether
Monday's opinions amounted to a
victory for principle, or for fuzziness.
Some admitted they could not easily
define the distinction between a school
that evaluates applicants with the goal of
enrolling a "critical mass" of minority
students, which was upheld, and an
admissions policy that uses a point scale
to enroll a reasonable percentage of
minority students.
"The difference is not all that clear. It is
a difference of degree," said Samuel
Issacharoff, a Columbia University law
professor.
A university policy that spells out rules
for evaluating minority applicants could
be challenged as unconstitutional, he
said. Yet, a university that does the
same, but obscures its actions, is
immune from challenge, he noted.
Stanford law professor Pamela Karlan
said she was pleased by Monday's
outcome, and the approach endorsed by
O'Connor. "Talking about [enrolling
enough minority students] is not
necessarily a good thing. That was also
one of the virtues of Justice [Lewis F.]
Powell's opinion in the Bakke case," she
said, referring to the landmark 1978 case
of Allan Bakke vs. the University of
California. "You can take race into
account, -but don't be too blatant about
it."
Former Solicitor General Walter
Dellinger said that in teaching his law
classes at Duke University, he used to
rail about the "logical flaws" in Powell's
opinion. If the University of California's
race-based admissions policy was
unconstitutional, as Powell said, why did
he urge colleges to adopt policies that
give preferences to minority applicants
as individuals?
"A quarter of a century later, I have the
maturity to see how profoundly wise that
opinion was," Dellinger wrote Tuesday
in a column for Slate magazine. He
praised O'Connor's opinion for its "basic
good sense." She had preserved
affirmative action for another
generation, yet rejected rigid point-
driven systems that make race the only
admissions factor.
Balderdash, responded Dahlia Lithwick,
Slate's legal correspondent. "O'Connor's
basic ends-justifies-the-means approach
to upholding the principle" fails the test
of "intellectual honesty," she wrote. "Her
use of all the catchwords -- 'individual
consideration' and 'flexible' and
'nonmechanical' -- all simply mean that
when programs give minorities a boost
informally, with a wink rather than out
in the open, these programs are
legitimate."
The debate is likely to go on for years.
Lawyers debated the Bakke decision for
decades before challenges to it moved
through the federal courts.
On Thursday, the court will wrap up its
term by issuing decisions in its five
remaining cases. They include a Texas
case that could be a landmark for the gay
rights movement.
Copyright 0 2003 The Los Angeles
Times
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Polls: Americans Say Court Is 'About Right'
The Washington Post
July 7, 2003
Charles Lane
It was more than a century ago that a
fictional Irish American rendered what
is, for some, still the definitive verdict
on the Supreme Court's actual degree of
insulation from politics. "[N]o matther
whether th' constitution follows th' flag
or not," Mr. Dooley, journalist Finley
Peter Dunne's Everyman, said in 1901,
"th' supreme coort follows th' iliction
returns."
Whether Mr. Dooley was right or not,
recent polling data about the Supreme
Court and the issues it decides suggest
that, though the court may now be
regarded as a somewhat more liberal
institution than it was before its
blockbuster rulings on race and
homosexuality, it remains a fairly
reliable weathervane of overall public
sentiment.
Fifty-one percent of 900 registered
voters queried by Fox News/Opinion
Dynamics at the end of the term agree
that the court is "in touch with what is
going on in the country." Only 38
percent say the court is "not in touch."
In its two most highly publicized rulings
of the term, the court let universities
consider race in admissions and struck
down the country's remaining state laws
criminalizing gay sex.
Thirty percent of those questioned in the
poll see the court as "too liberal," while
a plurality, 37 percent, say the court is
"about right" in its decisions. Twenty
percent say it is "too conservative."
That represents a shift to the left in the
public's perception of the court from a
Quinnipiac University poll conducted in
late February and early March. In that
poll, 19 percent saw the court as too
liberal, 46 percent said it was about
right, and 26 percent saw it as too right-
leaning.
But the current "about right" rating is in
line with other recent polls showing that,
even after its 5 to 4 decision in Bush v.
Gore (with which 52 percent of
Americans now agree, says the
Quinnipiac poll), the high court retains a
strong overall approval rating, usually in
the 55 to 60 percent range.
Also, some of the shift in perception of
the court could be accounted for by the
fact that the Quinnipiac poll's larger
sample of 1,448 adults was not limited to
registered voters, as the Fox poll was.
Fox reported that a 44 percent to 40
percent plurality (just one point outside
the poll's three-point margin of error)
disapproved of striking down Texas's
homosexual sodomy statute. But Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy seems to have
been right when he noted, in his majority
opinion in the Texas case, that
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Americans are growing more tolerant of
homosexuality and accepting of gays.
The Quinnipiac poll, taken before the
ruling, showed a 57 percent to 38
percent majority against the court's 1986
decision upholding a state's ban on gay
sex; Kennedy's opinion overruled that
decision.
In a 2000 Associated Press poll, solid
majorities favored permitting gay
partners to have legal rights to
inheritance, health insurance coverage
and Social Security benefits. In a 2000
Fox poll, 57 percent said that gay men
and lesbians should be allowed to serve
openly in the military.
And a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll
taken right after the court's ruling
showed the lowest majority against gay
marriage, 55 percent to 39 percent, since
that poll began asking the question in
1996.
So even if the court was in front of the
public on homosexuality, it was within
the mainstream.
A strong 63 percent to 24 percent
majority in the Fox poll objected to the
court's affirmative action ruling.
But on affirmative action, poll results are
notoriously dependent on how the
question is phrased. When Americans
are asked, as they were in the Fox poll,
whether they favor "allowing an
applicant's race to be a factor in college
admission procedures," the response is
usually strongly negative. However, on
the question, "Do you favor or oppose
affirmative action programs for racial
minorities?" a 49 percent to 43 percent
plurality favors such programs,
according to a June Gallup poll.
Perhaps most significantly for the court,
80 percent of Americans told an AP poll
earlier this year that it is very important
or somewhat important "for a college to
have a racially diverse student body."
The court's opinion hinged on the view
that race-conscious admissions are the
only way to preserve a measure of
campus integration,
Of the nine justices, middle-of-the-
roader Justice Sandra Day O'Connor --
the author of the court's affirmative
action decision -- tops the Fox poll's list
of who Americans "most admire or
agree with."
In the poll, 11 percent name her, almost
twice as many as the second-place
finisher, conservative icon Justice
Antonin Scalia.
Sixty-eight percent of those who
responded could not name any of the
justices.
Copyright D 2003, The Washington Post
Co. All Rights Reserved
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PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
Michael A. NEWDOW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
US CONGRESS; United States of America; William Jefferson Clinton, President
of the United States; State Of California; Elk Grove Unified School District;
David W. Gordon, Superintendent EGUSD; Sacramento City Unified School
District; Jim Sweeney, Superintendent SCUSD, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided March 14, 2002
Amended June 26, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted]
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
Michael Newdow appeals a judgment
dismissing his challenge to the
constitutionality of the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the
Flag. Newdow argues that the addition
of these words by a 1954 federal statute
to the previous version of the Pledge of
Allegiance (which made no reference to
God) and the daily recitation in the
classroom of the Pledge of Allegiance,
with the added words included, by his
daughter's public school teacher are
violations of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Newdow is an atheist whose daughter
attends public elementary school in the
Elk Grove Unified School District
("EGUSD") in California. In
accordance with state law and a school
district rule, EGUSD teachers begin each
school day by leading their students in a
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
("the Pledge"). The California Education
Code requires that public schools begin
each school day with "appropriate
patriotic exercises" and that "[tihe giving
of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag
of the United States of America shall
satisfy" this requirement. Cal.
Educ.Code § 52720 (1989) (hereinafter
"California statute").' To implement the
California statute, the school district that
Newdow's daughter attends has
promulgated a policy that states, in
pertinent part: "Each elementary school
1 The relevant portion of California Education
Code § 52720 reads:
In every public elementary school each day
during the school year at the beginning of the
first regularly scheduled class or activity period
at which the majority of the pupils of the school
normally begin the schoolday, there shall be
conducted appropriate patriotic exercises. The
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of
the United States of America shall satisfy the
requirements of this section.
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class [shall] recite the pledge of
allegiance to the flag once each day." 2
Newdow does not allege that his
daughter's teacher or school district
requires his daughter to participate in
reciting the Pledge.3 Rather, he claims
that his daughter is injured when she is
compelled to "watch and listen as her
state-employed teacher in her state-run
school leads her classmates in a ritual
proclaiming that there is a God, and that
our's [sic] is 'one nation under God.'"
Newdow's complaint in the district
court challenged the constitutionality,
under the First Amendment, of the 1954
Act, the California statute, and the
school district's policy requiring teachers
to lead willing students in recitation of
the Pledge. He sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, but did not seek
damages.
The school districts and their
superintendents (collectively, "school
district defendants") filed a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski held
a hearing at which the school district
defendants requested that the court rule
only on the constitutionality of the
Pledge, and defer any ruling on
sovereign immunity. The United States
Congress, the United States, and the
President of the United States
(collectively, "the federal defendants")
3 Compelling students to recite the Pledge was
held to be a First Amendment violation in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628
(1943)...
joined in the motion to dismiss filed by
the school district defendants. The
magistrate judge reported findings and a
recommendation; District Judge Edward
J. Schwartz approved the
recommendation and entered a judgment
of dismissal. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
C. Standing
Article III standing is a jurisdictional
issue. See United States v. Viltrakis,
108 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir.1997).
Accordingly, it "may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, including for
the first time on appeal." See A-Z
Intern. v. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187, 1190-
91 (9th Cir.1999). To satisfy standing
requirements, a plaintiff must prove that
"(1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.
Newdow has standing as a parent to
challenge a practice that interferes with
his right to direct the religious education
of his daughter. "Parents have a right to
direct the religious upbringing of their
children and, on that basis, have standing
to protect their right." Doe v. Madison
Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795
(9th Cir. 1999)
Newdow has standing to challenge the
EGUSD's policy and practice regarding
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the recitation of the Pledge because his
daughter is currently enrolled in
elementary school in the EGUSD.
However, Newdow has no standing to
challenge the SCUSD's policy and
practice because his daughter is not
currently a student there. The SCUSD
and its superintendent have not caused
Newdow or his daughter an "injury in
fact" that is "actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical." Laidlaw,
528 U.S. at 180...
The final question of standing relates to
the 1954 Act. Specifically, has Newdow
suffered an "injury in fact" that is "fairly
traceable" to the enactment of the 1954
Act? Id.
We begin our inquiry by noting the
general rule that the standing
requirements for an action brought under
the Establishment Clause are the same as
for any other action. Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 488-90...
While Valley Forge remains good law,
the Supreme Court in more recent
opinions has indirectly broadened the
notion of Establishment Clause standing
in public education cases by holding that
the mere enactment of a statute may
constitute an Establishment Clause
violation. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, ... the Court considered an
Establishment Clause challenge to an
Alabama statute that originally had
authorized a one-minute period of
silence in public schools "for
meditation," ... we may presume that in
Wallace the Court examined the
standing question before deciding the
merits, and that the Court determined
that the schoolchildren's parents had
standing to challenge the amended
Alabama statute.
Our reading of Wallace is supported by
Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, where the Court
upheld a facial challenge to a school
district's policy of permitting, but not
requiring, prayer initiated and led by a
student at high school football games.
Noting that "the Constitution also
requires that we keep in mind 'the
myriad, subtle ways in which the
Establishment Clause values can be
eroded,' " id. at 314, the Court held that
the "mere passage by the District of a
policy that has the purpose and
perception of government establishment
of religion," id., violated the
Establishment Clause. "[T]he simple
enactment of this policy, with the
purpose and perception of school
endorsement of student prayer, was a
constitutional violation." Id. at 316, 120
S.Ct. 2266 (emphasis added).
In Wallace and Santa Fe, the Court
looked at the language of each statute,
the context in which the statute was
enacted, and its legislative history to
determine that the challenged statute
caused an injury in violation of the
Establishment Clause. "We refuse to
turn a blind eye to the context in which
this policy arose, and that context quells
any doubt that this policy was
implemented with the purpose of
endorsing school prayer." Id. at 315, 120
S.Ct. 2266. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Wallace noted that
whether a statute actually conveys a
message of endorsement of religion is
"not entirely a question of fact .... The
relevant issue is whether an objective
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observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation
of the statute, would perceive it as state
endorsement of prayer in public
schools." 472 U.S. at 76, 105 S.Ct.
2479(O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment). In Santa Fe, "[t]he text and
history of this policy ... reinforce our
objective student's perception that the
prayer is, in actuality, encouraged by the
school." 530 U.S. at 308, 120 S.Ct.
2266. In evaluating the purpose of the
school district policy, the Court found
"most striking ... the evolution of the
current policy." Id. at 309. In Wallace,
a review of the legislative history led the
Court to conclude that enactment of the
amended statute "was not motivated by
any clearly secular purpose--indeed, the
statute had no secular purpose." 472 U.S.
at 56.
Operating within the above-described
legal landscape, we now turn to the
question initially posed, namely, does
Newdow have standing to challenge the
1954 Act? Initially, we note that the
1954 statute challenged by Newdow is
similar to the Alabama statute struck
down in Wallace. Neither statute works
the traditional type of "injury in fact"
that is implicated when a statute compels
or prohibits certain activity, nor do the
amendments brought about by these
statutes lend themselves to "as-applied"
constitutional review. Nevertheless, the
Court in Wallace, at least implicitly,
determined that the schoolchildren's
parents had standing to attack the
challenged statute. Moreover, the
legislative history of the 1954 Act shows
that the "under God" language was not
meant to sit passively in the federal code
unbeknownst to the public; rather, the
sponsors of the amendment knew about
and capitalized on the state laws and
school district rules that mandate
recitation of the Pledge. The
legislation's House sponsor,
Representative Louis C. Rabaut, testified
at the Congressional hearing that "the
children of our land, in the daily
recitation of the pledge in school, will be
daily impressed with a true
understanding of our way of life and its
origins," and this statement was
incorporated into the report of the House
Judiciary Committee. H.R.Rep. No. 83-
1693, at 3 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2341. Taken
within its context, the 1954 addendum
was designed to result in the recitation of
the words "under God" in school
classrooms throughout the land on a
daily basis, and therefore constituted as
much of an injury-in-fact as the policies
considered in Wallace and Santa Fe. As
discussed earlier, Newdow has standing
as a parent to challenge a practice that
interferes with his right to direct the
religious education of his daughter. The
mere enactment of the 1954 Act in its
particular context constitutes a religious
recitation policy that interferes with
Newdow's right to direct the religious
education of his daughter. Accordingly,
we hold that Newdow has standing to
challenge the 1954 Act.
D. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment
of religion," **** Over the last three
decades, the Supreme Court has used
three interrelated tests to analyze alleged
violations of the Establishment Clause in
the realm of public education: the three-
prong test set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602; the
"endorsement" test, first articulated by
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Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion in Lynch, and later adopted by a
majority of the Court in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573; and
the "coercion" test first used by the
Court in Lee.
... To survive the "Lemon test," the
government conduct in question (1) must
have a secular purpose, (2) must have a
principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3)
must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105. The
Supreme Court applied the Lemon test to
every Establishment case it decided
between 1971 and 1984, with the
exception of Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, the case upholding legislative
prayer. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 63,
105 S.Ct. 2479 (Powell, J., concurring).
In the 1984 Lynch case, which upheld
the inclusion of a nativity scene in a
city's Christmas display, Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in
order to suggest a "clarification" of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
465 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 1355
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor's "endorsement" test
effectively collapsed the first two prongs
of the Lemon test:
The Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community.
Government can run afoul of that
prohibition in two principal ways. One is
excessive entanglement with religious
institutions.... The second and more
direct infringement is government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.
Id. at 687-88, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
The Court formulated the "coercion
test" when it held unconstitutional the
practice of including invocations and
benedictions in the form of
"nonsectarian" prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies. Lee, 505 U.S. at
599, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Declining to
reconsider the validity of the Lemon test,
the Court in Lee found it unnecessary to
apply the Lemon test to find the
challenged practices unconstitutional.
Id. at 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Rather, it
relied on the principle that "at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise to act in a way
which establishes a state religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so." Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)....
Finally, in its most recent school prayer
case, the Supreme Court applied the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and
the coercion test to strike down a school
district's policy of permitting student-led
"invocations" before high school football
games. See Santa Fe,...
We are free to apply any or all of the
three tests, and to invalidate any measure
that fails any one of them. The
Supreme Court has not repudiated
Lemon; in Santa Fe, it found that the
application of each of the three tests
provided an independent ground for
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invalidating the statute at issue in that
case; and in Lee, the Court invalidated
the policy solely on the basis of the
coercion test. Although this court has
typically applied the Lemon test to
alleged Establishment Clause violations,
see, e.g., Am. Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City
and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d
1114, 1120-21(9th Cir. 2002), we are not
required to apply it if a practice fails one
of the other tests. Nevertheless, for
purposes of completeness, we will
analyze the school district policy and the
1954 Act under all three tests.
We first consider whether the 1954 Act
and the EGUSD's policy of teacher-led
Pledge recitation survive the
endorsement test. The magistrate judge
found that "the ceremonial reference to
God in the pledge does not convey
endorsement of particular religious
beliefs." Supreme Court precedent does
not support that conclusion.
In the context of the Pledge, the
statement that the United States is a
nation "under God" is an endorsement of
religion. It is a profession of a religious
belief, namely, a belief in monotheism.
The recitation that ours is a nation
"under God" is not a mere
acknowledgment that many Americans
believe in a deity. Nor is it merely
descriptive of the undeniable historical
significance of religion in the founding
of the Republic. Rather, the phrase
"one nation under God" in the context of
the Pledge is normative. To recite the
Pledge is not to describe the United
States; instead, it is to swear allegiance
to the values for which the flag stands:
unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and--
since 1954--monotheism. The text of
the official Pledge, codified in federal
law, impermissibly takes a position with
respect to the purely religious question
of the existence and identity of God. A
profession that we are a nation "under
God" is identical, for Establishment
Clause purposes, to a profession that we
are a nation "under Jesus," a nation
"under Vishnu," a nation "under Zeus,"
or a nation "under no god," because none
of these professions can be neutral with
respect to religion. "[T]he government
must pursue a course of complete
neutrality toward religion." Wallace,
472 U.S. at 60, 105 S.Ct. 2479.
Furthermore, the school district's
practice of teacher-led recitation of the
Pledge aims to inculcate in students a
respect for the ideals set forth in the
Pledge, and thus amounts to state
endorsement of these ideals. Although
students cannot be forced to participate
in recitation of the Pledge, the school
district is nonetheless conveying a
message of state endorsement of a
religious belief when it requires public
school teachers to recite, and lead the
recitation of, the current form of the
Pledge.
The Pledge, as currently codified, is an
impermissible government endorsement
of religion because it sends a message to
unbelievers "that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct.
1355(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy, in his dissent in Allegheny,
agreed:
[B]y statute, the Pledge of Allegiance to
the Flag describes the United States as
'one nation under God.' To be sure, no
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one is obligated to recite this phrase,
but it borders on sophistry to suggest
that the reasonable atheist would not feel
less than a full member of the political
community every time his fellow
Americans recited, as part of their
expression of patriotism and love for
country, a phrase he believed to be false.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672, 109 S.Ct.
3086 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, the policy and the Act fail
the endorsement test.
Similarly, the policy and the Act fail the
coercion test. Just as in Lee, the policy
and the Act place students in the
untenable position of choosing between
participating in an exercise with
religious content or protesting. As the
Court observed with respect to the
graduation prayer in that case: "What to
most believers may seem nothing more
than a reasonable request that the
nonbeliever respect their religious
practices, in a school context may appear
to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an
attempt to employ the machinery of the
State to enforce a religious orthodoxy."
Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 112 S.Ct. 2649.
Although the defendants argue that the
religious content of "one nation under
God" is minimal, to an atheist or a
believer in certain non-Judeo- Christian
religions or philosophies, it may
reasonably appear to be an attempt to
enforce a "religious orthodoxy" of
monotheism, and is therefore
impermissible. The coercive effect of
this policy is particularly pronounced in
the school setting given the age and
impressionability of schoolchildren, and
their understanding that they are
required to adhere to the norms set by
their school, their teacher and their
fellow students. Furthermore, under
Lee, the fact that students are not
required to participate is no basis for
distinguishing Barnette from the case at
bar because, even without a recitation
requirement for each child, the mere fact
that a pupil is required to listen every
day to the statement "one nation under
God" has a coercive effect. The
coercive effect of the Act is apparent
from its context and legislative history,
which indicate that the Act was designed
to result in the daily recitation of the
words "under God" in school
classrooms. President Eisenhower,
during the Act's signing ceremony,
stated: "From this day forward, the
millions of our school children will daily
proclaim in every city and town, every
village and rural schoolhouse, the
dedication of our Nation and our people
to the Almighty." 100 Cong. Rec. 8618
(1954) (statement of Sen. Ferguson
incorporating signing statement of
President Eisenhower). Therefore, the
policy and the Act fail the coercion
test.o
Finally we turn to the Lemon test, the
first prong of which asks if the
challenged policy has a secular purpose.
Historically, the primary purpose of the
10 In Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th
Cir.1970), this court, without reaching the
question of standing, upheld the inscription of
the phrase "In God We Trust" on our coins and
currency. But cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 722, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority's holding leads logically to the
conclusion that "In God We Trust" is an
unconstitutional affirmation of belief). In any
event, Aronow is distinguishable in many ways
from the present case. The most important
distinction is that school children are not coerced
into reciting or otherwise actively led to
participating in an endorsement of the markings
on the money in circulation.
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1954 Act was to advance religion, in
conflict with the first prong of the
Lemon test. The federal defendants "do
not dispute that the words 'under God'
were intended" "to recognize a Supreme
Being," at a time when the government
was publicly inveighing against atheistic
communism. Nonetheless, the federal
defendants argue that the Pledge must be
considered as a whole when assessing
whether it has a secular purpose. They
claim that the Pledge has the secular
purpose of "solemnizing public
occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition
of what is worthy of appreciation in
society." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693, 104
S.Ct. 1355.
The flaw in defendants' argument is that
it looks at the text of the Pledge "as a
whole," and glosses over the 1954 Act.
The problem with this approach is
apparent when one considers the Court's
analysis in Wallace. There, the Court
struck down Alabama's statute
mandating a moment of silence for
"meditation or voluntary prayer" not
because the final version "as a whole"
lacked a primary secular purpose, but
because the state legislature had
amended the statute specifically and
solely to add the words "or voluntary
prayer." 472 U.S. at 59-60, 105 S.Ct.
2479.
By analogy to Wallace, we apply the
purpose prong of the Lemon test to the
amendment that added the words "under
God" to the Pledge, not to the Pledge in
its final version. As was the case with
the amendment to the Alabama statute in
Wallace, the legislative history of the
1954 Act reveals that the Act's sole
purpose was to advance religion, in
order to differentiate the United States
from nations under communist rule.
"[T]he First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion." Id. at 56, 105 S.Ct.
2479 (citations omitted) (applying the
Lemon test). As the legislative history of
the 1954 Act sets forth:
At this moment of our history the
principles underlying our American
Government and the American way of
life are under attack by a system whose
philosophy is at direct odds with our
own. Our American Government is
founded on the concept of the
individuality and the dignity of the
human being. Underlying this concept is
the belief that the human person is
important because he was created by
God and endowed by Him with certain
inalienable rights which no civil
authority may usurp. The inclusion of
God in our pledge therefore would
further acknowledge the dependence of
our people and our Government upon the
moral directions of the Creator. At the
same time it would serve to deny the
atheistic and materialistic concepts of
communism with its attendant
subservience of the individual.
H.R.Rep. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339,
2340. This language reveals that the
purpose of the 1954 Act was to take a
position on the question of theism,
namely, to support the existence and
moral authority of God, while
"deny[ing] ... atheistic and materialistic
concepts." Id. Such a purpose runs
counter to the Establishment Clause,
which prohibits the government's
endorsement or advancement not only of
one particular religion at the expense of
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other religions, but also of religion at the
expense of atheism.
[T]he Court has unambiguously
concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First
Amendment embraces the right to select
any religious faith or none at all. This
conclusion derives support not only from
the interest in respecting the individual's
freedom of conscience, but also from the
conviction that religious beliefs worthy
of respect are the product of a free and
voluntary choice by the faithful, and
from recognition of the fact that the
political interest in forestalling
intolerance extends beyond intolerance
among Christian sects-- or even
intolerance among "religions"--to
encompass intolerance of the disbeliever
and the uncertain.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-54, 105 S.Ct.
2479.
In language that attempts to prevent
future constitutional challenges, the
sponsors of the 1954 Act expressly
disclaimed a religious purpose. "This is
not an act establishing a religion.... A
distinction must be made between the
existence of a religion as an institution
and a belief in the sovereignty of God.
The phrase 'under God' recognizes only
the guidance of God in our national
affairs." H.R.Rep. No. 83- 1693, at 3
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2339, 2341-42. This alleged distinction
is irrelevant for constitutional purposes.
The Act's affirmation of "a belief in the
sovereignty of God" and its recognition
of "the guidance of God" are
endorsements by the government of
religious beliefs. The Establishment
Clause is not limited to "religion as an
institution"; this is clear from cases such
as Santa Fe, where the Court struck
down student-initiated and student-led
prayer at high school football games.
530 U.S. at 310-16, 120 S.Ct. 2266. The
Establishment Clause guards not only
against the establishment of "religion as
an institution," but also against the
endorsement of religious ideology by the
government. Because the Act fails the
purpose prong of Lemon, we need not
examine the other prongs. Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-14, 91 S.Ct. 2105.
Similarly, the school district policy also
fails the Lemon test. Although it
survives the first prong of Lemon
because, as even Newdow concedes, the
school district had the secular purpose of
fostering patriotism in enacting the
policy, the policy fails the second prong.
As explained by this court in Kreisner v.
City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 782(9th
Cir. 1993), and by the Supreme Court in
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 390, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 87
L.Ed.2d 267(1985), the second Lemon
prong asks "whether the challenged
government action is sufficiently likely
to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as
a disapproval, of their individual
religious choices." Ball, 473 U.S. at
390, 105 S.Ct. 3216. Given the age and
impressionability of schoolchildren, as
discussed above, particularly within the
confined environment of the classroom,
the policy is highly likely to convey an
impermissible message of endorsement
to some and disapproval to others of
their beliefs regarding the existence of a
monotheistic God. Therefore the policy
fails the effects prong of Lemon, and
fails the Lemon test. In sum, both the
policy and the Act fail the Lemon test as
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well as the endorsement and coercion
tests.
In conclusion, we hold that (1) the 1954
Act adding the words "under God" to the
Pledge, and (2) EGUSD's policy and
practice of teacher-led recitation of the
Pledge, with the added words included,
violate the Establishment Clause. The
judgment of dismissal is vacated with
respect to these two claims, and the
cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with our holding.
Plaintiff is to recover costs on this
appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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'Under God' Underdog?
Legal Times
06-23-2003
Tony Mauro
The case of United States v. Newdow, No. 02-
1574, is challenging enough for the Supreme
Court.
The issue, whether the words "under God"
render the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional
under the First Amendment, has already divided
the nation. But with the case comes the
respondent: Michael Newdow of Elk Grove,
Calif., who first challenged the Pledge on behalf
of his public school student daughter -- and who
promises to make the case even more tricky if
the Supreme Court decides to grant review.
In a filing with the high court later this week,
Newdow says, he plans to make it clear that he
wants to take on the Supreme Court both pro se
and pro hac vice -- joining the extremely small
club of high court advocates who are not
members of the Supreme Court bar but who
argue their own cases nonetheless.
On top of that, Newdow plans at a later date to
take the rare step of asking that Justice Antonin
Scalia recuse himself in the case because of
widely reported statements he made in January
indicating that only "democratic" change could
take the words "under God" out of the Pledge --
presumably meaning action by Congress, not
the Supreme Court.
"I think I am highly qualified to argue this case.
There is no one who knows this case better than
me," says Newdow, who notes that he has
written every brief and argued every minute of
his case so far. "There may be people who know
the legal issues better, but I needed to get an
atheist to argue this. I want me."
Newdow's insistence about pressing his own
case before the Supreme Court is causing
discomfort among some of his natural allies.
Both the American Civil Liberties Union and
People for the American Way are staying on the
sidelines until the high court acts. Only
Americans United for Separation of Church and
State is expected to file in the case at the
certiorari stage. While some civil liberties
lawyers have discussed the case with Newdow,
he is not accepting substantive help.
"He's in over his head, but he won't let anyone
else take it over," says one civil liberties activist
who is monitoring the case. "A lot of us would
breathe a sigh of relief if the case would just go
away. It's a no-win situation."
In press reports last year, Newdow was usually
identified as a physician. But he has also been
licensed by the California State Bar since July
2002. He says he is a 1988 graduate of the
University of Michigan Law School.
To be a member of the Supreme Court bar, a
lawyer must have been a state bar member for
three years. Supreme Court bar membership is
not a prerequisite for filing a petition pro se, but
it is for a lawyer who wants to argue a case --
unless he or she wins admission pro hac vice.
The Court is rarely asked to admit someone this
way, but when it is, it usually says yes, unless it
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appears to the Court that the lawyer has not
been connected to the case for very long.
Sometimes, freshly minted members of the
solicitor general's office need pro hac vice
admission in order to be allowed to argue before
the Court.
What makes Newdow's plan especially unusual
is that he is his own client, so he will also be
filing pro se. In the most recent instances of pro
se representation, the 1998 case Lunding v. New
York Tax Appeals Tribunal and last year's
Christopher v. Harbury, both Christopher
Lunding and Jennifer Harbury were already
members of the Supreme Court bar.
Incidentally, Lunding won and Harbury lost.
And the general consensus among Court-
watchers is that Harbury did not help herself by
arguing the highly emotional case involving the
Central Intelligence Agency's role in the death
of her husband, a Guatemalan rebel leader.
Emotion is never far away for Newdow either.
Solicitor General Theodore Olson's brief
challenges Newdow's standing in the case,
because he is the noncustodial parent of his
daughter. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
said Newdow had standing nonetheless.
When asked about the standing issue in a phone
interview, Newdow angrily launched into an
indictment of the "insane and grossly
unconstitutional family law system" that
resulted in his loss of custody. "I am a terrific
father, and yet I am the only person in the world
who is forbidden to see her -- except every two
weeks."
According to Newdow, the custody battle has
cost him more than $100,000, much of which
has gone to pay attorney fees for his daughter's
mother. (Newdow says he and the mother,
Sandra Banning, never married.) Banning's
Sacramento lawyer, Dianne Fetzer, did not
return phone calls seeking comment.
In any event, Newdow says he expects to regain
custody of his daughter this summer, so that
standing will not be an issue. But if it still is, he
thinks he can achieve standing as a taxpayer and
as a parent who still has a role in making
decisions about his daughter.
Asked if the emotion of the custody battle will
hamper his advocacy on the Pledge issue,
Newdow said, "You're allowed to have passion
at the Supreme Court."
On the merits of the case, Newdow is also
taking an unusual step. His filing this week will
respond to the government's certiorari petition,
which asks the Court to review the controversial
ruling of the 9th Circuit declaring the Pledge
unconstitutional.
Ordinarily, respondents oppose review, but
Newdow will acquiesce, because he, too,
objects to the 9th Circuit ruling. In its original
June 2002 ruling, the 9th Circuit said the 1954
congressional enactment including the words
"under God" was unconstitutional, as was the
Elk Grove School District's teacher-led
recitation of the Pledge. But the court amended
its ruling in February to limit its scope to the
school district's use of the Pledge. On the
broader issue of the constitutionality of the
Pledge, the appeals court remanded for further
proceedings. Newdow challenges the narrowing
of the decision, so he, too, wants the high court
to grant review.
Proponents of the government's position are
viewing Newdow's unusual tactics with
amusement and concern.
Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of the American
Center for Law and Justice, who wrote a brief in
the case for some members of Congress, says he
understands Newdow's decision to press the
litigation himself. "It's his right to take the
case," he says. Sekulow adds that he believes
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the high court will grant cert by early fall: "'d
be stunned if they didn't."
But he also thinks the standing issue is crucial,
and could give the justices an "easy out" if they
want to avoid the contentious Pledge debate.
Since the question of standing has such personal
dimensions for Newdow, Sekulow says he, like
others, wonders if it is wise for Newdow to
argue on his own.
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US URGES SUPREME COURT TO KEEP 'UNDER GOD' IN PLEDGE 'RELIGIOUS
HERITAGE' CITED BY ASHCROFT IN APPEAL OF RULING
The Boston Globe
May 1, 2003
Lyle Denniston, Globe Correspondent
WASHINGTON The Bush administration,
vowing to "vigorously defend" childrens' right
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance as now
written, urged the Supreme Court yesterday to
uphold the constitutionality of the pledge with
the phrase "under God" included.
The administration's appeal to the Supreme
Court challenges a federal appeals court
decision in February barring public school
children in a California community from
reciting the pledge as long as "under God" is a
part of it.
Justice Department lawyers argued that the
pledge is being recited as written everywhere
else in the country, and it "cannot serve its
purpose of unifying and commonly celebrating
the national identity unless it is one Pledge with
one content for all citizens at all points in their
lives."
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court will act
on the appeal during the current term, scheduled
to end before July 1. The action is likely to
occur when the court opens a new term in early
October.
The new appeal contended that the issue of the
pledge's constitutionality is already a settled
one, even though the Supreme Court has never
had a case directly testing its validity.
Department attorneys, however, said that at least
two opinions of the court, and statements in
various opinions by as many as 12 justices over
several years, show that "the Pledge of
Allegiance is constitutional."
Announcing the appeal, Attorney General John
D. Ashcroft said: "Our religious heritage has
been recognized and celebrated for hundreds of
years in the national motto [In God We Trust],
national anthem, Declaration of Independence,
and Gettysburg Address."
The decision nullifying the pledge as written
when recited by public school children was
issued by the US Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco. It applied its
ruling only to the school district where it had
been challenged, in Elk Grove, Calif., a suburb
of Sacramento. After nullifying the recitation,
the appeals court put its decision on hold until
the Supreme Court could rule.
The Elk Grove school district is expected to
file a separate appeal defending the pledge in
the next few days, according to spokesman Jim
Elliott.
The pledge's inclusion of the phrase "one
nation under God" was challenged by Michael
A. Newdow, an atheist parent of a child in the
Elk Grove schools. The appeals court ruled that
he had a right to make the challenge to protect
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his right to teach his views about religion to his
daughter.
The Justice Department, while urging the
Supreme Court to uphold the pledge, also
argued that the court could avoid facing that
issue by ruling that Newdow had no right to
bring his challenge - a ruling that would nullify
the appeals court ruling, and leave the pledge as
is.
The department said it was defending the
pledge in general, and also specifically because
it is recited every day in schools that the
military operates for the children of military
members. Four of those schools are within the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.
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WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL? THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOD IN THE
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
Summer, 2003
John E. Thompson
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
In June 2002, a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional the
federal statute inserting "under God" into the
Pledge of Allegiance, as well as a California
school district's policy requiring teacher-led
recitation of the Pledge.
The Pledge of Allegiance was written in
1892 by a socialist Baptist minister. As
codified by Congress in 1942, the Pledge of
Allegiance read: "I pledge allegiance to the
flag of the United States of America and to
the Republic for which it stands, one Nation
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
Congress amended the law in 1954 by
adding the phrase "under God" after the
word "Nation." According to the
amendment's congressional sponsors, its
purpose was to distinguish America from
atheistic communism, affirm the nation as a
religious one, and infuse children with the
belief that the United States is under God.
California law mandates that the state's
public schools start each school day with
"appropriate patriotic exercises" and
provides that the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance satisfies this requirement.9 To
implement this law, the Elk Grove Unified
9 Cal. Educ. Code § 52720 (Deering 2001).
School District adopted a policy requiring
that "[e]ach elementary school class [shall]
recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag
once each day." The daughter of the
plaintiff, Michael Newdow, attended an Elk
Grove elementary school, where her teacher
led her class in reciting the Pledge as
codified in federal law.
Newdow filed suit in the Eastern District of
California challenging the constitutionality
of the federal statute, the California statute,
and the school district policy. He did not
claim that his daughter was required to
recite the Pledge.13 He did claim, however,
that his daughter was injured when she was
forced to "watch and listen as her state-
employed teacher in her state-run school
[led] her classmates in a ritual proclaiming
that there is a God, and that our's [sic] is 'one
nation under God."' The school district
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, in which the United States joined.
The district court granted the motion to
dismiss, and Newdow appealed the
1 Id. Such a requirement, of course, would directly
violate the holding of West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding
that forcing students to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance violated the students' free speech rights
under the First Amendment).
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dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
On appeal, a two-judge majority of the
three-judge Ninth Circuit panel ruled both
the federal law and the school district policy
unconstitutional under the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. The
majority noted that the Supreme Court had
used three different tests to assess
Establishment Clause challenges: (1) the
three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman; 20
(2) the endorsement test first articulated in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly2 and later adopted by a majority
in County of Allegheny v. ACLU;22 and (3)
the coercion test upon which the Court
relied in Lee v. Weisman.23 Since the
Supreme Court continues to use all three
tests, the panel felt "free to apply any or all
of the three tests, and to invalidate any
measure that fails any one of them." For the
sake of completeness, the panel chose to
analyze the claims under all three tests.
Turning first to the endorsement test, the
majority found the federal law's inclusion of
"under God" in the Pledge, as well as the
school district's recitation policy, to be
endorsements of religion. The court rejected
the notion that the phrase was merely a
description of the historical importance of
religion in the United States or an
acknowledgement that many Americans
believe in God. Instead, the court found the
20 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principle or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion ...; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."').
21 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
2 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
23 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
Pledge's statement that the United States is
"under God" to be a profession of a specific
religious belief--monotheism. The majority
stated that the Pledge takes a position with
regard to a fundamental religious question,
whether God exists, in contravention of the
principle of government neutrality toward
religion. The panel cited West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, in which
the Supreme Court emphasized that the
Pledge was not merely descriptive, but
rather normative and ideological. "To recite
the Pledge is ... to swear allegiance to the
values for which the flag stands: unity,
indivisibility, liberty, justice, and--since
1954--monotheism."
Applying the language of Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test, the panel
found that the Pledge sends a message to
non-believers "that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community." The panel agreed
with Justice Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny,
that "it borders on sophistry to suggest that
the reasonable atheist would not feel less
than a full member of the political
community every time his fellow Americans
recited, as part of their expression of
patriotism and love for country, a phrase he
believed to be false."
The panel then found that the Act and the
policy violated the coercion test. The panel
relied heavily on Lee v. Weisman, in which
the Supreme Court struck down a graduation
prayer as coercive even though students
were not required to pray along. As in Lee,
the recitation of the Pledge puts "students in
the untenable position of choosing between
30 319 U.S. 624. For a summary of the holding of this
opinion, see supra note 13.
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participating in an exercise with religious
content or protesting." The Supreme Court
in Lee, employing a broad concept of
coercion, held that "the State may not,
consistent with the Establishment Clause,
place primary and secondary school children
in this position." Like the prayer in Lee, the
majority felt that the Pledge of Allegiance
may appear to the non- believer to be "an
attempt to enforce a 'religious orthodoxy' of
monotheism." Lee is especially apropos
because, like Newdow, it involved
schoolchildren, whom the Supreme Court
had found particularly susceptible to
government coercion. As for the federal act,
the panel found that it too had a coercive
effect--its context and history showed that
Congress intended it to lead to the recitation
by schoolchildren of "under God" as part of
the Pledge. President Eisenhower announced
upon signing the bill, "From this day
forward, the millions of our school children
will daily proclaim in every city and town,
every village and rural school-house, the
dedication of our Nation and our people to
the Almighty."
Turning finally to the Lemon test, the
Ninth Circuit panel first found that the
federal law violated the test's "purpose"
prong. In defense of the Pledge statute, the
United States had urged the court to
recognize that the Pledge of Allegiance as a
whole had secular purposes, including the
solemnization of public occasions. The
court, however, concluded that the proper
focus was on the 1954 Act alone (inserting
"under God"), concluding that its "sole
purpose was to advance religion .." The
panel cited the House Report on the 1954
act, which included the statement: 'The
inclusion of God in our pledge therefore
would further acknowledge the dependence
of our people and our Government upon the
moral directions of the Creator. At the same
time it would serve to deny the atheistic and
materialistic concepts of communism with
its attendant subservience of the individual."
The school district's recitation policy, on
the other hand, did have a secular purpose:
to foster patriotism. he panel, however,
found that despite the secular purpose, the
policy had the impermissible effect of
promoting religion, and thus it failed
Lemon's second prong. Given the
impressionability of schoolchildren and the
confined school environment, the majority
found the policy "highly likely to convey an
impermissible message of endorsement to
some and disapproval to others of their
beliefs regarding the existence of a
monotheistic God."
Judge Fernandez dissented from the panel's
Establishment Clause holdings. He declined
to apply any of the specific Supreme Court
tests cited by the majority or to lay out in
depth any particular theory of the religion
clauses, dismissing such tests and concepts
as "legal world abstractions and
ruminations." Instead, his dissent relied
primarily on the assertion that any harm
caused by the Pledge's religious language is
so "miniscule," "de minimis," or "picayune
at most," that there was no constitutional
violation. In support of this proposition,
Judge Fernandez pointed to relevant dicta in
five Supreme Court cases.5 3  He also
Id. at 613 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). These various majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions were joined over
the years by Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Harlan,
Brennan, White, Goldberg, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id.
at 614 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The following opinions cited by
Fernandez suggested approval of the words 'under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, at least to some
extent: Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 672-73
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
78 n.5 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); and Lynch,
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expressed concern that the majority's
analysis would lead to the invalidation of
"God Bless America," "America the
Beautiful," the fourth stanzas of both "The
Star Spangled Banner" and "My Country
'Tis of Thee," and references to God on
currency.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Newdow
quickly provoked significant criticism.
United States Senators and Representatives
took to the floors of their respective
chambers to decry the ruling. The Senate
unanimously approved a resolution
denouncing the decision. The House
approved a similar resolution by a vote of
416 to 3.57 On the same day that the Ninth
Circuit issued its opinion, President Bush
called it "ridiculous," House Majority Whip
Tom DeLay deemed it "sad" and "absurd,"
and Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle
said it was "nuts." Senator John Edwards
called the opinion "wrong," and Senator
Robert Byrd called the judges in the
Newdow majority "stupid." Major
newspapers also criticized the decision.
In an unusual move, the day after its
decision, the panel stayed the enforcement
465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Fernandez
could also have included: Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 639 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); and Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 450 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, one of the opinions cited, Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion in Allegheny, puts to
the side the question of the constitutionality of
'nonsectarian references to religion" such as the
Pledge; it did not express a view either way.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-03.
56 S. Res. 292, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S6105
(2002).
57 H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC.
H4135 (2002).
of its decision pending appeal. The U.S.
Department of Justice petitioned the Ninth
Circuit to rehear the case en banc, as did the
Elk Grove school district. Meanwhile, on
December 4, 2002, the panel rejected a
motion by the student's mother to strip
Newdow of standing on the ground that the
mother had sole legal custody.
B. Newdow II
On February 28, 2003, the Ninth Circuit
panel amended its decision, and the full
circuit declined to rehear the case en banc.65
The amended decision (Newdow II) is
significantly narrower than the panel's June
2002 opinion.
First, the panel declined to reach the issue
of whether the federal Pledge of Allegiance
statute is unconstitutional. The panel noted
that the district court had not reached the
issue, finding only that the school district
policy was constitutional. Given its finding
that Newdow was entitled to injunctive
relief against recitation of the Pledge, and
given the rules for granting declaratory
relief, the Ninth Circuit panel doubted that
the district court would have granted the
declaratory relief sought by Newdow
regarding the 1954 Act. On remand,
however, Newdow could still ask the district
court to declare the federal statute
unconstitutional, in addition to issuing the
injunction against the school district policy.
Second, the Ninth Circuit's amended
opinion rested only on the coercion test in
finding that the school district's recitation
policy violated the Establishment Clause.
While the panel still felt free to apply any of
the Supreme Court's three tests, it
65 Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow II), No. 00-
16423, 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003).
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emphasized that it was unnecessary to apply
the Lemon or endorsement tests, once the
panel found that the policy was
impermissibly coercive. Thus, the panel
abandoned its original strategy of
completeness in order to focus on the
ground it presumably felt was the strongest.
The amended opinion, however, did not
simply discard its previous analysis under
the endorsement and Lemon tests, nor did it
completely ignore the 1954 Act. Rather, it
folded much of this analysis into its coercion
holding. For example, the amended decision
still argues that the statement that the nation
is "under God" expresses a belief in
monotheism, and that the Pledge has a
normative and ideological character, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Barnette.
These arguments were part of Newdow I's
endorsement holding. The opinion also cites
the legislative history of the 1954 Act to
bolster its finding of coercion, 74 whereas
Newdow I had considered this history in
applying Lemon's purpose prong to the
federal statute.
The amended opinion also addressed the
criticism that the original opinion ignored
Supreme Court dicta regarding the
constitutionality of the Pledge. The panel
focused on the two times that a Supreme
Court majority opinion specifically
addressed the Pledge of Allegiance in dicta--
in Lynch v. Donnelly and in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU. According to the
panel's majority, in neither case did the
Court suggest it was permissible for schools
to lead recitations of the Pledge.
At the same time that the Ninth Circuit
ordered Newdow I amended, it announced--
74 Newdow II, 2003 WL 554742, at *20 (concluding
that Congress and the President intended the religious
words to be recited by schoolchildren).
without opinion--that the petition for
rehearing en banc had failed to gain the
support of a majority of the full circuit court.
Nine judges dissented from the denial of en
banc review; there were two dissenting
opinions. Judge McKeown's one-paragraph
opinion simply stated that the case was
sufficiently important to be reheard en
banc. 79 Judge O'Scannlain, writing for six
judges, issued a scathing attack on the
Newdow II decision, which he considered a
barely modified version of Newdow I.8o
Reviewing the Supreme Court's school
prayer cases, O'Scannlain concluded that the
Supreme Court had barred only religious
acts (such as prayer) in public schools, but
that it had not barred mere references to
religion, a category that includes the Pledge
of Allegiance. The panel's decision
"contradicts our 200-year history and
tradition of patriotic references to God" and
conflicts with the Founders' understanding.
O'Scannlain feared that Newdow II would
forbid recitation of the Constitution,
Declaration of Independence, Gettysburg
Address, and National Motto, in addition to
singing the National Anthem, since they also
contain religious references; he also feared it
would forbid observation of the national
holidays of Thanksgiving and Christmas.
The Elk Grove School District quickly
announced that it would appeal Newdow II
to the Supreme Court. On March 4, 2003,
the Ninth Circuit stayed its decision for
ninety days; if the school district files an
appeal with the Supreme Court within the
ninety days, the stay will be extended until
the Court acts on the case.
7 Newdow II, 2003 WL 554742, at *13-*14
(McKeown, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at *3-*13 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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SCHROEDER, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a permanent
injunction entered to protect First
Amendment rights. The order enjoins the
federal government from either revoking a
physician's license to prescribe controlled
substances or conducting an investigation of
a physician that might lead to such
revocation, where the basis for the
government's action is solely the physician's
professional "recommendation" of the use of
medical marijuana. The district court's order
and accompanying opinion are at Conant v.
McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174 (N.D.Cal.
Sept.7, 2000). The history of the litigation
demonstrates that the injunction is not
intended to limit the government's ability to
investigate doctors who aid and abet the
actual distribution and possession of
marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The
government has not provided any empirical
evidence to demonstrate that this injunction
interferes with or threatens to interfere with
any legitimate law enforcement activities.
Nor is there any evidence that the similarly
phrased preliminary injunction that preceded
this injunction, Conant v. McCaffrey, 172
F.R.D. 681 (N.D.Cal.1997), which the
government did not appeal, interfered with
law enforcement. The district court, on the
other hand, explained convincingly when it
entered both the earlier preliminary
injunction and this permanent injunction,
how the government's professed
enforcement policy threatens to interfere
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with expression protected by the First
Amendment. We therefore affirm.
I. The Federal Marijuana Policy
The federal government promulgated its
policy in 1996 in response to initiatives
passed in both Arizona and California
decriminalizing the use of marijuana for
limited medical purposes and immunizing
physicians from prosecution under state law
for the "recommendation or approval" of
using marijuana for medical purposes. See
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5. The
federal policy declared that a doctor's
'action of recommending or prescribing
Schedule I controlled substances is not
consistent with the 'public interest' (as that
phrase is used in the federal Controlled
Substances Act)" and that such action would
lead to revocation of the physician's
registration to prescribe controlled
substances.4
II. Litigation History
Plaintiffs are patients suffering from serious
illnesses, physicians licensed to practice in
California who treat patients with serious
illnesses, a patient's organization, and a
physician's organization. The patient
organization is Being Alive: People with
The policy was entitled "The Administration's
Response to the Passage of California Proposition
215 and Arizona Proposition 200" and was released
on December 30, 1996, by Barry R. McCaffrey, the
Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy ("ONDCP") at the time. The Administration's
Response was promulgated by an interagency
working group that included the ONDCP; the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA"); the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"); the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"); the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; and the Departments of
Treasury, Defense, Transportation, and Education.
HIV/AIDS Action Coalition, Inc. The
physician's organization is the Bay Area
Physicians for Human Rights. Plaintiffs filed
this action in early 1997 to enjoin
enforcement of the government policy
insofar as it threatened to punish physicians
for communicating with their patients about
the medical use of marijuana. The case was
originally assigned to District Judge Fern
Smith, who presided over the case for more
than two years. After Judge Smith received
the parties' briefs, she issued a temporary
restraining order, certified a plaintiff class,
denied the government's motion to dismiss,
issued a preliminary injunction, awarded
interim attorney's fees to plaintiffs, and set
the briefing schedule for discovery.
Judge Smith entered the preliminary
injunction on April 30, 1997. It provided
that the government "may not take
administrative action against physicians for
recommending marijuana unless the
government in good faith believes that it has
substantial evidence" that the physician
aided and abetted the purchase, cultivation,
or possession of marijuana, 18 U.S.C. § 2,
or engaged in a conspiracy to cultivate,
distribute, or possess marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §
846. Id. at 700. Judge Smith specifically
enjoined the "defendants, their agents,
employees, assigns, and all persons acting in
concert or participating with them, from
threatening or prosecuting physicians, [or]
revoking their licenses ... based upon
conduct relating to medical marijuana that
does not rise to the level of a criminal
offense." Id. at 701. The preliminary
injunction covered not only
"recommendations," but also "non-criminal
activity related to those recommendations,
such as providing a copy of a patient's
medical chart to that patient or testifying in
court regarding a recommendation that a
patient use marijuana to treat an illness." Id.
at 701 n. 8.
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The government did not appeal the
preliminary injunction, and it remained in
effect after the case was transferred more
than two years later to Judge Alsup on
August 19, 1999. Judge Alsup in turn
granted a motion to modify the plaintiff
class, held a hearing on motions for
summary judgment, granted in part and
denied in part the cross-motions for
summary judgment, dissolved the
preliminary injunction, and entered a
permanent injunction. The class was
modified to include only those patients
suffering from specific symptoms related to
certain illnesses and physicians who treat
such patients. The permanent injunction
appears to be functionally the same as the
preliminary injunction that Judge Smith
originally entered. It provides that the
government is permanently enjoined from:
(i) revoking any physician class member's
DEA registration merely because the doctor
makes a recommendation for the use of
medical marijuana based on a sincere
medical judgment and (ii) from initiating
any investigation solely on that ground.
The injunction should apply whether or not
the doctor anticipates that the patient will, in
turn, use his or her recommendation to
obtain marijuana in violation of federal law.
In explaining his reasons for entering the
injunction, Judge Alsup pointed out that
there was substantial agreement between the
parties as to what doctors could and could
not do under the federal law. Id. at * 11.
The government agreed with plaintiffs that
revocation of a license was not authorized
where a doctor merely discussed the pros
and cons of marijuana use. Id. The court
went on to observe that the plaintiffs agreed
with the government that a doctor who
actually prescribes or dispenses marijuana
violates federal law. The fundamental
disagreement between the parties concerned
the extent to which the federal government
could regulate doctor-patient
communications without interfering with
First Amendment interests. Id. This appeal
followed.
E. Discussion
The dispute in the district court in this case
focused on the government's policy of
investigating doctors or initiating
proceedings against doctors only because
they "recommend" the use of marijuana.
While the government urged that such
recommendations lead to illegal use, the
district court concluded that there are many
legitimate responses to a recommendation of
marijuana by a doctor to a patient. There
are strong examples in the district court's
opinion supporting the district court's
conclusion. For example, the doctor could
seek to place the patient in a federally
approved, experimental marijuana-therapy
program. Id. at *15. Alternatively, the
patient upon receiving the recommendation
could petition the government to change the
law. Id. at *14. By chilling doctors' ability
to recommend marijuana to a patient, the
district court held that the prohibition
compromises a patient's meaningful
participation in public discourse. Id. The
district court stated:
Petitioning Congress or federal agencies for
redress of a grievance or a change in policy
is a time-honored tradition. In the
marketplace of ideas, few questions are
more deserving of free-speech protection
than whether regulations affecting health
and welfare are sound public policy. In the
debate, perhaps the status quo will (and
should) endure. But patients and physicians
are certainly entitled to urge their view. To
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hold that physicians are barred from
communicating to patients sincere medical
judgments would disable patients from
understanding their own situations well
enough to participate in the debate. As the
government concedes, many patients depend
upon discussions with their physicians as
their primary or only source of sound
medical information. Without open
communication with their physicians,
patients would fall silent and appear
uninformed. The ability of patients to
participate meaningfully in the public
discourse would be compromised.
Id.
On appeal, the government first argues that
the "recommendation" that the injunction
may protect is analogous to a "prescription"
of a controlled substance, which federal law
clearly bars. We believe this characterizes
the injunction as sweeping more broadly
than it was intended or than as properly
interpreted. If, in making the
recommendation, the physician intends for
the patient to use it as the means for
obtaining marijuana, as a prescription is
used as a means for a patient to obtain a
controlled substance, then a physician would
be guilty of aiding and abetting the violation
of federal law. That, the injunction is
intended to avoid. Indeed the predecessor
preliminary injunction spelled out what the
injunction did not bar; it did not enjoin the
government from prosecuting physicians
when government officials in good faith
believe that they have "probable cause to
charge under the federal aiding and abetting
and/or conspiracy statutes." 172 F.R.D. at
701.
The plaintiffs themselves interpret the
injunction narrowly, stating in their brief
before this Court that, "the lower court
fashioned an injunction with a clear line
between protected medical speech and
illegal conduct." They characterize the
injunction as protecting "the dispensing of
information," not the dispensing of
controlled substances, and therefore assert
that the injunction does not contravene or
undermine federal law.
As Judge Smith noted in the preliminary
injunction order, conviction of aiding and
abetting requires proof that the defendant
"associate[d] himself with the venture, that
he participate[d] in it as something that he
wishe[d] to bring about, that he [sought] by
his actions to make it succeed." 172 F.R.D.
at 700 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 190, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d
119 (1994) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). This is an accurate
statement of the law. We have explained
that a conviction of aiding and abetting
requires the government to prove four
elements: "(1) that the accused had the
specific intent to facilitate the commission
of a crime by another, (2) that the accused
had the requisite intent of the underlying
substantive offense, (3) that the accused
assisted or participated in the commission of
the underlying substantive offense, and (4)
that someone committed the underlying
substantive offense." See United States v.
Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459 (9th Cir.1988).
The district court also noted that conspiracy
requires that a defendant make "an
agreement to accomplish an illegal objective
and [that he] knows of the illegal objective
and intends to help accomplish it." 172
F.R.D. at 700-01 (citing United States v. Gil,
58 F.3d 1414, 1423 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1995)).
The government on appeal stresses that the
permanent injunction applies "whether or
not the doctor anticipates that the patient
will, in turn, use his or her recommendation
to obtain marijuana in violation of federal
law," and suggests that the injunction thus
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protects criminal conduct. A doctor's
anticipation of patient conduct, however,
does not translate into aiding and abetting,
or conspiracy. A doctor would aid and abet
by acting with the specific intent to provide
a patient with the means to acquire
marijuana. See Gaskins, 849 F.2d at 459.
Similarly, a conspiracy would require that a
doctor have knowledge that a patient intends
to acquire marijuana, agree to help the
patient acquire marijuana, and intend to help
the patient acquire marijuana. See Gil, 58
F.3d at 1423. Holding doctors responsible
for whatever conduct the doctor could
anticipate a patient might engage in after
leaving the doctor's office is simply beyond
the scope of either conspiracy or aiding and
abetting.
The government also focuses on the
injunction's bar against "investigating" on
the basis of speech protected by the First
Amendment and points to the broad
discretion enjoyed by executive agencies in
investigating suspected criminal misconduct.
The government relies on language in the
permanent injunction that differs from the
exact language in the preliminary injunction.
The permanent injunction order enjoins the
government "from initiating any
investigation solely on" the basis of "a
recommendation for the use of medical
marijuana based on a sincere medical
judgment." Conant, 2000 WL 1281174, at
*16. The preliminary injunction order
provided that "the government may not take
administrative action against physicians for
recommending marijuana unless the
government in good faith believes that it has
substantial evidence of [conspiracy or aiding
and abetting]." 172 F.R.D. at 701.
The government, however, has never
argued that the two injunctive orders differ
in any material way. Because we read the
permanent injunction as enjoining
essentially the 13 same conduct as the
preliminary injunction, we interpret this
portion of the permanent injunction to mean
only that the government may not initiate an
investigation of a physician solely on the
basis of a recommendation of marijuana
within a bona fide doctor-patient
relationship, unless the government in good
faith believes that it has substantial evidence
of criminal conduct. Because a doctor's
recommendation does not itself constitute
illegal conduct, the portion of the injunction
barring investigations solely on that basis
does not interfere with the federal
government's ability to enforce its laws.
The government policy does, however,
strike at core First Amendment interests of
doctors and patients. An integral
component of the practice of medicine is the
communication between a doctor and a
patient. Physicians must be able to speak
frankly and openly to patients. That need
has been recognized by the courts through
the application of the common law doctor-
patient privilege. See Fed.R.Evid. 501.
The doctor-patient privilege reflects "the
imperative need for confidence and trust"
inherent in the doctor-patient relationship
and recognizes that "a physician must know
all that a patient can articulate in order to
identify and to treat disease; barriers to full
disclosure would impair diagnosis and
treatment." Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186
(1980). The Supreme Court has recognized
that physician speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection because of the
significance of the doctor-patient
relationship. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 884, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d
674 (1992) (plurality) (recognizing
physician's First Amendment right not to
speak); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200,
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111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991)
(noting that regulations on physician speech
may "impinge upon the doctor-patient
relationship").
This Court has also recognized the core
First Amendment values of the doctor-
patient relationship. In Nat'1 Ass'n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v.
California Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043 (9th Cir.2000), we recognized that
communication that occurs during
psychoanalysis is entitled to First
Amendment protection. Id. at 1054. We
upheld California's mental health licensing
laws that determined when individuals
qualified as mental health professionals
against a First Amendment challenge. Id. at
1053-56. Finding the laws content-neutral,
we noted that California did not attempt to
"dictate the content of what is said in
therapy" and did not prevent licensed
therapists from utilizing particular "psycho-
analytical methods." Id. at 1055-56.
Being a member of a regulated profession
does not, as the government suggests, result
in a surrender of First Amendment rights.
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531,
65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) ( "the
rights of free speech and a free press are not
confined to any field of human interest").
To the contrary, professional speech may be
entitled to "the strongest protection our
Constitution has to offer." Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634, 115
S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). Even
commercial speech by professionals is
entitled to First Amendment protection.
See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 382-83,
97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).
Attorneys have rights to speak freely subject
only to the government regulating with
"narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433, 438-39, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9
L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).
In its most recent pronouncement on
regulating speech about controlled
substances, Thompson v. Western States
Medical Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 122 S.Ct. 1497,
152 L.Ed.2d 563 (2002), the Supreme Court
found that provisions in the Food and Drug
Modernization Act of 1997 that restricted
physicians and pharmacists from advertising
compounding drugs violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 1500. The Court
refused to make the "questionable
assumption that doctors would prescribe
unnecessary medications" and rejected the
government's argument that "people would
make bad decisions if given truthful
information about compounded drugs." Id.
at 1507. The federal government argues in
this case that a doctor-patient discussion
about marijuana might lead the patient to
make a bad decision, essentially asking us to
accept the same assumption rejected by the
Court in Thompson. Id. We will not do so.
Instead, we take note of the Supreme Court's
admonition in Thompson: "If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that
regulating speech must be a last--not first--
resort. Yet here it seems to have been the
first strategy the Government thought to
try." Id.
The government's policy in this case seeks
to punish physicians on the basis of the
content of doctor-patient communications.
Only doctor- patient conversations that
include discussions of the medical use of
marijuana trigger the policy. Moreover, the
policy does not merely prohibit the
discussion of marijuana; it condemns
expression of a particular viewpoint, i.e.,
that medical marijuana would likely help a
specific patient. Such condemnation of
particular views is especially troubling in the
First Amendment context. "When the
government targets not subject matter but
particular views taken by speakers on a
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subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant."
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829,
115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995).
Indeed, even content-based restrictions on
speech are "presumptively invalid." R.A.V.
v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct.
2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992).
The government's policy is materially
similar to the limitation struck down in
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 (2001),
that prevented attorneys from "present[ing]
all the reasonable and well-grounded
arguments necessary for proper resolution of
the case." 531 U.S. at 545, 121 S.Ct. 1043.
In Velazquez, a government restriction
prevented legal assistance organizations
receiving federal funds from challenging
existing welfare laws. Id. at 537-38, 121
S.Ct. 1043. Like the limitation in Velazquez,
the government's policy here "alter[s] the
traditional role" of medical professionals by
"prohibit[ing] speech necessary to the proper
functioning of those systems." Id. at 544,
121 S.Ct. 1043.
The government relies upon Rust and Casey
to support its position in this case. Rust, 500
U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233;
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120
L.Ed.2d 674. However, those cases did not
uphold restrictions on speech itself. Rust
upheld restrictions on federal funding for
certain types of activity, including abortion
counseling, referral, or advocacy. See Rust,
500 U.S. at 179-80, 111 S.Ct. 1759. In
Casey, a plurality of the Court upheld
Pennsylvania's requirement that physicians'
advice to patients include information about
the health risks associated with an abortion
and that physicians provide information
about alternatives to abortion. 505 U.S. at
883-84, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The plurality noted
that physicians did not have to comply if
they had a reasonable belief that the
information would have a "severely adverse
effect on the physical or mental health of the
patient," and thus the statute did not
"prevent the physician from exercising his
or her medical judgment." Id. The
government's policy in this case does
precisely that.
The government seeks to justify its policy
by claiming that a doctor's
"recommendation" of marijuana may
encourage illegal conduct by the patient,
which is not unlike the argument made
before, and rejected by, the Supreme Court
in a recent First Amendment case. See
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 1403, 152 L.Ed.2d 403
(2002). In Free Speech Coalition, the
government defended the Child
Pornography Prosecution Act of 1996 by
arguing that, although virtual child
pornography does not harm children in the
production process, it threatens them in
"other, less direct, ways." Id. at 1397. For
example, the government argued pedophiles
might use such virtual images to encourage
children to participate in sexual activity. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected such
justifications, holding that the potential
harms were too attenuated from the
proscribed speech. "Without a significantly
stronger, more direct connection, the
Government may not prohibit speech on the
ground that it may encourage ... illegal
conduct." Id. at 1403. The government's
argument in this case mirrors the argument
rejected in Free Speech Coalition.
The government also relies on a case in
which a district court refused to order an
injunction against this federal drug policy.
See Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F.Supp.2d
113, 125 (D.D.C.2001). The court did so,
however, because the plaintiffs in that case
did not factually support their claim that the
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policy chilled their speech. See id. at 120.
In this case, the record is replete with
examples of doctors who claim a right to
explain the medical benefits of marijuana to
patients and whose exercise of that right has
been chilled by the threat of federal
investigation. The government even
stipulated in the district court that a
"reasonable physician would have a genuine
fear of losing his or her DEA registration to
dispense controlled substances if that
physician were to recommend marijuana to
his or her patients."
To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the
government's policy must have the requisite
"narrow specificity." See Button, 371 U.S.
at 433, 83 S.Ct. 328. Throughout this
litigation, the government has been unable
to articulate exactly what speech is
proscribed, describing it only in terms of
speech the patient believes to be a
recommendation of marijuana. Thus,
whether a doctor- patient discussion of
medical marijuana constitutes a
"recommendation" depends largely on the
meaning the patient attributes to the doctor's
words. This is not permissible under the
First Amendment. See Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 535, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed.
430 (1945). In Thomas, the court struck
down a state statute that failed to make a
clear distinction between union membership,
solicitation, and mere "discussion, laudation,
[or] general advocacy." The distinction
rested instead on the meaning the listeners
attributed to spoken words. Id. The
government's policy, like the statute in
Thomas, leaves doctors and patients "no
security for free discussion." Id. As Judge
Smith appropriately noted in granting the
preliminary injunction, "when faced with the
fickle iterations of the government's policy,
physicians have been forced to suppress
speech that would not rise to the level of that
which the government constitutionally may
prohibit." 172 F.R.D. at 696.
Our decision is consistent with principles
of federalism that have left states as the
primary regulators of professional conduct.
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n. 30,
97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977)
(recognizing states' broad police powers to
regulate the administration of drugs by
health professionals); Linder v. United
States, 268 U.S. 5, 18, 45 S.Ct. 446, 69
L.Ed. 819 (1925) ("direct control of medical
practice in the states is beyond the power of
the federal government"). We must "show [
] respect for the sovereign States that
comprise our Federal Union. That respect
imposes a duty on federal courts, whenever
possible, to avoid or minimize conflict
between federal and state law, particularly in
situations in which the citizens of a State
have chosen to serve as a laboratory in the
trial of novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at
501, 121 S.Ct. 1711 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court's order entering a
permanent injunction.
AFFIRMED.
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I am pleased to join Chief Judge
Schroeder's opinion. I write only to explain
that for me the fulcrum of this dispute is not
the First Amendment right of the doctors.
That right certainly exists and its impairment
justifies the district court's injunction for the
reasons well explained by Chief Judge
Schroeder. But the doctors' interest in
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giving advice about the medical use of
marijuana is somewhat remote and
impersonal; they will derive no direct
benefit from giving this advice, other than
the satisfaction of doing their jobs well. At
the same time, the burden of the federal
policy the district court enjoined falls
directly and personally on the doctors: By
speaking candidly to their patients about the
potential benefits of medical marijuana, they
risk losing their license to write
prescriptions, which would prevent them
from functioning as doctors. In other words,
they may destroy their careers and lose their
livelihoods.
This disparity between benefits and burdens
matters because it makes doctors peculiarly
vulnerable to intimidation; with little to
gain and much to lose, only the most foolish
or committed of doctors will defy the federal
government's policy and continue to give
patients candid advice about the medical
uses of marijuana. Those immediately and
2 As Alice Pasetta Mead explained in her expert
report:
[P]hysicians are particularly easily deterred by the
threat of governmental investigation and/or sanction
from engaging in conduct that is entirely lawful and
medically appropriate.... [A] physician's practice is
particularly dependent upon the physician's
maintaining a reputation of unimpeachable integrity.
A physician's career can be effectively destroyed
merely by the fact that a governmental body has
investigated his or her practice....
The federal government's policy had precisely this
effect before it was enjoined by the district court.
Dr. Milton N. Estes, Associate Clinical Professor in
the Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and
Reproductive Medicine at the University of
California-San Francisco (UCSF), reports:
As a result of the government's public threats, I do
not feel comfortable even discussing the subject of
medical marijuana with my patients. I feel
vulnerable to federal sanctions that could strip me of
my license to prescribe the treatments my patients
depend upon, or even land me behind bars.... Because
of these fears, the discourse about medical marijuana
has all but ceased at my medical office.... My patients
bear the brunt of this loss in communication.
directly affected by the federal government's
policy are the patients, who will be denied
information crucial to their well-being, and
the State of California, whose policy of
exempting certain patients from the sweep
of its drug laws will be thwarted. In my
view, it is the vindication of these latter
interests--those of the patients and of the
state--that primarily justifies the district
court's highly unusual exercise of discretion
in enjoining the federal defendants from
even investigating possible violations of the
federal criminal laws.
And Dr. Stephen O'Brien, former co-director of
UCSF HIV Managed Care, similarly notes:
Due to fear caused by these threats, I feel compelled
and coerced to withhold information,
recommendations, and advice to patients regarding
use of medical marijuana.... I am fearful and reluctant
to engage in even limited communications regarding
medical marijuana.
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9TH CIRCUIT BACKS DOCTORS' RIGHT TO DISCUSS MARIJUANA
The Recorder
October 30, 2002
Jason Hoppin
Doctors can advise their patients about medical
marijuana without fear of criminal prosecution
or losing their ability to write prescriptions, the
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled
Tuesday.
The decision was met with unbridled
enthusiasm by medical marijuana supporters
angered by the federal government's recent
crackdown on marijuana dispensaries, and
comes as the debate about medical benefits of
the drug appears to be heating up. It also
preserves a key underpinning of Proposition
215, California's medical marijuana initiative.
"The [government's] policy does not merely
prohibit the discussion of marijuana; it
condemns expression of a particular viewpoint,
i.e., that medical marijuana would likely help a
specific patient," wrote Chief Judge Mary
Schroeder. "Such condemnation of particular
views is especially troubling in the First
Amendment context."
She was joined in Conant v. Walters, 02
C.D.O.S. 10709, by Senior Judge Betty Fletcher
and Judge Alex Kozinski, who wrote a broader
concurrence providing arguments that could be
used to defend state medical marijuana
initiatives.
"The Commerce Clause limits the scope of
national power, while the commandeering
doctrine limits how Congress may use the
power it has," Kozinski wrote. "These checks
work in tandem to ensure that the federal
government legislates in areas of truly national
concern, while the states retain independent
power to regulate areas
governance.
better suited to local
"Medical marijuana, when grown locally for
personal consumption, does not have any direct
or obvious effect on interstate commerce."
The case arose after federal authorities sent
medical associations a letter threatening to
revoke doctors' Drug Enforcement Agency
registrations if they enabled patients to obtain
marijuana. Without a DEA registration, doctors
can't write prescriptions of any kind.
Represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union's Drug Policy Litigation Project, a group
of patients, health care groups and doctors
including one who was being investigated by
the DEA - sought an injunction to prevent the
government from going after doctors.
One of the plaintiffs in the case is Valerie
Corral, director of Santa Cruz County's
Wo/Men's Alliance for Medical Marijuana.
WAMM was the target of a raid last month by
DEA agents, touching off protests at federal
buildings around the Bay Area.
Agents confiscated 167 marijuana plants and
arrested Corral and her husband, but the couple
was later released when no charges were
forthcoming from the U.S. attorney's office.
Corral has since sued for the return of the plants.
Meanwhile, criminal charges could still be
brought against her.
Corral said she has used marijuana for more
than 25 years to combat epileptic seizures that
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once made her life "hellish." She said she didn't
respond to normal medications.
"It's made all the difference in my life," Corral
said.
She still worries about the possibility of federal
prison, but said, "When you live in the prison of
illness, it reduces the concept of risk."
A Time/CNN poll released Tuesday showed
that 80 percent of Americans favor allowing
those in need access to medical marijuana. The
poll was released in conjunction with a Time
magazine cover story about the ongoing
controversies and a ballot measure asking
Nevada voters whether to legalize the
possession of marijuana.
Corral's first appearance in her suit against the
DEA is scheduled for a federal courtroom
Monday. She and her lawyer, Santa Clara
University law professor Gerald Uelmen, said
Kozinski's concurrence will give her arguments
more weight.
"I'm Xeroxing it for Judge [Jeremy] Fogel,"
Uelman said. "We're going to rely on it in our
arguments."
Uelmen has said that Corral's case is a vehicle
for unique arguments not raised before, since
patients at least those who are able - help grow
the marijuana at WAMM, and no money
changes hands.
DEA spokesman Richard Meyer said DEA
lawyers in Washington, D.C., were reviewing
the decision. "That's all we have for now,"
Meyer said.
"All we're saying is that we're reviewing the
matter," said Susan Dryden, a Department of
Justice spokeswoman.
Kozinski pointed out that what the government
sought to do would nullify Prop 215, since state
voters decided that the line between legal and
illegal marijuana use rests in the hands of
doctors.
The majority opinion made it clear, though, that
doctors could still face prosecution if they write
a note for the sole purpose of helping patients
procure illegal substances.
"If, in making the recommendation, the
physician intends for the patient to use it as the
means for obtaining marijuana, as a prescription
is used as a means for a patient to obtain a
controlled substance, then a physician would be
guilty of aiding and abetting the violation of
federal law," Schroeder clarified.
Schroeder and U.S. District Judge William
Alsup, author of the permanent injunction at
issue in the case, noted that there are several
legitimate reasons for doctors to recommend
marijuana. The patient could seek to participate
in a government-sanctioned medical marijuana
program or petition the government to change
the law.
In California, many medical marijuana
dispensaries require a written recommendation
from a doctor. Graham Boyd, director of the
Drug Policy Litigation Project, disputed that a
written recommendation could make doctors
criminally liable.
"No, it wouldn't, as long as it's a
recommendation," Boyd said.
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White House Escalates Pot War / It Asks High Court to let Doctors be Punished
The San Francisco Chronicle
July 11, 2003
Bob Egelko
The Bush administration, pressing its campaign
against state medical marijuana laws, has asked
the U.S. Supreme Court to let federal authorities
punish California doctors who recommend pot
to their patients. The administration would
revoke the federal prescription licenses of
doctors who tell their patients marijuana would
help them, a prerequisite for obtaining the drug
under the state's voter- approved medical
marijuana law.
Justice Department lawyers this week asked the
high court to take up the issue in its next term,
which begins in October. The department is
appealing a ruling by an appellate court in San
Francisco that said the proposed penalties would
violate the freedom of speech of both doctors
and patients.
If the justices agree to review the case, it would
be their first look at medical marijuana since
May 2001, when they upheld the federal
government's authority to close down a pot
dispensary in Oakland and others in the state.
The October decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals in San Francisco "effectively licensed
physicians to treat patients with prohibited
substances" and interfered with the
government's authority "to enforce the law in an
area vital to the public health and safety,"
Justice Department lawyers Mark Stern and
Colette Matzzie wrote in court papers.
The appeal "is a sign that this administration
will do everything they can to defeat the will of
the voters of California and many other states,"
said Graham Boyd, an American Civil Liberties
Union lawyer for doctors, patients and AIDS
support groups. Those groups sued the federal
government in 1997 over the policy, which the
Clinton administration originally introduced but
later decided not to pursue.
STATE LAWS WOULD BE MOOT
If the Supreme Court takes the case and
ultimately rules in the government's favor, Boyd
said, "it would make all of the states' marijuana
laws a dead letter. . . . If a physician can't
recommend marijuana, then no patient can
qualify" to use it under state law.
The federal action was in response to California
voters' 1996 approval of Proposition 215. The
initiative, a trailblazer for laws in eight other
states, allows seriously ill patients to use
marijuana with their doctors' approval. Prop.
215 specified that the approval would take the
form of a recommendation rather than a formal
prescription.
The federal government, which classifies
marijuana in the same prohibited category as
heroin -- drugs with a high potential for abuse
and no medical value -- has fought Prop. 215
since its passage. The reaction began under
former President Bill Clinton and has escalated
under President Bush, whose drug enforcers
have raided local pot clubs and filed criminal
charges against their suppliers.
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The Bush administration also revived the effort
to target doctors' federal licenses, which started
under the Clinton administration. When a
federal judge issued a permanent injunction
against the policy in 2000, Clinton's Justice
Department did not appeal, but the new
administration took up the case after taking
office in 2001.
Under the administration's policy, doctors who
recommended marijuana would lose their
licenses to prescribe federally regulated
narcotics. Doctors in many fields need federal
licenses to remain in practice.
GIVING ADVICE RULED LEGAL
The government's attempt to enforce the policy
was rejected in October by the U.S. Court of
Appeals in San Francisco.
In the 3-0 appellate decision, Chief Judge Mary
Schroeder said federal authorities can prosecute
doctors for helping patients acquire illegal
drugs, but not for simply giving medical advice
that might let a patient obtain marijuana.
She said the federal policy clashed not only with
free speech but also with the states' traditional
authority over the practice of medicine. That
issue is central to another case now pending
before the appeals court, involving Attorney
General John Ashcroft's attempt to punish
doctors who prescribe lethal drugs for patients
under Oregon's assisted-suicide law.
The Justice Department's Supreme Court appeal
argues that a physician's "recommendation"
under California law is the equivalent of a
prescription for illegal drugs, an action the
government can forbid without violating free
speech.
Department lawyers said the federal policy
would not penalize a doctor for merely
discussing marijuana with a patient -- as long as
the doctor makes it clear that the drug is illegal
under federal law, that federal authorities
consider it dangerous and medically useless, and
that the doctor is not recommending it.
'WAR AGAINST PATIENTS'
News of the administration's appeal dismayed
two patients who are plaintiffs in the lawsuit.
"I wish the government would stop this war
against patients and doctors," said Keith Vines,
53, a San Francisco assistant district attorney
who lost 50 pounds and nearly died from a
wasting syndrome associated with AIDS. He
credits medical marijuana with restoring his
appetite and saving his life.
"Medical marijuana is keeping me with the
ability to continue treatment," said Judith
Cushner, 58, director of Laurel Hill Nursery
School in San Francisco, who is undergoing
chemotherapy after suffering a relapse of breast
cancer. The government's bid for Supreme
Court intervention, she said, is "absolutely
frightening.".The case is Walters vs. Conant,
No. 03-40.
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THE MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE AND DE MINIMIS PROTECTION FOR
PATIENTS WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM USING MARIJUANA FOR MEDICAL
PURPOSES: A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION
UNDER FEDERAL DRUG LAWS
Valparaiso University Law Review
Summer, 2003
Ronald Timothy Fletcher
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
[M]arijuana, in its natural form, is one of the
safest therapeutically active substances known
to man .... One must reasonably conclude that
there is accepted safety for use of marijuana
under medical supervision. To conclude
otherwise, on the record, would be
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.1
C. Attempts to Effectuate Change in the System
1. State-Based Initiatives
The states and their citizens have responded to
the federal government's classification of
marijuana into Schedule I by enacting initiatives
allowing for the use of medicinal marijuana
under the relevant state laws. California and
Arizona have led this movement by enacting
laws allowing the use of medicinal marijuana in
1996.89 Numerous other states have followed
1 LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. & JAMES B.
BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE 15 (1993) (quoting Administrative Law
Judge Francis J. Young).
8 California's law was a direct result of the voter support
of Proposition 215. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5
(West Supp. 2002). It is known as the Compassionate Use
their example by enacting their own versions of
medicinal marijuana reforms. Significantly,
current President George W. Bush has gone on
record in support of states' rights to determine
for themselves how to address this issue.91
Moreover, Representative Barney Frank, a
Democrat from Massachusetts, has introduced a
proposal into the United States House of
Representatives that calls for the rescheduling of
marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II.
However, many Americans remain opposed to
the idea of allowing marijuana to be prescribed
as medicine. Many fear that marijuana acts as a
Act of 1996. Id. The text of the Act emphasizes the
concern for the unfortunately large number of AIDS
patients in the state. Id. Arizona voters adopted
Proposition 200 in November 1996. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-3412.01 (West 2001); see also Dogwill, supra note
83, at 247. But see Matthew Segal, Comment, Overdue
Process: Why Denial of Physician-Prescribed Marijuana
to Terminally Ill Patients Violates the United States
Constitution, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 235, 263 n.5 (1998)
(noting that the Arizona legislature revised the voters'
initiative by making medicinal marijuana legalization
dependent upon federal legalization).
9 Susan Feeney, Bush Backs States' Rights on Marijuana:
He Opposes Medical Use But Favors Local Control,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 1999, at 6A. Then
Governor of Texas, Mr. Bush stated, "I believe each state
can choose that decision as they so choose." Id.
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gateway drug to more serious drugs, such as
heroin or cocaine. Others are concerned with the
possible deleterious physiological effects that
result from the usage of marijuana. Similarly,
those opposed to medicinal marijuana note the
increase in drug use by teenagers, the increase
in marijuana-related emergency room visits, and
the increase in the numbers of babies born
addicted to drugs.
Critics of medicinal marijuana also point to the
costs of marijuana on society as a whole. First,
the illegal drug trade has had a negative impact
on the natural environment. Secondly, there is a
concern about the possibility of increased
accidents in the workplace that would be caused
by marijuana users. Thirdly, many fear that if
any of the restrictions on marijuana are reduced
the result would be an increase in crime.
Similarly, those opposed have noted that,
because of such an increase in crime, many
doctors would refuse to prescribe medicinal
marijuana simply because they would not want
to be associated with any perception of criminal
activity. The concerns of those opposed to
medicinal marijuana are valid, and, as such, any
proposal for change would need to address these
concerns properly in order to maintain any
semblance of legitimacy.
2. Lobbying Groups and the Courts
Over the years, lobbying groups such as the
National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws ("NORML") and the Alliance
for Cannabis Therapeutics have attempted to use
the judicial system to change the application of
marijuana laws in the United States. 01 In one
case, NORML sought to have marijuana
101 See, e.g., Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Nat'l Org. for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
removed entirely from the Controlled
Substances Act or to at least have marijuana
reclassified from Schedule I to Schedule V. The
Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, under a delegation of
authority from the Attorney General, refused
NORML's request. NORML then brought suit
challenging the Director's ruling. The court held
that the Attorney General was within his
authority to refuse NORML's request.
In a later proceeding involving the same
parties, the determination of the Administrator
of the Drug Enforcement Agency that marijuana
had no currently accepted medical use was
challenged.106  The court found the
Administrator's interpretation of the statute to be
a reasonable one. As of yet, these lobbying
groups have been unsuccessful in their attempts
to use the court system to have marijuana
reclassified into a lower schedule under the
Controlled Substances Act. Because marijuana
remains classified in Schedule I, those who are
arrested must rely on other novel approaches,
including the First Amendment and the medical
necessity defense, in order to attempt to prevent
their criminal prosecution under the current state
of the law.
4. The Medical Necessity Defense
The necessity defense has been characterized
as a choice between two evils.1 6 The necessity
106 Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 930 F.2d at 937.
The Administrator found that only a "respectable
minority" of physicians adhered to the use of marijuana as
medical treatment. Id. at 938. The Administrator ruled
that this "respectable minority" was not conclusory
evidence to show that there was a currently accepted
medicinal use for marijuana. Id.
116 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980)
(noting that "the defense of necessity, or choice of evils,
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defense was created and recognized under the
common law." 7 Modern courts, however, have
not been receptive to the medical necessity
defense when used as a defense for marijuana
possession. 118 One of the more significant
traditionally covered the situation where physical forces
beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the
lesser of two evils").
117 State v. Hastings, 801 P.2d 563, 564 (Idaho 1990). In
Hastings, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho law
was not a bar to the use of the defense of necessity. Id.
The court remanded the case to allow a jury to consider
the application of the necessity defense to a woman who
was arrested for possessing marijuana that she used to
treat her rheumatoid arthritis. Id. at 565. The court noted
that
The elements of the common law defense of necessity
are:
1. A specific threat of immediate harm;
2. The circumstances which necessitate the
illegal act must not have been brought about by the
defendant;
3. The same objective could not have been
accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to
the actor;
4. The harm caused was not disproportionate to
the harm avoided.
Id. at 564; see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Defense
of Necessity, Duress, or Coercion in Prosecution for
Violation of State Narcotics Laws, 1 A.L.R. 5th 938
(1992).
See generally United States v. Burton, 894 F.2d 188,
191 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the medical necessity
defense was unavailable to a man suffering from
glaucoma due to the amount of marijuana that he
possessed); Spillers v. State, 245 S.E.2d 54, 55 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding that the medical necessity defense
was unavailable for marijuana possession by a man
suffering from rheumatoid arthritis); State v. Corrigan,
2001 WL 881394, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2001)
(holding that the medical necessity defense was
unavailable for marijuana possession); State v. Tate, 505
A.2d 941, 942, 947 (N.J. 1986) (holding that the medical
necessity defense was unavailable to a quadriplegic who
used marijuana); State v. Piland, 293 S.E.2d 278, 280
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that medical necessity
defense was unavailable to a physician who grew
marijuana for his patients); State v. Poling, 531 S.E.2d
678, 684-85 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that the medical
necessity defense was unavailable to a woman who used
difficulties defendants have * 1005 had in
asserting this defense is that the courts appear to
be hostile to the idea that there are no
alternatives available other than medicinal
marijuana. Another significant difficulty in
asserting a necessity defense for medical
reasons is that marijuana remains classified as a
Schedule I controlled substance, which carries
the presumption that it has no medically
accepted purpose or use.
The United States Supreme Court recently
handed down a decision regarding the medicinal
use of marijuana in United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative. 12 1 In reviewing
the federal drug laws, the Court found no
implied medical necessity exception to the
prohibition on the manufacturing and
distribution of medicinal marijuana as
established in the Controlled Substances Act.
The Court did not, however, rule on whether the
same defense would be available for those
accused of possession of marijuana. Many agree
that the Supreme Court's decision will create
additional litigation. Moreover, disagreement on
this issue will not subside without
distinguishing the proper role of states' rights
and the regulatory power of the United States
Congress.
D. The Role of Federalism
Federalism refers to a system of government,
like that of the United States, in which
governmental power is divided among a
national government and individual states. The
result of this form of government is a great
variety in both procedural and substantive laws
and rights. The Framers of the United States
Constitution saw this balance of powers as
marijuana to relieve symptoms resulting from multiple
sclerosis).
121 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
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necessary to avoid any risk of tyranny or abuse
from any one entity. Because of their former
relationship with England, the Framers' biggest
fear was an overpowering central government.
As a result, the Bill of Rights was intended to
restrain the central government provided for by
the Federal Constitution. The Ninth and Tenth
Amendments of the Bill of Rights reflect this in
their acknowledgment of the retention of rights
in both the people and the states. Thus, citizens
at this time looked to their state constitutions for
protection of their rights. However, the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment established that
Americans have a dual citizenship in both the
United States and their individual states.
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment also
worked as a restriction on the states' power to
prevent them from infringing on the liberties
that dual citizenship provided.
After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the United States Supreme Court began the
process of selectively incorporating rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus making them
applicable to the states. This process of
incorporation was incremental, and, as a result,
very few provisions of the Bill of Rights became
binding on the states. During the 1960s,
however, the Supreme Court became more
active and extended nine provisions of the Bill
of Rights to the states. The result of this judicial
activism was that states now have become
deeply involved in the application of federal
law. Many scholars have noted that this shift has
been detrimental to individuals who attempt to
assert their rights under the United States
Constitution because state constitutions often
provide more expansive protections. Even the
United States Supreme Court has recognized
this in Michigan v. Long.139
1' 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1982) ("If the state court
decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, this Court will not undertake to
review the decision.").
The states, however, are not unrestrained in
their provision of rights and protections. The
states remain bound by the Supremacy Clause,
which requires state action to comply with laws
passed by Congress and with the interpretations
of those laws by the United States Supreme
Court. Similarly, state courts are also bound by
the Supremacy Clause when exercising their
discretion in fashioning equitable relief. It is this
delicate balance of powers which has led to the
current stalemate involving medicinal
marijuana.
On occasion, the United States Supreme Court
has determined that Congress has overstepped
its Commerce Clause powers and, thus, has
invalidated certain federal statutes.142 For many
years, the Supreme Court had been more
deferential to congressional action. However,
recent decisions indicate that the Supreme Court
has become more aggressive in reviewing
congressional action. In United States v. Lopez,
the Court established a paradigm for reviewing
federal statutes based on Congress' Commerce
Clause powers. The Court began by noting three
broad categories of activity that Congress is
permitted to regulate. The three categories
include: first, the use of the channels of
interstate commerce; second, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce; and
third, economic activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.
The Court has determined that congressional
action must contain a jurisdictional element in
order to show some nexus between the activity
to be regulated and interstate commerce.
Furthermore, it was also determined that
142 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)
(holding § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 unconstitutional); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 557-68 (1995) (holding § 922(q) of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional).
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legislative findings regarding the effects that the
regulated activity has on interstate commerce
would be relevant. The Court noted that, while
formal findings are normally not required, they
would assist in evaluating the constitutionality
of congressional action. Subsequently, the Court
has established that it is within this framework
that it will review legislative enactments.
However, the Court did assert that it will not
invalidate such enactments unless Congress has
clearly exceeded its constitutional bounds.
Some commentators have asserted that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional
boundaries under the Commerce Clause by
enacting the Controlled Substances Act.
However, an investigation of the Controlled
Substances Act within the framework
established by Lopez will demonstrate that
Congress has not exceeded its power, but rather
that Congress has wrongfully exercised its
power. As a result, a new approach must be
considered in order to effectuate any changes in
medicinal marijuana policy at the federal level.
ifi. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ATTENDANT
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH
CURRENT FEDERAL LAW
REGARDING MEDICINAL MARIJUANA
A. Federalism and Medicinal Marijuana
Under the current federal laws and the
analytical framework established by the United
States Supreme Court, it becomes apparent that
the federal government has the power to control
this issue. While many states have indicated
their desire to be able to allow for medicinal
marijuana, it is the federal government that is
preventing them from doing so. The Supreme
Court has held that Congress may regulate
economic activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
Unlike the statutes involved in Lopez and
Morrison that did not regulate activities with
any economic effects on interstate commerce,
marijuana does have an impact on interstate
commerce. In order to see this impact, one can
look to the amount of money expended in the
enforcement of drug laws. For example, in 1983
the federal budget allocated approximately two
billion dollars to the war on drugs, but by 1993
that number had increased to nearly thirteen
billion dollars. Moreover, those who would be
responsible for prescribing, manufacturing, and
distributing medicinal marijuana would be
making profits on a substance that has an
established market. Thus, marijuana regulation
can be seen as more akin to the regulation of the
wheat market that was upheld in Wickard v.
Filburn. 163
The next steps in the Lopez analysis look to
the statute to find a jurisdictional element and
indications of congressional findings. The
Controlled Substances Act provides for both of
these items in the text of the Act. The
jurisdictional element can be satisfied by noting
the flow of controlled substances not only
across state lines, but also across international
borders. Additionally, the Controlled Substances
Act regulates much more than mere possession,
unlike the statute in Lopez, which regulated
mere possession of guns. Moreover, unlike the
statute in Lopez that had no congressional
findings, the Controlled Substances Act
provides an enumerated list of findings. A
particularly significant finding is that it is
impossible to differentiate drugs that are
manufactured and distributed intrastate from
those involved in interstate movement. Thus,
under the Lopez analysis, Congress is within its
constitutional domain to regulate controlled
substances. However, merely recognizing that
Congress has the power to regulate does not
mean that it has done so in accordance with the
will of the people.
163 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
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The actions that the states and their citizens
have undertaken in an attempt to allow
medicinal marijuana to be prescribed are
laudable and deserve due credence. However,
this activity has been ineffectual because of
congressional power to control drugs for the
safety and health of the citizens in all states.
This Note does not take issue with the federal
government's ability to control drugs but rather
with the way in which this power has been
exercised. Indeed, it is this power of the federal
government which must be called upon to
effectuate lasting and uniform change to the
laws pertaining to medicinal marijuana. Drugs
and the regulation thereof involve issues which
are more suitable to being dealt with at the
federal level because of the federal
government's unique national viewpoint.
Additionally, there is an international element to
the drug issue in that the federal government has
the responsibility of controlling drugs that are
imported illegally.
Allowing states to decide for themselves how
to deal with this issue would result in a
patchwork of laws that would create even more
problems because the states focus on solving
problems within the confines of their borders.
For example, if one state allows for medicinal
marijuana and another does not, patients may be
forced to choose between leaving their
prescription at home or not traveling out of
state. Similarly, a state that allowed for
medicinal marijuana could be faced with an
influx of patients wishing to have the
opportunity to have a medicinal marijuana
prescription. The medicinal use of marijuana is
not simply an issue that one state must address,
but, rather, it must be addressed at the federal
level to ensure uniformity and clarity.
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ASSISTED SUICIDE
Suicide law
Statesman Journal
May 8, 2003
BY LAURENCE M. CRUZ
PORTLAND Judges with the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals led a vigorous debate
Wednesday about whether Oregon's physician-
assisted suicide law should stand.
The hearing before a three-judge panel was the
latest battle over the five-year-old law, which
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft moved to
block in November 2001, drawing a lawsuit by
the state.
The panel's decision, expected this summer,
could determine whether terminally ill
Oregonians who meet certain criteria have the
right to end their lives with a doctor's help.
Either side could appeal the
decision.
Much of the discussion Wednesday centered
around the same arguments heard in April,
2002, when U.S. District Judge Robert Jones
issued an injunction blocking Ashcroft from
trying to prevent doctors from writing lethal
prescriptions for terminally ill patients who
request the drugs.
"We expect to prevail for ALL the same
reasons," said Eli Stutsman, an attorney
representing a plaintiff physician and
pharmacist in the case, after the hearing.
"This case has not changed. You saw today
what you saw a year ago."
Federal lawyers would not comment directly on
the hearing, but deputy assistant attorney
general Gregory Katsas read a statement.
"Federal law has long authorized physicians to
prescribe controlled substances only for
legitimate medical purposes," Katsas read.
"Assisting suicide is not such a purpose," but
appropriate pain management is, he said.
The hearing got off to a running start before a
packed courtroom.
Minutes into arguments by Katsas, Judge
Richard Tallman cut in with questions about the
attorney general's right to regulate states'
medical practice an issue at the heart of the
case.
And so it went for the rest of the hour, with
judges Clifford Wallace and Donald Lay also
interrupting lawyers with questions,
observations and counter-arguments.
Central to the discussion was the Controlled
Substances Act, or CSA, passed by Congress in
1970 to combat illicit drug use, trafficking and
diversion.
In his initial attack on the Oregon law, Ashcroft
said assisted suicide violates the CSA because it
is not a "legitimate medical purpose."
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Robert Rocklin, a lawyer for the state,
maintained the CSA was intended to incorporate
different state medical standards, and that
Congress did not intend the CSA to give the
attorney general authority to interfere with state
medical practices.
Judge Wallace asked hypothetically if the
attorney general would have to defer to a state
law that allowed chiropractors to give morphine
to patients to relax them.
Rocklin answered yes.
But Katsas said controlled substances, which
include the lethal barbiturates used in assisting
suicide, have been regulated by the federal
government for 90 years, and that the attorney
general is not
required to defer to such "idiosyncratic" state
laws as Oregon's.
"The ordinary working assumption is that the
application of federal statutes is uniform
throughout the nation," he said.
Katsas said the attorney general "affirmatively
promotes" pain treatment. "That kind of pain
treatment is permissible, even if a collateral
consequence is to hasten death," he said.
But the judges said the case for deferring to
Ashcroft's interpretation was weakened by
inconsistencies between attorney generals.
"Attorney General (Janet) Reno - she went the
other way, and presumably within a few
months, the new attorney general will go the
other way," Judge Lay said.
Reno, a Clinton appointee, decided not to
interfere with Oregon's law in
1998.
Outside the courthouse, a small crowd of
protesters gathered, some supporting the law,
others calling it a slippery slope to legalized
euthanasia.
The American Medical Association and the
American Nurses Association reject assisted
suicide as fundamentally incompatible with the
physician's role as healer.
George Eighmey of the Oregon chapter of
Compassion in Dying, which supports assisted
suicide, said he thinks the panel will uphold
Jones' decision if the judges' concerns about two
technical issues are
satisfied.
One the question of whether either the federal
court or the appeals court had jurisdiction of the
case - cropped up repeatedly Wednesday.
The other is the issue of "ripeness," or whether
the court should get involved before the
Ashcroft ruling is enforced.
But the fact that six of nine terminally ill
patients who joined the state's lawsuit have died
since the case went to court was a persuasive
indicator that the case is not premature,
Eighmey said,
Doctors and pharmacists "can just wait until
their license is jerked and then they can sue, but
a patient can't wait," Eighmey said.
Dr. Kenneth Stevens, president of Physicians for
Compassionate Care, which advocates against
the law, said a ruling against Oregon would not
spell the end of the Death with Dignity Act,
because doctors still could use drugs and
methods not regulated by the CSA to assist
suicide, such as insulin.
Salem oncologist Dr. Peter Rasmussen, a
plaintiff in the case, disagreed.
"I don't think I would do that and I don't think
other Oregon physicians would do it because
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there are side-effects and complications," he
said.
"With barbiturates, the patient simply falls
asleep."
Thirty-eight Oregon residents used the law to
end their lives in 2002. They're among 129
people who have done so since the law took
effect in 1998, according to state records.
Laurence M. Cruz can be reached at (503) 399-
6716 or
Icruz@StatesmanJournal.com
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Clash in Court Over Oregon's Law on Suicide
Los Angeles Times
May 8, 2003
Tom Gorman
PORTLAND, Ore. -- Atty. Gen. John
Ashcroft has the right to ban Oregon physicians
from prescribing lethal doses of controlled
narcotics to terminally ill patients who want to
die sooner, Justice Department lawyers argued
Wednesday before federal appellate judges.
The drugs doctors prescribe under the state's
assisted-suicide law are regulated by the federal
Controlled Substances Act, which restricts their
use for medical purposes only, said lawyer
Gregory G. Katsas. Assisting suicide is not a
medical procedure, he said.
The Oregon attorney general's office
countered that the federal statute was designed
to fight drug trafficking and drug abuse, and not
impinge on state medical laws including
physician-assisted suicide.
Under Ashcroft's directive, doctors face a
"Hobson's choice" because they would be
punished for trying to help their dying patients,
said attorney Nicholas W. van Aelstyn,
representing patients seeking a physician-
assisted suicide.
Oregon is the only state in the nation to have
an assisted-suicide law, which voters have
approved twice since 1994. Under strict
guidelines, it allows doctors to prescribe lethal
cocktails of narcotics to terminally ill patients
who meet specific criteria.
Ashcroft, who opposes assisted suicide, tried to
overrule the state law in 2001 by prohibiting
doctors from prescribing controlled substances
for that purpose.
Oregon and suicide advocates went to court to
challenge Ashcroft's directive, and last year,
U.S. District Judge Robert Jones ruled that
Ashcroft had overstepped his authority by trying
to dictate a state's medical practices. Jones
issued a permanent injunction blocking
Ashcroft's directive.
Ashcroft contested that ruling and a three-
judge panel of the U.S. 9th District Court of
Appeals heard the challenge Wednesday.
Two judges -- Clifford Wallace and Richard
Tallman -- wondered whether physicians could
get around Ashcroft's ban by using other drugs,
such as insulin.
"Practitioners won't use anything but a
controlled substance," answered Eli Stutsman,
an attorney representing a physician and
pharmacist who are plaintiffs in the case. "You
can't meet the standard of care without using
controlled substances."
In focusing the legal debate, Tallman said,
"The argument is not that the attorney general
has prevented assisted suicides, but what drugs
to use to assist suicide -- that 'these are the
medicines doctors can use.'
"So the question is, may Oregon adopt ... a
medical practice that is in federal law
prohibited?" Tallman asked.
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Katsas acknowledged that states can craft their
own medical laws, but he said suicide is not a
medical mission, and chastised Oregon for
trying to up-end a tradition of medical healing
dating back to Hippocrates. Federal regulations
on the use of controlled substance trump a
state's desire to want to use them for suicide, he
said.
After the hearing, Van Aelstyn said, "I'm
encouraged that there appeared to be an
appreciation for the profoundly difficult
situation the patients find themselves in if
Ashcroft's directive is allowed to be enforced."
Justice Department attorneys declined
comment outside the courtroom, but read a
prepared statement. "Physicians have long
sworn a sacred oath to 'neither give a deadly
drug to anybody if asked for it, nor ... make a
suggestion to this effect,' " Assistant Atty. Gen.
Robert D. McCallum Jr. said.
"In contrast to assisted suicide, the prescription
of controlled substances for pain management
has long been recognized as a legitimate
medical purpose," he said, "and appropriate pain
management serves to protect the terminally ill
at the time of their greatest vulnerability and to
preserve human life."
To qualify for physician-assisted suicide, an
adult must be diagnosed as having a life
expectancy of less than six months, and a
second doctor must find the patient mentally
competent and not suffering from depression.
The patient must make two oral requests, and a
third in writing, for a physician's assistance, and
then wait 15 days before receiving the
prescription.
Since 1998, when the law took effect, 129
people in Oregon have committed suicide with
prescribed narcotics.
A decision by the panel is expected this
summer. Any ruling is likely to be appealed to
the full 9th Circuit Court, or directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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Federal Interference in Assisted Suicide
New York Times
March 27, 2002
The state of Oregon and the Bush
administration collided in court last week on
the sensitive issue of physician-assisted
suicide. The hearing provided sad evidence
of the administration's willingness to misuse
a law designed to control illicit drugs to
prevent doctors from carrying out the wishes
of Oregon voters that lethal drugs be
provided to terminally ill patients under
tightly regulated circumstances.
Oregon voters approved the Death With
Dignity Act by a narrow margin in 1994 and
reaffirmed it by a 60-to-40 margin in 1997,
but right-to-life and conservative religious
groups have been trying to overturn the law
ever since. Their attempts in Congress have
been unsuccessful so far, but late last year
Attorney General John Ashcroft, reversing a
decision made by his predecessor, Janet
Reno, asserted that the federal Controlled
Substances Act could be used against
Oregon doctors who helped patients commit
suicide by prescribing lethal drugs.
That opinion would allow the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration to revoke the
prescription-writing privileges of any
Oregon doctor who prescribed the drugs
commonly used for assisted suicide, and
would open the doctor to possible criminal
prosecution as well. Oregon has quite rightly
filed a lawsuit to block this vast and
dispiriting overreach of federal authority.
The Oregon law, the first assisted suicide act
approved in any state, is a model of
carefully controlled compassion for patients
ravaged by painful, incurable diseases. The
law allows terminally ill patients to receive
prescriptions for lethal medications that they
must administer themselves, without
assistance from a doctor or anyone else.
Two doctors must certify that the patient is
of sound mind and has less than six months
to live before a prescription can be written.
There has been no rush to suicide under this
process; only 21 patients died from taking
the lethal medications last year, down from
27 in each of the preceding two years.
We suspect that, when all the legal
proceedings are done, the courts will uphold
Oregon's right to settle this issue for itself.
Troubling end-of-life issues are surely better
handled through democratic political
processes than through a unilateral
declaration by an attorney general who may
be responding to constituency groups or
personal ideology.
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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND FEDERALISM
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2003
Brian H. Bix
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
I. Interactions Between States and Between
State Governments and the Federal
Government
The basic notion of American federalism is
that decisions are divided between the
central, national government and the
individual states. Additionally, within the
states, power is frequently devolved further
to municipalities and other entities;
however, for present purposes, the article
will focus almost exclusively on the choice
between federal and state regulation. In the
practice of American federalism, various
themes have emerged: in particular, the idea
of states as experimental laboratories; and
the tension between state autonomy, national
citizenship, and federal governmental
initiatives.
A. States as Laboratories
Justice Louis Brandeis famously described
the value of federalism in terms of how the
states can try out new programs and
approaches--the states as "laboratories":
To say experimentation in things social and
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial
of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation. It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.4
Thus, states are generally to be encouraged
to try out new approaches to dealing with
social, and even moral, problems. At the
same time, one need not assume that
experimentation is always valuable for its
own sake, any more than one should assume
that liberty is valuable, however it might be
used.5  We might rightly resist allowing
certain states to "experiment" with slavery,
torture, or involuntary euthanasia. One
justification for federal intervention would
be the belief that certain matters should be
beyond the scope of state choice.
4 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits,
But as Empowerment, 45 Kan. L. Rev. 1219, 1235-
36 (1997). On questioning whether liberty is always
valuable, regardless of its use, see James Fitzjames
Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, in Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity and Three Brief Essays 135-78
(Univ. Chicago Press 1991) (1873) ("The Doctrine of
Liberty in its Application to Morals"); Joseph Raz,
The Morality of Freedom 1-19 (1986).
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The notion of using the state as
experimental laboratories is also connected
with the desire of the federal courts (and, to
some extent, Congress) not to intervene on
issues until the consequences of various
approaches have become clearer through
actual practice. The United State Supreme
Court decisions that refused to recognize a
constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide, Washington v. Glucksberg7  and
Vacco v. Quill,8 contained numerous
references to the on-going state
'experimentations" on the issue, indicating,
perhaps, that one problem with the
challenges in those cases was that they were
brought too early.
Oregon is currently the only "laboratory" in
the United States experimenting with
physician-assisted suicide. In the 2000
Election, Maine narrowly defeated a ballot
measure which would have allowed
physician-assisted suicide. Similar
initiatives had also been defeated in
Washington in 1991 and in California in
1993. Finally, the Hawaii legislature
defeated a comparable proposal in 2002. Of
course, experimentation on this issue is also
going on in other countries, and there is no
reason why Americans should not try to
learn from foreign experiences.
C. Federal Intervention
The federal government has already
stepped in, to a limited extent, to constrain
state experimentation in the area of
physician-assisted suicide, and some federal
7 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
8521 U.S. 793 (1997).
officials have tried to end the experiment
entirely.
The first form of federal intervention with
the Oregon legislation in fact came neither
from the legislative branch nor from the
executive branch, but from the judicial
branch. The legislation legalizing
physician-assisted suicide, after being
passed in a November 1994 referendum,
was supposed to go into effect in December
1994. However, a federal district court
enjoined implementation of the Act, on the
basis of a lawsuit which claimed that the
legislation violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.38 However, the
district court decision was overturned by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
United States Supreme Court refused to hear
the appeal.39
38 The preliminary injunction, and its justification,
appears in Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or.
1994). The permanent injunction appears in Lee v.
State, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), rev'd sub
nom. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997).
The initial suit was brought by "two physicians, four
terminally ill or potentially terminally ill patients, a
residential care facility, and individual operators of
residential care facilities." Lee, 869 F. Supp. at 1493.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Act violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the First Amendment rights
to free exercise of religion and association, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. The eventual
injunction was based only on the Equal Protection
claim. Id. at 1437. The court stated:
[The Oregon Act] provides a means to commit
suicide to a severely overinclusive class who may be
competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or
abused by others. The state interest and the disparate
treatment are not rationally related and [the Act],
therefore, violates the Constitution of the United
States.
39 Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert
denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997).
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The injunction against implementation of
the Oregon legislation had been lifted on
October 27, 1997, and in November of the
same year, Oregon voters rejected by a
margin of 60% to 40% a referendum effort
to repeal the legislation. (Sixteen patients
died ingesting legally prescribed lethal
medication in 1998; twenty-seven in 1999;
twenty-seven in 2000; and twenty-one in
2001.)
The Federal Assisted Suicide Funding
Restriction Act of 1997 was a more
"successful" federal intervention, prohibiting
the use of federal funds in support of
physician-assisted suicide. More extensive
and constraining federal intervention has
been introduced, but has not (yet) been
enacted. The Pain Relief Promotion Act
was introduced in the House and the Senate
in both 1999 and 2000, and was in fact
passed by the House in October 1999 before
it died in the Senate. That Act would,
among other things, have made it illegal to
use a federally controlled substance in
physician-assisted suicide (and most
commentators viewed blocking physician-
assisted suicide in Oregon as this Act's main
purpose).
On November 6, 2001, Attorney General
John Ashcroft sent a letter to the Drug
Enforcement Administration, a copy of
which was published in the Federal Register,
stating that assisting suicide was not a
"legitimate medical purpose," and therefore
the use of controlled substances to effect
that purpose would violate the Controlled
Substances Act, and make a physician's
The Circuit Court decision was grounded on the fact
that none of the plaintiffs had the requisite standing
to challenge the statute and their claims lacked
"ripeness" --that is, that the plaintiffs could not claim
actual harm from the Act, or any imminent harm that
was more than highly speculative. Id. at 1387-92.
license subject to suspension or revocation if
she prescribed controlled substances for that
purpose of assisting suicide. The State of
Oregon subsequently filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District
of Oregon, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the Attorney General's
Directive.47 Judge Robert E. Jones initially
granted temporary relief, and eventually
granted a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the Directive. The District
Court grounded the injunction on the
conclusion that the Attorney General's
actions had exceeded his authority under the
Controlled Substances Act.
There is ample evidence that Oregon
residents, whatever their positions on the
issue of physician-assisted suicide, generally
have not reacted well to the perceived
federal interference with what is perceived
to be a state matter.
E. Application to Physician-Assisted Suicide
Both the Oregon law and most other recent
proposals impose a residency requirement
on those who would take advantage of the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide.
That alone should be sufficient to mollify
most concerns about one state's laws
undermining the policies of other states, or
about there being a ghoulish "race to the
bottom" for the medical-suicide "tourist
trade." Here, it is interesting to contrast the
likely effects of two different controversial
state health legalizations--physician-assisted
suicide and medical marijuana --and perhaps
add in the non-medical example of same-sex
47 A physician, a pharmacist, and a number of
terminally ill patients were allowed to intervene.
State v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
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marriage. Though some commentators had
suggested that there might be a strong
financial incentive for states to enact same-
sex marriage in order to gain the tourism
dollars from those who would take
advantage of such laws, there has in fact
been no rush to that "top" or "bottom,"
because the proposal is sufficiently
controversial that there will inevitably be
serious resistance to the proposal, whatever
the financial (or other) incentives might be
for passage. Similarly, for physician-
assisted suicide and medical marijuana:
whatever incentives there might be for
passage, the proposals inevitably evoke
sufficiently strong ideological opposition
that the marginal financial (or other)
incentives are unlikely to cause quick
passage-- contrast rules like those regarding
corporate governance or securities
regulation, where those favoring business-
friendly rules are likely to be well-
organized and have a strong financial
incentive in passage, while opponents are
unlikely to be either strongly organized or
strongly motivated.
Consider also one response to physician-
assisted suicide: the federal legislation that
prohibited the use of federal funds for
physician-assisted suicide. How that
decision comports with federalist principles
depends on one's views on at least two
issues. First, does one consider physician-
assisted suicide to be an acceptable option
for individuals to use and states to
authorize? Those who do not think so
would not be inclined to think of physician-
assisted suicide as a matter on which states
should be allowed, or encouraged, to
"experiment," and therefore, federal
intervention to discourage or prohibit
physician-assisted suicide would be
appropriate.
Second, even assuming that physician-
assisted suicide is an appropriate matter for
state choice, what is the baseline against
which federal funding decisions are to be
evaluated? If one considers the baseline to
be "no funding," then a decision not to offer
federal funds to physician-assisted suicides
in Oregon seems entirely acceptable. This is
an experiment of that state, and to require
the citizens of other states, including states
whose citizens sharply disagree with the
practice, to subsidize Oregon's experiment,
seems contrary to the whole notion of "the
states as laboratories." Each state, as
experimenter, should make its own decisions
and live with the costs and benefits of those
decisions.
On the other hand, if the federal decision to
block funds is seen against a baseline of
general funding for medical procedures, then
the federal decision is less a matter of a
"failure to subsidize," fully justified under
federalist principles, and more a matter of
the federal government trying to undermine
the practice. The inverse of the prior
analysis then applies: just as experimenting
states have no right to be subsidized by (the
citizens of) other states, so they have a right
not to be undermined by the federal
government, representing the citizens of
other states. There is no easy or obvious
conclusion regarding the proper baseline for
this analysis, and the analysis raises
conceptual, moral, and political questions
far beyond the scope of this piece.
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[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
DEATH WITH
This analysis of foreign laws and state
laws regarding PAS and euthanasia
emphasizes two main theories. First, at
least some people in the United States
have considered the prospect of dying as
they choose and clearly want a choice if
they become terminally ill or debilitated.
That theory seems to transcend state
lines as Dr. Kevorkian did not confine
his "practice" to Michigan and was
sought out by ill patients across the
country. Second, efforts by private
citizens to challenge anti-PAS statutes
have proven unsuccessful. However, as
foreign countries have shown, the
Supreme Court hinted, and Oregon has
attempted to show, legislative efforts to
legalize PAS may be successful.
"Oregon's Death with Dignity Act is an
exemplary model of public interest
direct democracy, not because of the
outcome, but because of the process.
Both the 1994 voter initiative and the
1997 referendum were free of many of
the 'flaws' typically associated with
direct democracy."' 0
A. The Death with Dignity Act
While PAS and euthanasia have been
debated for decades, Oregon's DWDA
was merely a hope for one man at the
beginning of 1990.
1. History of the DWDA
Elvin Sinnard began the quest for
legalized physician-assisted suicide in
Oregon during 1990. The quest stemmed
from Mr. Sinnard's elderly wife who
took her own life in 1989 after living on
massive doses of morphine for 18
months due to suffering caused by
chronic heart disease. Mr. Sinnard "had
sought and received information from
the Hemlock Society, a national
euthanasia advocacy group
headquartered at the time in Eugene,
101 Carol A. Pratt, Efforts to Legalize Physician-
Assisted Suicide in New York, Washington and
Oregon: A Contrast Between Judicial and
Initiative Approaches--Who Should Decide?, 77
OR. L. REV. 1027, 1038-39 (1998)
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II. OREGON'S
DIGNITY ACT
Oregon." Mr. Sinnard sought to legalize
PAS when he realized that "to legally
protect himself he had to leave his wife's
side when she died." After her death,
Mr. Sinnard "and a coalition of attorneys
and physicians, which eventually
organized as Oregon Right to Die, met in
his basement and began drafting what
would be passed in November of 1994
by Oregon voters as the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act--the first statute in this
country to legalize PAS."
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act
(DWDA), known as Measure 16 on the
ballot, was brought by initiative and
voted on November 8, 1994.106 It was
"voted into law by fifty-one percent of
Oregon's voters." However, Lee v. State
of Oregon108  was filed in the U.S.
District Court of Oregon in December of
1994 and a preliminary injunction was
issued by the Court stating:
1. the defendant ... [is] preliminarily
enjoined from recognizing the exception
from the homicide laws created by
Oregon Ballot Measure 16 .... ;
2. defendant ... [is] preliminarily
enjoined from recognizing the exception
from the standard of professional
conduct created by Oregon Ballot
' The initiative process in Oregon is authorized
under Article IV, Section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution which provides, in part, that "the
legislative power of the state, except for the
initiative and referendum powers reserved to the
people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly,
consisting of a Senate and House of
Representatives."
'os 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994) (plaintiffs in
this case were two physicians, four terminally ill
or potentially terminally ill patients, a residential
care facility, and individual operators of
residential care facilities).
Measure 16 in the conduct of their duties
3. the defendant ... is preliminarily
enjoined from allowing assisted suicides
to be perforned in its facilities;
4. [the defendant is] preliminarily
enjoined from bringing criminal, civil, or
regulatory enforcement action based on
Ballot Measure 16 against any plaintiff
for refusing, on the basis of religious
objection to, ... assist any physician with
a patient suicide; and,
5. [defendant is] preliminarily
enjoined from recognizing the
constitutionality of recently enacted
Oregon Ballot Measure 16.
The court re-affirmed its temporary
restraining order on August 3, 1995,
basically restating the above
injunction."10  However, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
lower court's judgment and on remand
directed the district court to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint for lack of
jurisdiction."' This decision allowed
the Oregon voters to once again vote on
the Death with Dignity Act, which
passed again. The DWDA went into
effect in November of 1997 and has
been in use since that time.
2. The Language and Use of the DWDA
The DWDA is quite lengthy and
includes forms that patients are required
to fill out to receive a prescription from
their physician. The DWDA defines the
terms used in the statute, dictates who
110 Lee v. State of Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D.
Or. 1995).
" Lee v. State of Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th
Cir. 1997).
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may initiate a written request for
medication, and describes the attending
physician's responsibilities. The DWDA
also provides certain safeguards to
ensure that the statute is followed
explicitly, and that PAS is not abused.
Another key provision states that a
patient has a right to rescind his or her
request at any time.
Under the Act, the Oregon Health
Department is required to review records
that are maintained under Oregon
statutes annually. After review, the
Health Department must compile a
statistical report that is to be made
available to the public. This annual
report is available both in hard copy and
on the World Wide Web. In 2001, the
statistics showed that 21 patients "used
legalized physician-assisted suicide,"
bringing the four-year total to 91. The
Fourth Annual Report shows that the
median age of those requesting a
prescription was 68 and almost half had
been educated beyond high school.
Common illnesses predicating the
patients' requests were lung cancer,
breast cancer, pancreatic cancer, ovarian
cancer, prostate cancer, colon cancer,
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and
chronic lower respiratory disease.
Public support for the DWDA is high.
According to a Harris Poll, by
approximately "two-to-one, most adults
continue to favor the right to euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide." In fact, a
considerable majority believes the law
should allow physicians to help dying
patients who are in severe distress. The
poll concludes by stating: "No matter
which questions are asked, there is a
strong, approximately two-to-one
majority in favor of an individual's right
to euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide where terminally ill patients
clearly want this to happen."
Attorney General Ashcroft's Order and
Memo
AG Ashcroft's order stated that
"assisting suicide is not a 'legitimate
medical purpose' within the meaning of
21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and that
prescribing, dispensing, or administering
federally controlled substances to assist
suicide violates the Controlled Substance
Act." The order also stated that the
"conclusion applies regardless of
whether state law authorizes or permits
such conduct by practitioners or others
and regardless of the condition of the
person whose suicide is assisted." The
order goes on to say that, although the
CSA and Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) are involved, the AG understands
that physicians have a legitimate medical
purpose in dispensing controlled
substances for pain management. AG
Ashcroft ends by saying that the order in
no way changes DEA standards in any
state except Oregon.
Attached to the order is a memorandum
that AG Ashcroft wrote to DEA
Administrator Asa Hutchinson. In this
memo, AG Ashcroft lists various reasons
why he issued the order, reasoning that
narcotics and other dangerous drugs
controlled by federal law may not be
dispensed consistently with the
Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C.
801- 971 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (CSA),
to assist suicide in the United States ....
[T]he DEA's original reading of the
CSA-that controlled substances may
not be dispensed to assist suicide-was
correct .... [T]he original DEA
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determination is reinstated and should be
implemented ....
Mr. Hutchinson was quoted as saying
how pleased he was that the issue of
PAS had been addressed and clarified.
He stated the "DEA had always ensured
that controlled substances were
prescribed properly, and that health and
safety are always of paramount
importance." He continued by saying
that the AG's statement mirrors the
DEA's current and past stance.
C. Oregon Physicians' Fears of Being
Reprimanded
Attorney General Ashcroft stressed that
his decision to regulate Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act will not increase the
scrutiny of physicians who prescribe
controlled substances for pain relief. It
remains the position of the Department
of Justice and the Drug Enforcement
Administration that the dispensing of
controlled substances for pain treatment,
when carried out by a physician acting in
the usual course of professional practice,
is a legitimate medical purpose under
federal law.
However, Brad Wright, a member of
Compassion in Dying, a group that
supports PAS, stated that "[m]any
Oregon doctors have been reluctant to
assist with suicides because of Ashcroft's
order." It follows that, with heightened
scrutiny, Oregon physicians will
probably be writing prescriptions with
''one eye over their shoulder."
IV. OREGON TAKES
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ASHCROFT
ON
JOHN
Oregon's sovereign rights are being
stepped upon by AG John Ashcroft's
order to the DEA to "investigate and
prosecute Oregon doctors who prescribe
life- ending medication to terminally ill
patients .... Ashcroft's decision ... raises
difficult questions of statutory and
constitutional interpretation. However,
the courts ultimately resolve those
issues." While there are a few grounds
for a federal law to legitimately usurp
state law, "the Oregon experience does
not justify federal intervention on this
issue." In fact, "[t]he Supreme Court has
decided to leave the physician- assisted
suicide issue to the states, and Ashcroft,
who is a proponent of federalism, ought
to follow the Court's lead on this issue."
As it stands, Ashcroft "fired the first
shot in the battle between the state of
Oregon and the federal government over
which government has the ultimate
authority to decide what constitutes the
legitimate practice of medicine, at least
when schedule II substances regulated
by the Controlled Substance Act ... are
involved."16 8  Immediately after AG
Ashcroft set forth his order, the State of
Oregon filed suit in federal district court
requesting a temporary restraining order,
which was granted on November 7,
2001, and then extended until further
notice on November 20, 2001. Oral
arguments were heard on March 22,
2002, before U.S. District Judge Robert
E. Jones, who issued a written opinion
on April 17, 2002.
1 State of Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d
1077, 1078 (D. Or. 2002) (citation omitted).
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A. Oregon's Argument
Oregon's argument is based on five
factors:
1. The CSA does not apply. The
Controlled Substance Act created a
"closed system" intended to prevent
trafficking and diversion and physicians
and pharmacists who practice under the
Death with Dignity Act are in full
compliance with the state's standard of
care and are not trafficking or diverting
drugs.
2. The DOJ cannot change previous
rulings in this manner. The Attorney
General violated the Administrative
Procedures Act by attempting to
promulgate a substantive regulation (or
amend an existing regulation) without
following the mandatory notice and
comment procedure.
3. Ashcroft pushes federal v. state
limits. The CSA lacks the requisite
"clear statement" that the Supreme Court
has required before it will find that
Congress intended to alter the federal-
state framework--in this case by
permitting federal encroachment into
[an] area traditionally reserved to the
states.
4. Ashcroft abuses commerce clause.
The manner in which Oregonians die is
not interstate commerce, nor may the
federal government use a trivial
connection to commerce to justify a
heavy-handed federal intrusion into
areas traditionally reserved to the states.
The states are capable of addressing this
issue themselves, and should be
permitted to do so, as the Supreme Court
contemplated in Washington v.
Glucksberg.
5. Ashcroft is in violation of
Executive Order 13132 on Federalism.
Ashcroft's ruling violates this Executive
Order reiterating the principles of
Federalism as outlined in the U.S.
Constitution.172
Although Judge Jones did not hint at
how he might rule, he questioned the
government's attorneys on "whether the
government's authority rested on the
relatively narrow regulating of drugs or
the much broader issue of stopping
doctors who might advise patients on
suicide."
B. State of Oregon v. Ashcroftl 74
In its written opinion, the court,
through Judge Jones, first addressed the
background of the CSA set forth above.
It then outlined the purpose of the CSA
by stating: "The CSA provides a
comprehensive federal scheme for
regulation and control of certain drugs
and other substances. The congressional
findings supporting Title II reveal that
Congress' overarching concern in
enacting the CSA was the problem of
drug abuse and illegal trafficking in
drugs." The court explained the different
amendments the CSA has gone through
and pointed out that Congress
continually attempted to address
problems with illegal drug trafficking
and drug abuse.
The court then specifically addressed
the DWDA, including the events that
gave rise to the current suit.
172 Greg Eddleston, Oregon Death with Dignity
Attorney Asserts Ashcroft in Violation of
Executive Order on Federalism: Briefs Filed on
Behalf of Oregon Physician and Pharmacist, Jan.
22, 2002, available at
www.dwd.org/press/releases/01 2 202.asp.
174 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002).
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On July 27, 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch
and Representative Henry Hyde sent a
letter to the Administrator of the DEA
advocating an interpretation of the CSA
that would, in effect, permit the DEA to
revoke the registrations of physicians
and pharmacists who take actions
authorized by the Oregon Act. In late
October 1997, Hatch and Hyde sent a
second letter to the DEA, expressing
"heightened ... urgency" resulting from
the United States Supreme Court's
decision to deny certiorari in Lee v. State
of Or., which had, until then, kept the
Oregon Act from going into effect.
From the court's opinion, one can see
that the DWDA is what the people of
Oregon want.
The court continued, stating that AG
Ashcroft passed on the opportunity to
"evaluate carefully the scientifically
conducted epidemiological studies of the
Oregon Act, and the excellent analysis
of the multiple issues as set forth in the
briefs submitted by plaintiff and
intervenors in these proceedings." Prior
to the publication of the Ashcroft order,
Ashcroft did not consult with, or give
notice to, Oregon's public officials. In
failing to do so, Ashcroft eliminated any
opportunity for public comment. The
court then stated that "[t]he [p]lain
[I]anguage of the CSA [d]oes [niot
[s]upport the Ashcroft [order]," and the
"[legislative [h]istory of the CSA [d]oes
[n]ot [s]upport the Ashcroft [order]."
Judge Jones summarized the court's
opinion by saying:
The determination of what constitutes a
legitimate medical practice or purpose
traditionally has been left to the
individual states .... The CSA was never
intended, and the USDOJ and DEA were
never authorized, to establish a national
medical practice or act as a national
medical board. To allow an attorney
general--an appointed executive whose
tenure depends entirely on whatever
administration occupies the White
House--to determine the legitimacy of a
particular medical practice without a
specific congressional grant of authority
would be unprecedented and
extraordinary.
The court concluded by saying that "the
fact that opposition to assisted suicide
may be fully justified, morally, ethically,
religiously or otherwise, does not permit
a federal statute to be manipulated from
its true meaning to satisfy even a worthy
goal."
Even though the court ruled for the
plaintiffs, "the case is almost certain to
be appealed, extending the controversy
that has defined the landmark law since
it was approved by Oregon voters eight
years ago." In fact, the defendants have
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
SEAN SILVEIRA; JACK SAFFORD; PATRICK OVERSTREET; DAVID K.
MEHL; STEVEN FOCHT, Sgt.; DAVID BLALOCK, Sgt.; MARCUS DAVIS;
VANCE BOYCE; KENETH DEWALD, Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.
BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General, State of California; GRAY DAVIS, Governor,
State of California, Defendants-Appellees.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
February 15, 2002, Argued and Submitted
December 5, 2002, Filed
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations
omitted]
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
In 1999, the State of California enacted
amendments to its gun control laws that
significantly strengthened the state's
restrictions on the possession, use, and
transfer of the semi-automatic weapons
popularly known as "assault weapons."
Plaintiffs, California residents who either
own assault weapons, seek to acquire such
weapons, or both, brought this challenge to
the gun control statute, asserting that the
law, as amended, violates the Second
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause,
and a host of other constitutional
provisions. The district court dismissed all
of the plaintiffs' claims. Because the Second
Amendment does not confer an individual
right to own or possess arms, we affirm the
dismissal of all claims brought pursuant to
that constitutional provision. As to the Equal
Protection claims, we conclude that there is
no constitutional infirmity in the statute's
provisions regarding active peace officers.
We find, however, no rational basis for the
establishment of a statutory exception with
respect to retired peace officers, and hold
that the retired officers' exception fails even
the most deferential level of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, we
conclude that each of the three additional
constitutional claims asserted by plaintiffs
on appeal is without merit.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to a proliferation of shootings
involving semi-automatic weapons, the
California Legislature passed the Roberti-
Roos Assault Weapons Control Act ("the
AWCA") in 1989. ... The AWCA renders it
a felony offense to manufacture in
California any of the semi-automatic
weapons specified in the statute, or to
possess, sell, transfer, or import into the
state such weapons without a permit. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12280. The statute
contains a grandfather clause that permits
the ownership of assault weapons by
individuals who lawfully purchased them
before the statute's enactment, so long as the
owners register the weapons with the state
Department of Justice. Id. The grandfather
clause, however, imposes significant
restrictions on the use of weapons that are
registered pursuant to its provisions. Id. §
12285(c). ..
In 1999, the legislature amended the AWCA
in order to broaden its coverage and to
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render it more flexible in response to
technological developments in the
manufacture of semiautomatic weapons. The
amended AWCA retains both the original
list of models of restricted weapons, and the
judicial declaration procedure by which
models may be added to the list. The 1999
amendments to the AWCA statute add a
third method of defining the class of
restricted weapons: The amendments
provide that a weapon constitutes a
restricted assault weapon if it possesses
certain generic characteristics listed in the
statute. Id. § 12276.1. Examples of the types
of weapons restricted by the revised AWCA
include a "semiautomatic, center-fire rifle
that has a fixed magazine with the capacity
to accept more than 10 rounds," §
12276.1(a)(2), and a semiautomatic,
centerfire rifle that has the capacity to accept
a detachable magazine and also features a
flash suppressor, a grenade launcher, or a
flare launcher. § 12276.1(a)(1)(A)-(E). The
amended AWCA also restricts assault
weapons equipped with "barrel shrouds,"
which protect the user's hands from the
intense heat created by the rapid firing of the
weapon, as well as semiautomatic weapons
equipped with silencers. Id. . . .
Plaintiffs in this case are nine individuals,
some of whom lawfully acquired weapons
that were subsequently classified as assault
weapons under the amended AWCA.7 They
filed this action in February, 2000, one
month after the 1999 AWCA amendments
took effect. Plaintiffs who own assault
weapons challenge the AWCA requirements
that they either register, relinquish, or render
inoperable their assault weapons as violative
of their Second Amendment rights. Plaintiffs
The nine plaintiffs include, inter alia, two California
National Guardsmen (both combat veterans), a San
Francisco police officer, an insurance agent, a
chemical engineer, and a California correctional
officer.
who seek to purchase weapons that may no
longer lawfully be purchased in California
also attack the ban on assault weapon sales
as being contrary to their rights under that
Amendment. Additionally, plaintiffs who
are not active or retired California peace
officers challenge on Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection grounds two
provisions of the AWCA: one that allows
active peace officers to possess assault
weapons while off-duty, and one that
permits retired peace officers to possess
assault weapons they acquire from their
department at the time of their retirement.
The State of California immediately moved
to dismiss the action pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
contending that all the claims were barred as
a matter of law. After a hearing, the district
judge granted the defendants' motion in all
respects, and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs
appeal, and we affirm on all claims but one.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background and Precedent.
There are three principal schools of thought
that form the basis for the debate. The first,
which we will refer to as the "traditional
individual rights" model, holds that the
Second Amendment guarantees to individual
private citizens a fundamental right to
possess and use firearms for any purpose at
all, subject only to limited government
regulation. This view, urged by the NRA
and other firearms enthusiasts, as well as by
a prolific cadre of fervent supporters in the
legal academy, had never been adopted by
any court until the recent Fifth Circuit
decision in United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 227 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
153 L. Ed. 2d 184, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
The second view, a variant of the first, we
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will refer to as the "limited individual
rights" model. Under that view, individuals
maintain a constitutional right to possess
firearms insofar as such possession bears a
reasonable relationship to militia service.
The third, a wholly contrary view,
commonly called the "collective rights"
model, asserts that the Second Amendment
right to "bear arms" guarantees the right of
the people to maintain effective state
militias, but does not provide any type of
individual right to own or possess weapons.
Under this theory of the amendment, the
federal and state governments have the full
authority to enact prohibitions and
restrictions on the use and possession of
firearms, subject only to generally
applicable constitutional constraints, such as
due process, equal protection, and the like.
Long the dominant view of the Second
Amendment, and widely accepted by the
federal courts, the collective rights model
has recently come under strong criticism
from individual rights advocates. After
conducting a full analysis of the amendment,
its history, and its purpose, we reaffirm our
conclusion in Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98
(9th Cir. 1996), that it is this collective
rights model which provides the best
interpretation of the Second Amendment.
Despite the increased attention by
commentators and political interest groups
to the question of what exactly the Second
Amendment protects, with the sole
exception of the Fifth Circuit's Emerson
decision there exists no thorough judicial
examination of the amendment's meaning.
The Supreme Court's most extensive
treatment of the amendment is a somewhat
cryptic discussion in United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 83 L. Ed. 1206, 59 S. Ct. 816
(1939). . . . in Miller the Supreme Court
decided that because a weapon was not
suitable for use in the militia, its possession
was not protected by the Second
Amendment. As a result of its phrasing of its
holding in the negative, however, the Miller
Court's opinion stands only for the
proposition that the possession of certain
weapons is not protected, and offers little
guidance as to what rights the Second
Amendment does protect....
Some thirty-odd years after Miller , two
Justices of the Court pithily expressed their
views on the question whether the Second
Amendment limits the power of the federal
or state governments to enact gun control
laws. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, stated in dissent in
Adams v. Williams, that in his view, the
problem of police fearing that suspects they
apprehend are armed:
"is an acute one not because of the Fourth
Amendment, but because of the ease with
which anyone can acquire a pistol. A
powerful lobby dins into the ears of our
citizenry that these gun purchases are
constitutional rights protected by the Second
Amendment . . . . There is under our
decisions no reason why stiff state laws
governing the purchase and possession of
pistols may not be enacted. There is no
reason why pistols may not be barred from
anyone with a police record. There is no
reason why a State may not require a
purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric
test. There is no reason why all pistols
should not be barred to everyone except the
police."
Our court, like every other federal court of
appeals to reach the issue except for the
Fifth Circuit, has interpreted Miller as
rejecting the traditional individual rights
view. In Hickman v. Block, we held that
"the Second Amendment guarantees a
collective rather than an individual right." 81
F.3d at 102 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Like the other courts, we reached
our conclusion regarding the Second
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Amendment's scope largely on the basis of
the rather cursory discussion in Miller, and
touched only briefly on the merits of the
debate over the force of the amendment. See
id.
Appellants contend that we misread Miller
in Hickman. They point out that, as we have
already noted, Miller, like most other cases
that address the Second Amendment, fails to
provide much reasoning in support of its
conclusion. We agree that our determination
in Hickman that Miller endorsed the
collective rights position is open to serious
debate. We also agree that the entire subject
of the meaning of the Second Amendment
deserves more consideration than we, or the
Supreme Court, have thus far been able (or
willing) to give it. This is particularly so
because, since Hickman was decided, there
have been a number of important
developments with respect to the
interpretation of the highly controversial
provision: First, as we have noted, there is
the recent Emerson decision in which the
Fifth Circuit, after analyzing the opinion at
length, concluded that the Supreme Court's
decision in Miller does not resolve the issue
of the Amendment's meaning. The Emerson
court then canvassed the pertinent
scholarship and historical materials, and
held that the Second Amendment does
establish an individual right to possess arms
-- the first federal court of appeals ever to
have so decided. Second, the current
leadership of the United States Department
of Justice recently reversed the decades-old
position of the government on the Second
Amendment, and adopted the view of the
Fifth Circuit. Now, for the first time, the
United States government contends that the
Second Amendment establishes an
individual right to possess arms. The
Solicitor General has advised the Supreme
Court that "the current position of the United
States . . . is that the Second Amendment
more broadly protects the rights of
individuals, including persons who are not
members of any militia or engaged in active
military service or training, to possess and
bear their own firearms, subject to
reasonable restrictions . . . ." Opposition to
Petition for Certiorari in United States v.
Emerson, No. 01-8780, at 19 n.3. In doing
so, the Solicitor General transmitted to the
Court a memorandum from Attorney
General John Ashcroft to all United States
Attorneys adopting the Fifth Circuit's view
and emphasizing that the Emerson court
"undertook a scholarly and comprehensive
review of the pertinent legal materials . . . "
although the Attorney General was as vague
as [*25] the Fifth Circuit with respect both
to the types of weapons that he believes to
be protected by the Second Amendment, and
the basis for making such determinations.
Id., app. A.
In light of the United States government's
recent change in position on the meaning of
the amendment, the resultant flood of
Second Amendment challenges in the
district courts, the Fifth Circuit's extensive
study and analysis of the amendment and its
conclusion that Miller does not mean what
we and other courts have assumed it to
mean, the proliferation of gun control
statutes both state and federal, and the active
scholarly debate that is being waged across
this nation, we believe it prudent to explore
Appellants' Second Amendment arguments
in some depth, and to address the merits of
the issue, even though this circuit's position
on the scope and effect of the amendment
was established in Hickman. Having
engaged in that exploration, we determine
that the conclusion we reached in Hickman
was correct.
476
1.The Text and Structure of the Second
Amendment Demonstrate that the
Amendment's Purpose is to Preserve
Effective State Militias; That Purpose Helps
Shape the Content of the Amendment.
The Second Amendment states in its
entirety: "A well regulated Militia being
necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST.
amend. II. As commentators on all sides of
the debate regarding the amendment's
meaning have acknowledged, the language
of the amendment alone does not
conclusively resolve the question of its
scope. . . . What renders the language and
structure of the amendment particularly
striking is the existence of a prefatory
clause, a syntactical device that is absent
from all other provisions of the Constitution,
including the nine other provisions of the
Bill of Rights. Our analysis thus must
address not only the meaning of each of the
two clauses of the amendment but the
unique relationship that exists between
them.
a. The Meaning of the Amendment's First
Clause: "A Well-Regulated Militia Being
Necessary to the Security of A Free State."
The first or prefatory clause of the Second
Amendment sets forth the amendment's
purpose and intent. An important aspect of
ascertaining that purpose and intent is
determining the import of the term "militia."
Many advocates of the traditional individual
rights model, including the Fifth Circuit
have taken the position that the term
"militia" was meant to refer to all citizens,
and, therefore, that the first clause simply
restates the second in more specific terms...
. We agree with the Fifth Circuit in a very
limited respect. We agree that the
interpretation of the first clause and the
extent to which that clause shapes the
content of the second depends in large part
on the meaning of the term "militia." If
militia refers, as the Fifth Circuit suggests,
to all persons in a state, rather than to the
state military entity, the first clause would
have one meaning -- a meaning that would
support the concept of traditional individual
rights. If the term refers instead, as we
believe, to the entity ordinarily identified by
that designation, the state-created and
organized military force, it would likely be
necessary to attribute a considerably
different meaning to the first clause of the
Second Amendment and ultimately to the
amendment as a whole.
We believe the answer to the definitional
question is the one that most persons would
expect: "militia" refers to a state military
force. We reach our conclusion not only
because that is the ordinary meaning of the
word, but because contemporaneously
enacted provisions of the Constitution that
contain the word "militia" consistently use
the term to refer to a state military entity, not
to the people of the state as a whole. We
look to such contemporaneously enacted
provisions for an understanding of words
used in the Second Amendment in part
because this is an interpretive principle
recently explicated by the Supreme Court in
a case involving another word that appears
in that amendment -- the word "people."
That same interpretive principle is
unquestionably applicable when we construe
the word "militia."
1."Militia" appears repeatedly in the first
and second Articles of the Constitution.
From its use in those sections, it is apparent
that the drafters were referring in the
Constitution to the second of two
government-established and -controlled
military forces. Those forces were, first, the
national army and navy, which were subject
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to civilian control shared by the president
and Congress, and, second, the state militias,
which were to be "essentially organized and
under control of the states, but subject to
regulation by Congress and to
'federalization' at the command of the
president." Paul Finkelman, "A Well
Regulated Militia": The Second Amendment
in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 195, 204 (2000).
After examining each of the significant
words or phrases in the Second
Amendment's first clause, we conclude that
the clause declares the importance of state
militias to the security of the various free
states within the confines of their newly
structured constitutional relationship. With
that understanding, the reason for and
purpose of the Second Amendment becomes
clearer.
b. The Meaning of the Amendment's Second
Clause: "The Right of the People to Keep
and Bear Arms, Shall Not Be Infringed."
Having determined that the first clause of
the Second Amendment declares the
importance of state militias to the proper
functioning of the new constitutional
system, we now turn to the meaning of the
second clause, the effect the first clause has
on the second, and the meaning of the
amendment as a whole. The second clause --
"the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed" -- is not free
from ambiguity. We consider it highly
significant, however, that the second clause
does not purport to protect the right to
"possess" or "own" arms, but rather to "keep
and bear" arms. This choice of words is
important because the phrase "bear arms" is
a phrase that customarily relates to a
military function.
Historical research shows that the use of the
term "bear arms" generally referred to the
carrying of arms in military service -- not
the private use of arms for personal
purposes. For instance, Professor Dorf, after
canvassing documents from the founding
era, concluded that "overwhelmingly, the
term had a military connotation." Dorf,
supra, at 314. Our own review of historical
documents confirms the professor's report.
c. The Relationship Between the Two
Clauses.
Our next step is to consider the relationship
between the two clauses, and the meaning of
the amendment as a whole. As we have
noted, and as is evident from the structure of
the Second Amendment, the first clause
explains the purpose of the more substantive
clause that follows, or, to put it differently, it
explains the reason necessitating or
warranting the enactment of the substantive
provision. Moreover, in this case, the first
clause does more than simply state the
amendment's purpose or justification: it also
helps shape and define the meaning of the
substantive provision contained in the
second clause, and thus of the amendment
itself....
When the second clause is read in light of
the first, so as to implement the policy set
forth in the preamble, we believe that the
most plausible construction of the Second
Amendment is that it seeks to ensure the
existence of effective state militias in which
the people may exercise their right to bear
arms, and forbids the federal government to
interfere with such exercise. This conclusion
is based in part on the premise, explicitly set
forth in the text of the amendment, that the
maintenance of effective state militias is
essential to the preservation of a free State,
and in part on the historical meaning of the
right that the operative clause protects -- the
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right to bear arms. In contrast, it seems
reasonably clear that any fair reading of the
"bear Arms" clause with the end in view of
"assuring . . . the effectiveness of" the state
militias cannot lead to the conclusion that
the Second Amendment guarantees an
individual right to own or possess weapons
for personal and other purposes....
In the end, however, given the history and
vigor of the dispute over the meaning of the
Second Amendment's language, we would
be reluctant to say that the text and structure
alone establish with certainty which of the
various views is correct. Fortunately, we
have available a number of other important
sources that can help us determine whether
ours is the proper understanding. These
include records that reflect the historical
context in which the amendment was
adopted, and documents that contain
significant portions of the contemporary
debates relating to the adoption and
ratification of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights....
In sum, our review of the historical record
regarding the enactment of the Second
Amendment reveals that the amendment was
adopted to ensure that effective state militias
would be maintained, thus preserving the
people's right to bear arms. The militias, in
turn, were viewed as critical to preserving
the integrity of the states within the newly
structured national government as well as to
ensuring the freedom of the people from
federal tyranny. Properly read, the historical
record relating to the Second Amendment
leaves little doubt as to its intended scope
and effect.
3. Text, History, and Precedent All Support
the Collective Rights View of the
Amendment.
After conducting our analysis of the
meaning of the words employed in the
amendment's two clauses, and the effect of
their relationship to each other, we
concluded that the language and structure of
the amendment strongly support the
collective rights view. The preamble
establishes that the amendment's purpose
was to ensure the maintenance of effective
state militias, and the amendment's operative
clause establishes that this objective was to
be attained by preserving the right of the
people to "bear arms" -- to carry weapons in
conjunction with their service in the militia.
CONCLUSION
Because the Second Amendment affords
only a collective right to own or possess
guns or other firearms, the district court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' Second Amendment
claims is AFFIRMED. . . . The
constitutional challenges to the validity of
the California Assault Weapons Control Act
are all rejected, with the exception of the
claim relating to the retired officers
provision.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part,
and REMANDED.
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S.F. Court Won't Rule on Right to Bear Arms
Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, CA)
Wednesday, May 7, 2003
By David Kravets
A divided federal appeals court Tuesday
declined to reconsider an earlier ruling that the
Second Amendment affords Americans no
personal right to own firearms.
The December decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld California's law
banning certain assault weapons and revived the
national gun ownership debate. With Tuesday's
action, the nation's largest federal appeals court
cleared the way for an appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which has never squarely ruled
on the issue.
"I'll have this filed by the end of the week, it's
already drafted," said attorney Gary Gorski,
who challenged California's ban on 75 high-
powered, rapid-fire weapons.
California lawmakers passed the nation's first
law banning such weapons in 1989 after a
gunman fired a semiautomatic weapon into a
Stockton schoolyard, killing five children and
injuring 30.
Following California's lead, several states and
the federal government passed similar or more
strict bans.
In originally dismissing the bulk of Gorski's
challenge, a three-judge panel of the San
Francisco-based appeals court ruled 2-1 that the
Second Amendment was not adopted "to afford
rights to individuals with respect to private gun
ownership or possession."
That December decision was written by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, a President Carter appointee
who also signed on with the court's decision in
June declaring the Pledge of Allegiance and
unconstitutional endorsement of religion when
recited in public schools. The pledge case is
pending before the high court.
On Tuesday, a majority of the circuit's 25
active judges declined to rehear the case, as
Gorski had requested. Only six judges publicly
said they wished to reconsider.
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski urged his
colleagues to rehear the case with a panel of 11
judges, arguing that without individual Second
Amendment protections, the government could
ban the public's only recourse against tyranny.
"The Second Amendment is a doomsday
provision, one designed for those exceptionally
rare circumstances where all other rights have
failed, where the government refuses to stand
for re-election and silences those who protest,
where courts have lost the courage to oppose, or
can find no one to enforce their decrees,"
Kozinski wrote in papers released Tuesday.
Matt Nosanchuk, litigation director of the
Violence Policy Center, said Kozinski has got it
wrong. Weapons don't keep the government in
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check, free speech does, he said. "The Second
Amendment is not the bulwark against tyranny.
It's the First Amendment," he said.
The court's decision, which said weapons were
properly allowed for the states to maintain
militias, conflicts with a 2001 decision from the
New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals that said individuals had a
constitutional right to guns.
Reinhardt, appointed in 1980, noted in the
December ruling that the Supreme Court's
guidance on whether the Second Amendment
offers individuals the right to bear arms was
"not entirely illuminating." The high court, he
said, has never directly said whether the
personal right to possess weapons was a
constitutional guarantee.
State and federal laws barring assault and other
types of weapons are routinely upheld in the
courts on grounds that the prohibitions are
rational governmental approaches to combat
violence. The Second Amendment has had little,
if any, impact on those decisions, except in the
California case.
Attorney General John Ashcroft has said he
believes the Second Amendment grants
individuals the right to bear arms, but that the
right is not absolute. In a 2001 memo to federal
prosecutors, he said the Justice Department
"will vigorously enforce and defend existing
firearms laws."
Larry Pratt, executive director of the 300,000-
member Gun Owners of America, said he wants
the Supreme Court to overturn Reinhardt's
decision. "If judge Reinhardt prevails, the
American people could become subjects of the
government," Pratt said.
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer,
through a spokeswoman, said he was "pleased
that the court has upheld this important
California law regulating assault weapons."
The 9th Circuit covers Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Oregon and Washington.
Arizona,
Nevada,
The case is Silveira v. Lockyer, 0 1-15098.
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EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PUBLICLY OR, EVERYMAN'S
CONSTITUTION
UMKC Law Review
Fall, 2002
Philip C. Kissam
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
B. Guns
The Second Amendment issue of the right
to guns in fact consists of three basic issues.
The first issue is whether the right "to keep
and bear arms" is an individual right or only
a collective right of states to organize and
regulate their militias free from
unreasonable national regulations. Second, if
this is an individual right, should this right
be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and
applied to gun regulations by state and local
governments in the same way that this right
applies against the national government
under the Second Amendment? The Bill of
Rights was originally designed to limit only
the national government,154 but most of the
Bill of Rights, including the Free Speech
Clauses, have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause by judicial interpretation and applied
to the states because of fundamental
relationships that these rights bear to our
concepts of liberty and property that are
protected by due process. Does then the
right "to keep and bear arms," if it is an
individual right, bear the same kind of
fundamental relationship to liberty or
154 See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243
(1833).
property as, for example, the Free Speech
Clauses bear to the liberties of citizens in a
democracy? Third, if the right to guns is an
individual right, what standard of judicial
review of the reasons for gun regulations
should be used to balance the right to guns
against the legitimate needs of governments
to regulate guns? Should the courts employ
the standard of "strict scrutiny," which they
use to protect political speech, or a form of
"intermediate scrutiny," which they use to
protect commercial speech, or the
deferential "rational basis test" that tests the
constitutionality of most economic
regulations?
We have already considered competing
arguments from the text and the Framers'
intent about whether the Second
Amendment provides an individual right to
keep and bear arms or only a collective right
of states to maintain their militias free of
interference from the national government.
The textual arguments, however, were about
what the Framers of the Second Amendment
might have meant its words to mean, not
about what the text might mean to
contemporary society. Looking to the
contemporary meaning of the Second
Amendment's language, there is a strong
argument to be made that the words "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms"
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means an individual right to possess guns.
This is so not only because "the right of the
people" has been interpreted to mean
individual rights in other constitutional
contexts, but also because the National Rifle
Association (NRA) and other gun
enthusiasts have campaigned so vigorously
and effectively in public discourse to equate
the language of the Second Amendment
with an individual's right to guns. At the
same time, the Second Amendment's first
clause refers to the purpose of maintaining
"[a] well regulated Militia," and one can
argue that the contemporary disappearance
of state-managed or state-regulated militias
has vitiated any individual right to keep and
bear arms that might have been recognized
in the eighteenth century in order to support
the operation of such militias. That is, one
may argue that militias are assemblies of
persons with their own guns brought
together to fight battles or put down
insurrections and that such state-organized
militias no longer exist, thus eliminating any
individual right to keep guns to support this
kind of militia. Alternatively, one can argue
that the word militia means something
similar to today's National Guard, where by
practice and law all arms are kept in
government-operated arsenals. Textual
arguments about today's meaning of the
Second Amendment's language also appear
to have uncertainty and elasticity.
When we turn to precedents, these
authorities may not be entirely dispositive
either, although the argument from
precedent seems to cut against the individual
right to guns. In 1939, in California v.
Miller, 160 the Supreme Court rejected a
claim of a Second Amendment right to
possess a sawed-off shotgun, reasoning that
there was no evidence that possession of
such a weapon bore "some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia." Under this
reasoning, many kinds of guns and gun
regulations would seem to fall outside the
scope of the Second Amendment. Still, the
Miller decision did not expressly hold that
the Second Amendment fails to recognize
any individual right to possess firearms, for
one can imagine that keeping some weapons
might bear a "reasonable relationship" to the
preservation of militias, however militias are
defined. The Miller opinion also describes
the calling together of citizen-soldiers, who
would bring their own weapons when called
upon to do so by the states, as the purpose of
the Second Amendment. The proponents of
an individual right to guns can thus
reasonably claim that Miller is at least
opaque on the basic issue of an individual or
collective right.
But the Supreme Court has never
articulated an individual rights interpretation
of Miller when given the opportunity,165 and
the lower courts with one recent exception
have interpreted Miller to stand for the
collective rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment.166 The Supreme Court surely
could shift this doctrine without too much
straining or overruling of its precedents, but
the trend and weight of judicial precedents is
. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65
n.8 (1980); Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969);
Dorf, supra note 27, at 297-99.
166 See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th
Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016,
1020 (8th Cir. 1992). The odd case out is United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (explaining the Second
Amendment grants an individual right to possess
firearms, but a federal statute that prohibits firearms
possession by individuals subject to judicial
protective orders is "reasonable" and a "limited,
narrowly tailored" regulation of this right that
survives constitutional scrutiny).
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160 307 U.S. 174, 177 (1939).
against the individual rights reading and any
shift in constitutional doctrine of this sort
should require some kind of special
justification if the principle of stare decisis,
that previous judicial decisions should be
followed without reexamination, is to be
given respect. As earlier noted, neither the
textual nor historical arguments about the
meaning of the Second Amendment offer
clear or dispositive evidence about what this
amendment means. Thus, the other kinds of
conventional constitutional authority, text
and the Framers' intent, do not seem to
provide special justification for the courts to
retreat from the Miller line of precedents or
stare decisis.
Constitutional theory, or how the
Constitution should be interpreted, may thus
be a likely decisive factor in determining the
basic issue of whether the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to
guns or only a collective right for states to
maintain militias as they wish. Many if not
all originalist judges may favor the
individual right to guns, since they will be
able to find many specific statements about
such a right in the eighteenth century
background to the adoption of the original
Constitution and Second Amendment. These
judges, desiring a specific rule from the
eighteenth century to support their decision,
also might easily imagine how the Framers
would have decided this issue if they had
been directly confronted with it instead of
the more complex debate about the
allocation of military powers between the
national and state governments. Originalist
judges, wanting to give great weight to
original intent, are also likely to favor
narrow interpretations of Miller v.
California. On the other hand, judges of
principle are likely to favor the collective
right interpretation of the Second
Amendment, for these judges are likely to
focus upon the general purposes of the
amendment, as expressed in its preamble,
the debates among the Framers about the
purpose of allocating military powers
between the national and state governments
and, importantly, the judicial need to
translate these purposes of the late
eighteenth century into meaningful rules for
the twenty- first century. In this case, the
demise of state-operated militias and the
changing nature of guns in our
contemporary society will figure importantly
in the decision and will support the
collective rights reading of the Second
Amendment's text, its history, and its
precedents. Theory counts at least in some
constitutional issues.
Suppose the Supreme Court decided that
the Second Amendment confers an
individual right to own or use guns free of
unreasonable regulations by the federal
government. Would the Court also
incorporate this right into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and apply
the right against state and local government
gun regulations? The standard for
incorporating other rights in the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment has
been stated variously as whether the right is
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty, reflects "a principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"
or, in the case of criminal procedure rights,
is among those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions." 73 Since
most of the Bill of Rights has gradually been
incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment during the twentieth century,
171 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
173 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)
(quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926))).
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one might reasonably predict that a Supreme
Court following the individual rights reading
of the Second Amendment would not
hesitate to apply this right to state and local
governments as some kind of "fundamental
right." Yet the Supreme Court decided two
cases in the late nineteenth century, after
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment but
before emergence of the modem
incorporation doctrine, which held the
Second Amendment does not apply to the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment.175
Moreover, some judges might reasonably
interpret the modern nature of guns and gun
regulations in ways that discourage the
characterization of an individual
constitutional right to possess firearms as a
fundamental liberty that is necessary to the
operations of a free democratic society.
Guns today are much more dangerous,
society is much more crowded and complex,
and the need for various sorts of gun
regulations more imperative than was the
case in the late eighteenth century.
Accordingly, there might be openness or
doubt about how the Supreme Court would
decide this issue assuming that it recognized
an individual right to guns.
Most importantly, if an individual right to
possess firearms were recognized, how
would the Supreme Court be likely to
protect this right in terms of the standard of
judicial review applied to gun regulations?
The precedent of Miller v. California, which
upheld a gun regulation in the absence of a
reasonable relationship between guns and
militias might seem to support a deferential
standard, say one that requires that a gun
regulation, to be constitutional, need only
have some reasonable relationship to a
government's safety or welfare purpose. The
fact that guns can be dangerous to others, as
175 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
complex economic relationships can be
dangerous to others, would also support
such a deferential standard since the
Supreme Court generally reviews economic
regulations under the Fourteenth
Amendment by the deferential rational basis
or reasonable means test.' 78 But if the
Supreme Court adopts the individual rights
view of the Second Amendment, Miller is
also likely to be viewed as a dated or not
particularly persuasive precedent for the
standard of judicial review, and the right to
guns is likely to be viewed as more
important to individual liberties than the
economic rights to contract or property. The
critical question on the issue of judicial
review may be whether courts will protect
the right to guns by strict judicial scrutiny,
as they protect most speech and privacy
rights, or will apply some form of
intermediate scrutiny to gun regulations
such as the Central Hudson rule for
reviewing commercial speech regulations,
the ad hoc weighing of factors approach
courts use to test state regulations which
burden interstate and local commerce in
even-handed waysiso or disadvantage
children who are born out-of- wedlock, 8 1
or the equally open-ended reasonableness
standard that is used to determine the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Which is the compelling analogy? Is the
right to possess guns as fundamental to
178 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
144 (1938); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (opinion
by Thomas, J.).
180 See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
18' See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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democracy and our liberties as the right to
free speech? Proponents of the right to
possess guns, who typically emphasize the
connection of guns to self-defense, would
agree and thus attempt to justify a review
standard of strict scrutiny. Should the right
to possess guns be analogized instead to the
constitutional rights of commercial
advertisers to be free from unreasonable
restrictions on their speech,m the rights of
interstate businesses to be free from
particularly burdensome state safety
regulations, 1 84  or the rights of criminal
defendants to invalidate unreasonable
searches and seizures by the police?185 The
great harms from guns and the apparent
need to carefully calibrate or balance
individual rights and the power of
governments to regulate against harm to
others in complex arenas of social action
support these analogies. Proponents of gun
regulations and lesser standards of judicial
scrutiny will argue for these analogies, and
they will emphasize distinctions between
any right to possess guns and the
constitutional rights to political speech and
personal privacy that obtain the protection of
strict judicial scrutiny.
One senses that a judge's choice of the
appropriate analogy for this most critical
issue respecting an individual constitutional
right to guns could be heavily influenced by
either the mutual construction of facts and
rules or the judge's theory of constitutional
interpretation. If a judge perceives of gun
possession as a fundamentally legitimate
activity and government regulations as
inclined towards oppressive bureaucracy,
183 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995).
184 See Grade v. Nat'1 Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505
U.S. 88 (1992).
185 E.g., U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
then this judge is more likely to favor strict
judicial scrutiny of gun regulations.
Similarly, if a judge is an originalist who
likes to think in eighteenth century terms, he
or she seems likely to favor strict judicial
scrutiny as an appropriate method of
protecting a fundamental right. By contrast,
if a judge is more ambivalent about the
value of guns, perceives their dangers as
well as their legitimate uses, and is more
inclined to think that government ought to
be allowed to address pressing social issues,
then the judge may favor the more lenient
form of intermediate scrutiny that allows
considerable government regulation, or even
the deferential reasonable means test.
Likewise, a judge of principle rather than
originalism seems more likely to think in
twentieth or twenty-first century terms and
give weight to analogies between the need
for modern gun regulations and the need for
regulations of commercial advertising,
interstate businesses and criminal activity in
order to limit the harms to others that these
complex activities can cause. The openness
or dialectical quality of constitutional law
continues to appear in this more technical
issue of the standard of review, and yet the
theory of conventional constitutional
argument that we have been developing in
this article seems capable of explaining
judicial and political differences over this
issue too.
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FILE-SHARING
Recording Firms Win Copyright Ruling; Judge Orders Verizon to Identify Internet
Customer Who Used Music-File-Sharing Service
The Washington Post
January 22, 2003
Jonathan Krim
An Internet service provider must turn
over the identity of one of its customers
suspected of illegally trading music files,
a federal judge ruled yesterday, handing
the recording industry a powerful new
weapon in its efforts to crack down on
what it considers digital piracy.
In a closely watched test case of how
much anonymity Internet users can
expect, U.S. District Judge John D.
Bates ordered the online division of
Verizon Communications Inc. to give
the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) the name of a Verizon
customer who had downloaded as many
as 600 songs a day using the popular
Kazaa music-file-sharing service.
If the decision survives a promised
appeal, it means that people who use
such file-swapping programs could be
targeted for legal action by
entertainment companies. Because file
sharing is popular with teenagers, their
parents also could be in the cross hairs if
they are the official subscribers of online
services that connect their homes to the
Internet.
The major labels have been waging
fierce legal battles against file-sharing
services, successfully shutting down the
pioneering Napster Inc. and recently
winning a ruling that the overseas-based
Kazaa service could be sued in the
United States. But online file sharing,
which allows users to trade songs
without paying for them, has persisted,
costing the industry an estimated $5
billion in lost revenue last year
worldwide.
The Kazaa software has been
downloaded more than 100 million
times. Now the industry can zero in on
individuals as well, legal experts said.
"This will be a big club in the hands of
the entertainment industry," said
Jonathan Band, a Washington lawyer
who specializes in Internet law. "They
will definitely be able to reach a class of
users that they have not been able to
reach until now."
Cary Shernan, president of the RIAA,
hailed the decision.
"The illegal distribution of music on the
Internet is a serious issue for musicians,
songwriters and other copyright
owners," he said in a statement. "Now
that the court has ordered Verizon to live
up to its obligation under the law, we
look forward to contacting the account
holder whose identity we were seeking
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so we can let them know that what they
are doing is illegal."
Sarah B. Deutsch, Verizon's associate
general counsel, countered that the judge
improperly interpreted the law and that
the company would appeal.
Internet service companies fear that if
the decision stands, they will be deluged
by subpoenas from the music industry
demanding the identities of the tens of
thousands of users, which will
compromise their privacy and have a
"chilling effect" on consumers and the
online providers, she said.
Verizon also argued that the subpoena
process is unfair to users because it does
not require judicial approval. Subpoenas
can be issued by the clerk of any federal
court.
The case began last July, when the
RIAA served Verizon with a subpoena
for the user's name under a provision of
the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA). The organization uses
automated software to scour the Internet
and identify file swappers but can
identify them only by numeric Internet
addresses on various networks. The
RIAA also asked Verizon to terminate
the user's service, which Verizon refused
to do.
Verizon said it opposes digital piracy but
argued that under the law Internet
service providers are required to provide
such information only if the offending
material is stored on its network -- if, for
example, it provides Web hosting
services -- and not if it is merely the
conduit for data transmission. Typically,
the offending files reside on users'
computers, which they make publicly
available over the file-sharing networks.
But Bates ruled that the 1998 copyright
act clearly specifies an ability and
process for copyright holders to demand
the identities of suspected infringers.
"Verizon's assertions to the contrary are
refuted by the structure and language of
the DMCA," Bates wrote. "Verizon has
provided no sound reason why Congress
would enable a copyright owner to
obtain identifying information from a
service provider storing the infringing
material on its system, but would not
enable a copyright owner to obtain
identifying information from a service
provider transmitting the material over
its system."
That distinction is crucial to online
providers. Providers often work with law
enforcement agencies to identify
lawbreakers but have been generally
exempted from responsibility for the
actions of their users in non-criminal
areas such as libel.
"We support the right of RIAA and other
copyright owners to protect their
intellectually property," said David
Baker, head of public policy for online
provider EarthLink. "But RIAA is
misusing the DMCA as a sword instead
of a shield."
Some of the consumer groups that filed
briefs in support of Verizon argued that
the DMCA is unconstitutional because it
restricts users' "fair use" rights to replay
music and infringes on their privacy.
Copyright @ 2003, The Washington Post
Co. All Rights Reserved
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SBC Unit Sues RIAA Over Push to Identify Net Music Sharers
Los Angeles Times
July 31, 2003
From Associated Press
Pacific Bell Internet Services jumped
into the fray over music downloading
late Wednesday, filing a federal lawsuit
against the recording industry and
questioning the constitutionality of the
industry's effort to track down online
music sharers. PBIS, the California
Internet service provider of San
Antonio- based SBC Communications
Inc., alleges that many of the subpoenas
served against it by the Recording
Industry Assn. of America were filed
improperly.
The RIAA has filed at least 871
subpoenas in U.S. District Court in
Washington this month, demanding
information from universities and
Internet service providers about users of
the online file-sharing network Kazaa.
PBIS claims that 154 subpoenas seeking
file sharers' e-mail addresses were issued
from the wrong jurisdictions. PBIS said
the RIAA's demand for information on
multiple file sharers could not be
grouped under one subpoena.
In the suit, filed in U.S. District Court in
San Francisco, PBIS maintains that it
acts only as a "passive conduit" for the
activity of its subscribers and "does not
initiate or direct the transmission of
those files and has no control over their
content or destination."
PBIS is seeking a declaration that the
subpoenas are overly broad in scope and
should have been issued by a California
district court.
In response, the RIAA called the suit
"procedural gamesmanship" and said
Internet service providers must identify
online copyright violators.
Copyright D 2003 The Los Angeles
Times
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PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION
Judge Blocks Va. 'Partial-Birth' Abortion Ban; Federal Trial Scheduled to Decide
Whether Measure Is Constitutional
The Washington Post
July 2, 2003
Michael D. Shear
A federal judge today blocked
enforcement of a new Virginia law
barring the termination of pregnancy by
"partial birth," pending a trial in
November on whether the measure is
constitutional. The Center for
Reproductive Rights had challenged the
constitutionality of the ban, which was
to take effect today. Lawyers for
Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore (R)
defended the law in a brief hearing today
and argued that it should take effect
immediately.
U.S. District Judge Richard L. Williams
granted the center's request that the law
be put on hold. And he denied a motion
by Kilgore's office for a 120-day delay
before trial.
"I don't know why you need 120 days
for a no-brain case like this," Williams
said, alluding to previous reviews of the
issue. In 1998, a similar Virginia law
was struck down as unconstitutional by
another judge in the same court.
The law, passed this year over the
objections of Gov. Mark R. Warner (D),
would make it a crime for doctors to
perform procedures that opponents label
"partial-birth infanticide."
The ban is similar to the "partial-birth
abortion" ban that has passed both
houses of Congress.
Suzanne Novak, who argued the case for
the center, called the judge's decision a
temporary victory and a good sign that
the ban would be struck down
permanently later this year.
"We're happy that women's rights are
protected, at least for now," she said. "If
the Virginia General Assembly wants to
pass unconstitutional laws, they will be
struck down."
Priscilla Smith, another lawyer for the
center, said the outcome in the Virginia
case could indicate the fate of the
national measure, which the center also
opposes.
"That bill, like this one, is plainly
unconstitutional," Smith said.
Supporters of Virginia's ban said it
would stop the practice of killing infants
moments after they had been
prematurely delivered. They said they
were disappointed by today's ruling.
"It is disappointing, but not unexpected,
that those who have lost in the court of
public opinion and the legislature use the
courts to circumvent the will of the
people," said Victoria Cobb, a
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spokeswoman for the Family
Foundation, which lobbied for the law.
Timothy Murtaugh, a spokesman for
Kilgore, said the attorney general
"intends to forcefully and vigorously
defend the law, duly passed by the
legislature. We are going to explore all
of our options."
That could include asking the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 4th Circuit to overturn
the judge's injunction.
The Virginia law was the first scheduled
to take effect since the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in 2000 that a Nebraska
partial-birth abortion bill was
unconstitutional. The court said that law
was too broad and should have included
an exception to allow the procedure
when a woman's health was at risk.
This year, the General Assembly sought
to avoid the constitutional issue by
defining the procedure as infanticide
rather than abortion. The new law did
not include a health exception.
A lawyer for Kilgore recounted the
differences between the laws during the
hearing.
But Williams, a longtime federal judge
nominated to the bench by President
Jimmy Carter in 1980, did not dwell on
those arguments, barely waiting until the
attorney had finished speaking before he
ruled.
Copyright © 2003, The Washington Post
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House Votes to Restrict Abortions; Bill Would Ban Method Foes Call 'Partial Birth'
The Washington Post
June 5, 2003
Juliet Eilperin
The House voted last night to ban a
series of procedures that critics call
"partial birth" abortion, handing abortion
opponents their biggest legislative win in
more than a decade. President Bush --
unlike his predecessor -- has promised to
sign the bill, which passed the Senate
earlier this year in a slightly different
form. Senate and House members plan
to resolve those differences, and the
measure could become law within
weeks.
That will not end the fight, however.
Abortion rights activists have vowed to
challenge the measure in court, noting
that three years ago the Supreme Court
struck down a similar law in Nebraska.
Yesterday's 282 to 139 vote caps an
eight-year legislative battle in which
opponents used graphic depictions of
abortion procedures to sway the opinion
of the public and many Democrats who
normally resist abortion restrictions.
Under the bill, doctors could not commit
an "overt act" to kill a partially delivered
fetus whose head is outside the mother's
body, or whose trunk beyond the navel is
outside her body.
The bill defines partial-birth abortion as
an operation in which the doctor
"deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus .. . for the purpose
of performing an overt act that the
person knows will kill the partially
delivered fetus." Doctors violating the
law would face fines and as much as two
years in prison.
In yesterday's contentious floor debate,
the bill's supporters described the
procedure as a savage and immoral act
that must be stopped. "It's violent, it's
barbaric, it's gruesome, it's horrific, it's
infanticide," said Rep. Steve Chabot (R-
Ohio).
Abortion rights advocates, who concede
there is a procedure called "dilation and
extraction," said doctors resort to it only
when it is medically necessary. They
said that the bill would apply to an array
of common abortion methods used in the
second or third trimester of pregnancy
and that it fails to provide an exception
for the mother's health.
"We should be promoting a woman's
health. We shouldn't be endangering it,"
said Rep. Lynn C. Woolsey (D-Calif.).
Maryland Democratic Reps. Benjamin
L. Cardin, Elijah E. Cummings, Steny H.
Hoyer, Chris Van Hollen and Albert R.
Wynn voted against the measure, while
Democratic Rep. C.A. Dutch
Ruppersburger joined Republican Reps.
Roscoe G. Bartlett and Wayne T.
Gilchrest in voting for it. In Virginia, the
votes split along party lines, with
Democratic Rep. James P. Moran Jr.
voting against the bill, and Republican
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Reps. Thomas M. Davis Ill and Frank R.
Wolf voting in favor.
It is unclear how often physicians
perform the procedures in question.
Opponents say thousands take place
each year, but others say the number is
far lower. The Alan Guttmacher
Institute, which does research for
abortion rights groups, estimates that
about 2,200 dilation and extraction
procedures took place in 2002, but that
procedure is defined slightly differently
from the one outlined in the bill adopted
yesterday.
Congress has approved the ban twice
before, but President Bill Clinton vetoed
it each time. Supporters set the bill aside
three years ago when the Supreme
Court, voting 5 to 4, ruled that
Nebraska's law on partial birth abortions
was unconstitutional because it did not
define the procedure clearly enough and
failed to provide an exception for the
mother's health.
Authors of the House bill said they
addressed the court's concerns by
including a more specific description of
partial-birth abortion as well as language
saying the procedure is never medically
essential, making a health exception
unnecessary.
Although the bill contains an exception
for the mother's life, it asserts that
"partial-birth abortion is never medically
indicated to preserve the health of the
mother; is in fact unrecognized as a valid
abortion procedure by the mainstream
medical community [and] poses
additional health risks to the mother."
Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James
Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.) said he is
confident the
"defer" to the
stated in the bill.
Supreme Court will
congressional findings
But opponents of the legislation said
Congress could not simply sidestep the
constitutional requirement for a health
exception by declaring it unnecessary.
"Congress cannot suddenly claim to
have medical degrees," said Rep. Mark
S. Kirk (R-l1.).
Doctors typically perform dilation and
extraction procedures for health reasons,
such as when a woman is prone to
uterine perforation, when the fetus's
head is enlarged and when doctors want
to reduce the likelihood of retained fetal
tissue that can lead to infection in the
woman.
If lawmakers succeed in outlawing such
procedures, doctors could employ
methods that many consider riskier, such
as hysterectomies.
Seeking a different approach, a
bipartisan group of lawmakers who
support abortion rights offered a
substitute amendment that would outlaw
abortions after a fetus becomes viable,
unless the attending physician
determines "it is necessary to preserve
the life of the woman or to avert serious
adverse consequences to her health."
That proposal was defeated 133 to 287.
Advocates on both sides described
yesterday's vote as groundbreaking.
Although Congress has limited federal
funding for abortion in the past, it has
never banned a specific procedure in the
three decades since the Supreme Court
legalized abortion in Roe v. Wade.
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"Congress is passing legislation that
prevents women and families and
doctors from making decisions about the
best way to protect the life and health of
the woman," said Gloria Feldt, president
of Planned Parenthood.
Douglas Johnson, legislative director for
the National Right to Life Committee,
said the vote demonstrated that
Americans were growing more
comfortable with curtailing abortion
rights.
"Increasing numbers of people are
coming to understand Roe v. Wade is far
more expansive than people realized,"
Johnson said.
Copyright @ 2003, The Washington Post
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10 COMMANDMENTS IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS
Stephen R. GLASSROTH, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Roy S. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2003)
Decided July 1, 2003.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
The Chief Justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court installed a two-and-one-
half ton monument to the Ten
Commandments as the centerpiece of the
rotunda in the Alabama State Judicial
Building. He did so in order to remind
all Alabama citizens of, among other
things, his belief in the sovereignty of
the Judeo-Christian God over both the
state and the church. And he rejected a
request to permit a monument displaying
a historically significant speech in the
same space on the grounds that '[tihe
placement of a speech of any man
alongside the revealed law of God would
tend in consequence to diminish the very
purpose of the Ten Commandments
monument." Glassroth v. Moore, 229
F.Supp.2d 1290, 1297 (M.D.Ala.2002).
The monument and its placement in the
rotunda create the impression of being in
the presence of something holy and
sacred, causing some building
employees and visitors to consider the
monument an appropriate and inviting
place for prayer. Three attorneys who do
not consider the monument appropriate
at all and who do not share the Chief
Justice's religious beliefs brought two
separate lawsuits to have the monument
taken out. Agreeing with them that it
violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, the district court
ordered the monument removed.
Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1319;
Glassroth v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1067
(M.D.Ala.2002). The Chief Justice
appealed. We affirm.
I.
Because "[iln religious-symbols cases,
context is the touchstone," King v.
Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1282,
slip op. at 2552 (11th Cir.2003), we set
out the relevant facts in some detail,
most of which are pulled from the
district court's opinion, but a few of
which we have drawn from undisputed
testimony or other evidence in the
record.
Chief Justice Moore began his judicial
career as a judge on the Circuit Court of
Etowah County, Alabama. After taking
office he hung a hand-carved, wooden
plaque depicting the Ten
Commandments behind the bench in his
courtroom and routinely invited clergy
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to lead prayer at jury organizing
sessions. Those actions generated two
high-profile lawsuits in 1995 based on
the Establishment Clause, one filed by a
nonprofit organization seeking an
injunction and the other brought by the
State of Alabama seeking a declaratory
judgment that then- Judge Moore's
actions were not unconstitutional. Both
suits were dismissed on justiciability
grounds.
During his campaign for the Chief
Justice position in the November 2000
election, then-Judge Moore's campaign
committee, capitalizing on name
recognition from the lawsuits, decided to
refer to him as the "Ten Commandments
Judge." *** The central platform of his
campaign was a promise "to restore the
moral foundation of law."
After he was elected, Chief Justice
Moore fulfilled his campaign promise by
installing the Ten Commandments
monument in the rotunda of the Alabama
State Judicial Building. *** Chief
Justice Moore placed the monument in
the rotunda of the Judicial Building
without the advance approval or even
knowledge of any one of the other eight
justices of the Alabama Supreme Court.
All decisions regarding it were made by
him. He did not use any government
funds in creating or installing the
monument.
Thousands of people enter the Judicial
Building each year. *** No one who
enters the building through the main
entrance can miss the monument. ***
[M]embers of the public must pass
through the rotunda to access the public
elevator or stairs, to enter the law
library, or to use the public restrooms. A
person walking to the elevator, stairs, or
restroom will pass within ten to twenty
feet of the monument. The Chief Justice
chose the location of the monument so
that everyone visiting the Judicial
Building would see it.
The 5280-pound granite monument is
"approximately three feet wide by three
feet deep by four feet tall." Id. Two
tablets with rounded tops are carved into
the sloping top of the monument.
Excerpts from Exodus 20:2-17 of the
King James Version of the Holy Bible,
the Ten Commandments, are chiseled
into the tablets. *
The monument was installed after the
close of business during the evening of
July 31, 2001. The Chief Justice has
explained that it was done at night to
avoid interrupting the normal business of
the building. The installation of the
monument that night was filmed by
Coral Ridge Ministries, an evangelical
Christian media outreach organization.
Id. at 1294. The organization has used its
exclusive footage of the installation to
raise funds for its own purpose and for
Chief Justice Moore's legal defense,
which it has underwritten.
At the public unveiling of the monument
the day after its installation, Chief
Justice Moore delivered a speech
commemorating the event, and in that
speech *** explained that the location of
the monument was "fitting and proper"
because:
this monument will serve to remind the
appellate courts and judges of the
circuit and district courts of this state,
the members of the bar who appear
before them, as well as the people who
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visit the Alabama Judicial Building, of
the truth stated in the preamble of the
Alabama Constitution, that in order to
establish justice, we must invoke "the
favor and guidance of Almighty God."
During that speech, the Chief Justice
criticized government officials who
"forbid teaching your children that they
are created in the image of Almighty
God" and who "purport all the while that
it is a government and not God who gave
us our rights," because they have "turned
away from those absolute standards
which form the basis of our morality and
the moral foundation of our law" and
"divorced the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights from these principles."
Recalling his campaign "pledge to
restore the moral foundation of law," he
noted that "[i]t is axiomatic that to
restore morality, we must first recognize
the source of that morality," and that
''our forefathers recognized the
sovereignty of God." He noted during
the speech that no government funds had
been expended on the monument.
The rotunda is open to the public, but it
is not a public forum where citizens can
place their own displays. Chief Justice
Moore has denied the two requests that
have been made to place other displays
in the rotunda. He did so because he
believed that those displays would have
been inconsistent with the rotunda's
theme of the moral foundation of law.
The Chief Justice did add two smaller
displays to the rotunda at some point
after the Ten Commandments monument
was installed. The first, a plaque entitled
"Moral Foundation of Law," contains a
quotation from the Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.'s letter from the
Birmingham jail speaking of just laws
and "the moral law or law of God," and a
quotation from Frederick Douglass
speaking of slavery as hiding man "from
the laws of God." That plaque, which the
Chief Justice paid for with his own
money, measures forty-two inches by
thirty- two inches. The second display is
a brass plaque that contains the Bill of
Rights. That plaque, measuring thirty
inches by thirty-six inches, had been
found in a box in the building. The Chief
Justice added both plaques because he
thought that they "comported with the
'moral foundation of law theme."' The
two plaques are inconspicuous compared
to the Ten Commandments monument.
Each is not only much smaller than the
monument, but also is located seventy-
five feet from it. A person standing in
front of the monument cannot see either
plaque. Nothing about their location or
appearance indicates that they are
connected to the monument.
The three plaintiffs are practicing
attorneys in the Alabama courts. As a
result of their professional obligations,
each of them has entered, and will in the
future have to enter, the Judicial
Building. Because of its location, they
necessarily come in contact with the
monument. The monument offends each
of them and makes them feel like
"outsiders." ***
II.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the three
plaintiffs sued Chief Justice Moore in his
official capacity as administrative head
of Alabama's judicial system, claiming
that his actions violated the
Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment as applied to the states
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through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. They sought a
declaratory judgment that his actions
were unconstitutional and an injunction
to force him to remove the monument.
Prior to trial, Chief Justice Moore's
counsel requested--it may have been
done jointly, but it is unclear from the
record whether the plaintiffs actually
joined or simply did not object to the
request--that the district court judge visit
the monument. The judge did so,
accompanied by the attorneys for both
sides.
After a seven-day bench trial, the district
court concluded that Chief Justice
Moore's actions violated the
Establishment Clause because his
purpose in displaying the monument was
non-secular and because the monument's
primary effect is to advance religion.
The court entered judgment to that effect
and gave the Chief Justice thirty days to
remove the monument voluntarily. After
he declined to do so, the district court
entered an order enjoining him from
failing to remove the monument from
the public areas of the Judicial Building.
The Chief Justice appealed, and the
district court stayed its injunction
pending appeal.
As this Court recently explained,
Establishment Clause challenges are not
decided by bright-line rules, but on a
case-by-case basis with the result turning
on the specific facts. King v. Richmond
County, 331 F.3d 1271, ----- , slip op.
2541 (11th Cir.2003). As we have
already noted, the facts set out in this
opinion are taken largely from the
district court's findings. The Chief
Justice attacks those findings on several
bases.
[The court dismisses the Chief Justices
four contentions. First that "the district
court judge should not have made any
factfindings based upon his viewings of
the monument." The court finds that the
judge "fully discuss[ed] the matter with
counsel for both sides . . . [a]nd he
undertook the view in their presence."
Second, the court holds that the judge
was not required to disclose its
factfindings prior to issuing his opinion.
Third, the court holds that the district
court's "subjective impressions" were
acceptable, since the judge was required
to "apply the reasonable person test."
Finally, the court finds no clear error in
the district court's factfindings.]
IV.
[The court finds that the plaintiffs have
suffered as a result of the monument,
and therefore have standing to bring the
lawsuits.]
V.
Because of this country's "history and
tradition of religious diversity that dates
from the settlement of the North
American Continent," the Founders
included in the Bill of Rights an
Establishment Clause which prohibits
any law "respecting an establishment of
religion." County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 589, 109 S.Ct. 3086,
3099, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989). In the
more than two centuries since that clause
became part of our Constitution, the
Supreme Court has arrived at an
understanding of its general meaning,
which is that "government may not
promote or affiliate itself with any
religious doctrine or organization, may
not discriminate among persons on the
basis of their religious beliefs and
practices, may not delegate a
governmental power to a religious
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institution, and may not involve itself
too deeply in such an institution's
affairs." Id. at 590-91, 109 S.Ct. at 3099
(footnotes omitted). Some aspects of the
Chief Justice's position in this case are
aimed directly at that understanding.
Take, for example, the one we address
next.
A.
The First Amendment does not say that
no government official may take any
action respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. It says that "Congress shall
make no law" doing that. Chief Justice
Moore is not Congress. Nonetheless, he
apparently recognizes that the religion
clauses of the First Amendment apply to
all laws, not just those enacted by
Congress. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91
L.Ed. 711 (1947) (holding that the
Establishment Clause applies to the
states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Even with
that concession, his position is still
plenty bold. He argues that because of its
"no law" language, the First Amendment
proscribes only laws, which should be
defined as "rule[s] of civil conduct ...
commanding what is right and
prohibiting what is wrong." Brief of
Appellant at 19 (quoting I William
Blackstone, Commentaries *44). Any
governmental action promoting religion
in general or a particular religion is free
from constitutional scrutiny, he insists,
so long as it does not command or
prohibit conduct. The monument does
neither, but instead is what he calls "a
decorative reminder of the moral
foundation of American law."
However appealing those prospects may
be to some, the position Chief Justice
Moore takes is foreclosed by Supreme
Court precedent. Allegheny County, 492
U.S. at 612, 109 S.Ct. at 3110, which
held unconstitutional the placement of a
cr&che in the lobby of a courthouse,
stands foursquare against the notion that
the Establishment Clause permits
government to promote religion so long
as it does not command or prohibit
conduct. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 3110 *
B.
Another of the Chief Justice's broad-
based attacks on the application of the
Establishment Clause to his conduct
involves the definition of religion. [The
court dismisses the Chief Justice's
definition of religion as "inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's."]
As for the other essential premise of
Chief Justice Moore's argument--that the
Ten Commandments monument depicts
only the moral foundation of secular
duties-- the Supreme Court has
instructed us that "[t]he Ten
Commandments are undeniably a sacred
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,
and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to
that fact." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 194, 66 L.Ed.2d 199
(1980) (footnote omitted). *** [A]
particular governmental use of [the Ten
Commandments] is permissible under
the Establishment Clause only if it
withstands scrutiny under the prevailing
legal test. As we discuss next, the use to
which Chief Justice Moore, acting as a
government official, has put the Ten
Commandments in this case fails that
test.
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C.
For a practice to survive an
Establishment Clause inquiry, it must
pass the three-step test laid out in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct.
2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The
Lemon test requires that the challenged
practice have a valid secular purpose,
not have the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and not foster
excessive government entanglement
with religion. Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at
2111.
*** We applied the Lemon test in
another religious display case just days
before this one was orally argued. See
King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d
1271 (11th Cir.2003). In doing so, we
observed that "[e]ven though some
Justices and commentators have strongly
criticized Lemon, both the Supreme
Court and this circuit continue to use
Lemon's three-pronged analysis." Id. at
1276, slip op. at 2545-46 (footnote
omitted). ***
Applying Lemon, the district court
concluded that Chief Justice Moore's
purpose in displaying the monument was
not secular. It based that conclusion on
the Chief Justice's own words, on the
monument itself, and on the physical
context in which it appears. Glassroth,
229 F.Supp.2d at 1299-1300. ***
Chief Justice Moore testified candidly
that his purpose in placing the
monument in the Judicial Building was
to acknowledge the law and sovereignty
of the God of the Holy Scriptures, and
that it was intended to acknowledge
"God's overruling power over the affairs
of men." 1st Supp. Rec. Vol. 2 at 100;
1st Supp. Rec. Vol. 3 at 34. ***
Against the weight of all this evidence,
Chief Justice Moore's insistence in his
briefs and argument, and in part of his
testimony, that the Ten Commandments
as presented in his monument have a
purely secular application is
unconvincing. ***
Under our circuit law, the purpose
inquiry is a factual one, see ACLU v.
Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
698 F.2d 1098, 1110-11 (11th Cir.1983),
and on appeal we are obligated to accept
the district court's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous, Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d
518 (1985). Clearly erroneous they are
not. Moreover, even if we were free to
review the determination de novo,
having examined the record ourselves,
we agree with the district court that it is
"self-evident" that Chief Justice Moore's
purpose in displaying the monument was
non-secular. ***
[The court acknowledges that its inquiry
could end there, but, applying the effect
prong, further finds that the monument
had "the primary effect of advancing
religion." It concludes, "The monument
fails two of Lemon 's three prongs. It
violates the Establishment Clause."]
D.
Chief Justice Moore contends that even
if it cannot clear the Lemon test, the
monument is saved by the Supreme
Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77
L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). In that case, the
Supreme Court considered a challenge to
500
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of
employing a chaplain to lead it in prayer
at the beginning of each session. Id. at
784-85, 103 S.Ct. at 3332-33. Applying
the Lemon test to the practice, the court
of appeals concluded that the practice of
beginning legislative sessions with
prayer violated all three requirements of
the test. Id. at 786, 103 S.Ct. at 3333.
The Supreme Court, without applying
Lemon, reversed on the ground that the
challenged practice was "deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of
this country." Id. at 795, 103 S.Ct. at
3333, 3338.
[The court refuses to read Marsh as
broadly as the Chief Justice argues, and
finds that there is "no evidence of an
'unambiguous and unbroken history' of
displaying religious symbols in judicial
buildings." Therefore, the court finds
that Marsh does not apply to this case.]
E.
The result we reach in this case is not
inconsistent with our recent decision in
King, 331 F.3d at ---- , slip op. 2541. In
that case, we applied the Lemon test and
concluded that the Seal of the Richmond
County Superior Court did not violate
the Establishment Clause despite its
inclusion of a depiction of the Ten
Commandments. Id. at ----, slip op. at
2556. The Seal included an image of two
tablets, the first with Roman numerals I
through V and the second with numerals
VI through X. Id. at ----, slip op. at 2543.
The Seal had been in use for more than
one hundred thirty years, and there was
no evidence about why the pictograph of
the Commandments was originally
included. The county proffered a
plausible secular purpose, which was
that the Commandments allowed
illiterate Georgians to recognize the Seal
as a symbol of law, and in the absence of
any showing that the proffered secular
purpose was implausible, we concluded
that the County had satisfied the purpose
prong of the Lemon test. Id. at ---- ----,
slip op. at 2546-48.
The distinctions between that case and
this one are clear. In King, there was no
evidence of a non-secular purpose; in
this case, there is an abundance of
evidence, including parts of the Chief
Justice's own testimony, that his purpose
in installing the monument was not
secular. In King, the image was in the
context of another symbol of law; in this
case the monument sits prominently and
alone in the rotunda of the Judicial
Building. In King, the image was
approximately one-inch in size and not a
focal point; in this case the monument is
an unavoidable two-and-one-half ton
centerpiece of the rotunda. Finally, there
was no text of the Commandments on
the Seal in King; in this case the
monument contains text from the King
James version of the Bible.
VI.
Finally, we turn to a position of Chief
Justice Moore's that aims beyond First
Amendment law to target a core
principle of the rule of law in this
country. He contends that the district
court's order and injunction in this case
contravene the right and authority he
claims under his oath of office to follow
the state and federal constitutions "as he
best understands them, not as understood
by others." He asserts that "courts are
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bound by the Constitution, not by
another court's interpretation of that
instrument," and insists that he, as Chief
Justice is "not a ministerial officer; nor is
he answerable to a higher judicial
authority in the performance of his
duties as administrative head of the state
judicial system."'
The Chief Justice's brief reminds us that
he is "the highest officer of one of the
three branches of government in the
State of Alabama," and claims that
because of his important position, "Chief
Justice Moore possesses discretionary
power to determine whether a court
order commanding him to exercise of
[sic] his duties as administrative head is
consistent with his oath of office to
support the federal and state
constitution." ***
The clear implication of Chief Justice
Moore's argument is that no government
official who heads one of the three
branches of any state or of the federal
government, and takes an oath of office
to defend the Constitution, as all of them
IA critical distinction is worth mentioning here.
While all state and federal courts are bound to
follow decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, state courts when acting judicially, which
they do when deciding cases brought before
them by litigants, are not bound to agree with or
apply the decisions of federal district courts and
courts of appeal. See Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n. 11, 117
S.Ct. 1055, 1064 n. 11, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997);
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th
Cir.1996). That is different from what we have
here. At issue here is not a judicial decision of
the Alabama Supreme Court, eight-ninths of
which had nothing to do with the challenged
action. At issue here is the conduct of a party,
who concedes he acted not judicially but as the
administrative head of a state government
department, and in that capacity his conduct is
subject to as much scrutiny as that of any head of
any government department.
do, is subject to the order of any court, at
least not of any federal court below the
Supreme Court. In the regime he
champions, each high government
official can decide whether the
Constitution requires or permits a federal
court order and can act accordingly.
That, of course, is the same position
taken by those southern governors who
attempted to defy federal court orders
during an earlier era. ***
Any notion of high government officials
being above the law did not save those
governors from having to obey federal
court orders, and it will not save this
chief justice from having to comply with
the court order in this case. ***
The rule of law does require that every
person obey judicial orders when all
available means of appealing them have
been exhausted. The chief justice of a
state supreme court, of all people, should
be expected to abide by that principle.
We do expect that if he is unable to have
the district court's order overturned
through the usual appellate processes,
when the time comes Chief Justice
Moore will obey that order. If necessary,
the court order will be enforced. The rule
of law will prevail.
VII.
AFFIRMED.
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Ten Commandments Monument Removal Ordered
AP Online
August 5, 2003
Bob Johnson
MONTGOMERY, Ala. (AP) A federal
judge on Tuesday ordered the chief
justice of Alabama's Supreme Court to
remove a Ten Commandments
monument from the state's Judicial
Building within 15 days.
The federal judge, who has ruled the
5,300-pound monument violates the
constitutional ban on government
promotion of religion, lifted a stay he
had previously issued while Alabama
Chief Justice Roy Moore appealed.
Moore, whose stand was rejected by an
appeals court, has said he will turn next
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The ruling by Judge Myron Thompson
came a day after Moore filed a brief
claiming Thompson did not have the
authority to make him remove the black
granite monument from the building's
rotunda. Moore contends Alabama's
constitution permits the
acknowledgment of God by the state and
that the federal court has no jurisdiction
to order the state to act otherwise.
Thompson's order said the monument
must be moved from the public areas of
the building by Aug. 20, but could
remain in a private area, such as Moore's
chambers. The building houses the
Supreme Court chamber and offices of
appeals court judges.
Thompson said he does not plan to take
immediate action to remove the
monument if Moore does not comply,
but may fine the state each day the
monument remains in place.
An attorney for Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, one of
three groups that filed suit challenging
the monument, said it is time for Moore
to remove it.
"The monument is becoming a millstone
around the neck of Alabama. It is time to
let reason prevail over politics," Ayesha
Khan said.
Moore had no immediate comment
Tuesday. His spokesman, Tom Parker,
issued a statement calling Thompson's
order "judicial tyranny."
Parker added that Thompson had no
right to fine other state officials if the
monument is not removed. "They are not
parties to this case," he said.
Moore had the monument moved into
the building's rotunda in the middle of
the night on July 31, 2001, saying that
the Ten Commandments represent the
moral foundation of American law.
Last year, Thompson ruled that the
monument was an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion by the state.
Thompson ordered Moore to remove the
monument within 30 days, but stayed
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that order pending Moore's appeal. A
federal appeals panel upheld
Thompson's order last month.
Several religious groups have called on
Christians across the country to come to
Montgomery and kneel around the
monument to prevent its removal.
John Giles, president of the Alabama
Christian Coalition, said there would be
a showdown if Thompson attempts to
have the monument removed.
"The encroachment of the federal court
on this matter will be met with
considerable peaceful intervention,"
Giles said.
Richard Cohen, a lawyer for the
Southern Poverty Law Center, which
also joined the lawsuit, urged Attorney
General Bill Pryor "to put aside his
personal support of the monument and
work with Justice Moore to follow the
law."
A spokeswoman for Pryor declined to
comment.
Copyright @ 2003 The Associated Press.
All Rights Reserved.
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Moore vows to fight ruling
Montgomery Advertiser
July 23, 2003
Todd Kleffman
The chief justice plans to take the
Commandments case to the nation's
highest court Alabama Supreme Court
Chief Justice Roy Moore decided
Tuesday to take his Ten Commandments
case direct ly to the U.S. Supreme Court,
triggering a timeline that opponents say
could lead to the monument's removal
by next week.
"If he wants to continue his
grandstanding, he better do it quickly,
because that monument is not going to
be there much longer," said attorney
Danielle Lipow of the Southern Poverty
Law Center, one of three organizations
battling Moore in court.
Moore had until Tuesday to ask the full
11th Circuit Court of Appeals to
reconsider an earlier ruling by three of
the circuit's judges. They ruled that the
Ten Commandments monument Moore
installed in the rotunda of the state
Judicial Building two years ago is
unconstitutional.
"I will not delay by seeking further
hearings before the I Ith Circuit Court of
Appeals," Moore said in a statement
released Tuesday. "I will personally
petition the United States Supreme Court
as chief justice of this state to hear me
on this matter."
Because Moore has decided not to ask
for a rehearing before the 11th Circuit,
the decision made by the three-judge
panel becomes official on July 29.
The appellate judges upheld an earlier
ruling by U.S. District Judge Myron
Thompson that the monument violates
the First Amendment's prohibition
against state-endorsed religion. After a
weeklong trial last year, Thompson
ordered the monument removed but
issued a stay until after Moore appealed
to the 11th Circuit.
"On that day, the plaintiffs will ask
Judge Thompson to lift his stay. He
stated very clearly that he would lift the
stay immediately upon receipt of the
appellate court's decision," Lipow said.
"I believe Judge Thompson may wait to
hear what Chief Justice Moore has to
say, but I can't imagine a good argument
for keeping it a day longer," she
continued. "This has already been
delayed four months so Chief Justice
Moore could pursue an appeal that never
had a prayer for success. At a certain
point, the federal court is going to treat
the plaintiffs civil rights more seriously
than the chief justice's ego."
Tom Parker, Moore's spokesman, said
Tuesday that neither Moore nor his
attorneys would comment beyond what
was said in the press release. In the past,
the chief justice has repeatedly declined
to comment on what he will do if
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ultimately ordered by the courts to
remove the monument.
Moore now has until early October to
file a petition of certiorari with the
Supreme Court, requesting the high
court to take on the case.
"We are 100 percent confident they will
elect not to hear this case," Lipow said.
Moore's plan to petition the high court
personally as chief justice will not earn
him any extra favors with the justices,
Lipow said.
"His name or position carry no weight
with the Supreme Court. They will give
him the same respect they would to
anyone coming before them," she said.
Moore supporter Mel Glenn, executive
director of Foundation for Moral Law,
said that, despite the naysayers, he
remains hopeful the high court will hear
Moore out.
"People say it has only a remote chance,
but I believe in my heart they will agree
to hear it because of all the critical issues
involved," said Glenn, whose
organization helps raise money to defend
Moore's monument in court.
"This isn't your average Ten
Commandments case," he continued. "It
is being raised by the top judicial official
in the state. It's about whether the state
and its citizens can publicly
acknowledge God. The eyes of the
nation are on this case. I believe the
Supreme Court will pick up on all this
and pick up the case on certiorari."
Copyright @ 2003, Montgomery
Advertiser. All Rights Reserved.
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WAR ON TERRORISM
Yaser Esam HAMDI, Petitioner-Appellee,
V.
Donald RUMSFELD, Respondent-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fourth Circuit
(en banc)
2003 WL 21540768 (4th Cir.)
Filed July 9, 2003.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
[After a panel of the Fourth Circuit
denied him relief, Hamdi filed a petition
for rehearing en banc. The Court denies
the petition for rehearing.]
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc:
I concur in the denial of the rehearing en
banc. The panel opinion written by Chief
Judge Wilkins, Judge Traxler, and
myself has already properly resolved this
case. I thus offer only these few
comments in response to the dissent of
my good colleague Judge Motz.
Hamdi is being held according to the
time-honored laws and customs of war.
There is nothing illegal about that. The
option to detain those captured in a zone
of armed combat for the duration of
hostilities belongs indisputably to the
Commander in Chief. And the question
is essentially whether the United States
can capture and detain prisoners of war
without subjecting the factual
circumstances surrounding foreign
battlefield seizures to extensive in-court
review. The answer to this is now--and
always has been--yes. In giving
prisoners of war the right to litigate their
detentions in American courts, the
dissent would install a more restrictive
regime on the executive branch after
September 11 than existed before. I
regret that my colleague does not even
quote the provisions of Article I and
Article II which delegate the conduct of
war to the coordinate branches of our
government. ***
To claim, as my colleague does here,
that there was no meaningful judicial
review of Hamdi's detention is incorrect.
There was extensive review of every
legal challenge to Hamdi's detention.
The dissent wishes to proceed further
and litigate precisely why petitioner was
seized and whether the military capture
can be justified. The conduct of war,
however, involves innumerable
discretionary decisions made by our
armed forces in the field every day.
Many of them have life or death
consequences. To subject these
discretionary decisions made in the
course of foreign combat operations to
the prospect of domestic litigation would
be an unprecedented step. Doing so
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would ignore the fundamentals of
Article I and 1--namely that they entrust
to our armed forces the capacity to make
the necessary and traditional judgments
attendant to armed warfare, and that
among these judgments is the capture
and detention of prisoners of war.
Hamdi's own filings make clear that he
was seized in a zone of active combat
operations. Hamdi's petition notes that
"[w]hen seized by the United States
Government, Mr. Hamdi resided in
Afghanistan." In their traverse,
petitioners state that the petition does not
"implicate Respondents' initial detention
of Petitioner Hamdi in Afghanistan."
And outside the legal arena, petitioner
Esam Fouad Hamdi, in a letter to
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, stated that they
were "not challenging the battlefield
determination, decision to detain
individuals in the theater of combat."
Even the district court, while ordering a
more intrusive examination of the
circumstances of Hamdi's capture, noted
that "[p]etitioners concede that Hamdi's
initial detention in a foreign land during
a period of ongoing hostilities is not
subject, for obvious reasons, to a due
process challenge." Our review of the
petition was undertaken in light of this
undisputed fact.
With respect, the dissent's demand for
further factual inquiries raises many
more questions than it answers. The
dissent notes vaguely that it wants a non-
hearsay basis for petitioner's detention
and that the Mobbs Declaration must be
probed for every incompleteness or
inconsistency. While the dissent appears
to acknowledge that the district court
production order went too far, its
specific criticisms of the Mobbs
Declaration suggest otherwise. This
desire to have courts wade further and
further into the supervision of armed
warfare ignores the undertow of judicial
process, the capacity of litigation to
draw us into the review of military
judgments step by step.
The dissent declines to acknowledge the
perils in its path, and we are left to guess
at how it would proceed. Opposing
affidavits would not likely satisfy the
dissent, for they would leave the court to
weigh one protestation against the other
with little means of doing so. Ex parte,
in camera review would set disputes in
motion over the scope of redaction and
create a whole new set of secrecy issues
surrounding Hamdi's case. Ex parte, in
camera submissions would likely please
no one--neither the government required
to hand over potentially sensitive
materials, nor Hamdi who would be
denied the chance to contest an ex parte
review of them, nor the public who
would be left in the dark about the real
basis for resolving Hamdi's case. My
dissenting colleague also laments the
absence of "first-hand knowledge of
Hamdi's conduct or status in
Afghanistan." The dissent is plainly
unwilling to trust the judgment of those
actually fighting the war that Hamdi was
properly seized. What further steps
should the judiciary then be prepared to
take? What kind of hearings? What role
for counsel? What kind of showings?
What sort of witnesses? The district
court struggled with these questions to ill
effect. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71;
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 527
(E.D.Va.2002).
My colleague's desire for more and more
information signals not the end of a
constitutionally intrusive inquiry, but the
beginning. To start down this road of
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litigating what Hamdi was actually
doing among the enemy or to what
extent he was aiding the enemy is to
bump right up against the war powers of
Articles I and 11. Judges are ill equipped
to serve as final and ultimate arbiters of
the degree to which litigation should be
permitted to burden foreign military
operations. The ingredients essential to
military success--its planning, tactics,
and intelligence--are beyond our ken,
and the courtroom is a poor vantage
point for the breadth of comprehension
that is required to conduct a military
campaign on foreign soil.
Because I think it both unreasonable and
unfair to expect either judges or
attorneys to discard a lifetime of honed
instinct, I suspect that in time, if the
course of the dissent is followed, the
norms of the criminal justice process
would come to govern the review of
battlefield detentions in federal court.
The prospect of such extended litigation
would operate to inhibit our armed
forces in taking the steps they need to
win a war. The specter of hindsight in
the courtroom would haunt decision-
making in the field. At a minimum, if
rules are to be prescribed for litigating
something as sensitive as the soundness
of battlefield detentions in Article Ill
courts, then the prescription should come
from Congress or the Executive--the
branches of government charged by our
Constitution with the conduct of foreign
war. I cannot conceive of the courts on
their own motion--without the
considered input of the political
branches--devising a set of procedures
allowing prisoners of war to hold
American commanders accountable in
federal court. If any illustration of the
difficulties and hazards of such a judicial
enterprise were needed, the history of
Hamdi's case should more than suffice.
My colleague also interprets a series of
World War I-era Supreme Court cases
as invitations for the judiciary to involve
itself in an exacting review of decisions
made on foreign battlefields. My
colleague's overreading of these
decisions misses their fundamental
import: they are replete with warnings
that the judiciary must stay its hand
when reviewing an exercise of the
Commander-in-Chief powers during
wartime. Ex parte Quirin, for example,
holds without reservation that detentions
"ordered by the President in the declared
exercise of his powers as Commander in
Chief of the Army in time of war and of
grave public danger" should not "be set
aside by the courts without the clear
conviction that they are in conflict with
the Constitution or laws of Congress
constitutionally enacted." 317 U.S. 1, 25,
63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942). Likewise,
Johnson v. Eisentrager emphasized that
"[e]xecutive power over enemy aliens"--
the enemy combatants at issue in that
case--"undelayed and unhampered by
litigation, has been deemed, throughout
our history, essential to war-time
security." 339 U.S. 763, 774, 70 S.Ct.
936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950). And In re
Yamashita noted that the military
tribunals challenged in that case were
"not subject to judicial review merely
because they have made a wrong
decision on disputed facts." 327 U.S. 1,
8, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L.Ed. 499 (1946).
These cases are caution signals to the
judiciary, not green lights.
I seriously doubt that any mistake was
made in Hamdi's case. But the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Quirin, Johnson v.
Eisentrager, and In re Yamashita was
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fully aware that war was a messy
business, that mistakes could be made,
but that close judicial review was
nonetheless costly and constitutionally
proscribed. And the panel in this case
did not seek to move further than the
precise case before it. To compare this
battlefield capture to the domestic arrest
in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to compare
apples and oranges. Moreover, the
recharacterizations of the holding in the
dissent are manifestly far afield. The
panel did not suggest that its holding
would apply to any part of the world
where American troops might happen to
be present. There is not the slightest
resemblance of a foreign battlefield
detention to the roundly and properly
discredited mass arrest and detention of
Japanese-Americans in California in
Korematsu. These attempts to
recharacterize the holding of the panel
find no support in the opinion's text
itself.
Finally, although both the panel opinion
and the dissent have noted the
evidentiary shortcomings of the Mobbs
Declaration, there is a value to having
the United States state under oath its
reasons for the detention of an American
citizen, even one captured during the
course of armed combat. To go further,
however, would be folly. It is precisely
at the point of armed combat abroad that
the government's detention interests in
gathering vital intelligence, in
preventing detainees from rejoining the
enemy and in stemming the diversion of
military resources abroad into litigation
at home are at their zenith. It diminishes
these interests to inquire whether the
judiciary deems them "legitimate,"
"substantial," or "compelling," for they
are grounded in the wording of Articles I
and H themselves. The federal judiciary
plays a vital role in securing our rights.
But the other branches of government
also play their part in securing the
blessings of our liberty. In this case, the
paramount right is that of the citizens of
our country to have their democracy's
most vital, life-or-death decisions made
by those whom the Constitution charges
with that task.
TRAXLER,
the denial
[Omitted.]
Circuit Judge, concurring in
of rehearing en banc:
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc: [Omitted.]
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit
Judge, dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc:
For more than a year, a United States
citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, has been
labeled an enemy combatant and held in
solitary confinement in a Norfolk,
Virginia naval brig. He has not been
charged with a crime, let alone convicted
of one. The Executive will not state
when, if ever, he will be released. Nor
has the Executive allowed Hamdi to
appear in court, consult with counsel, or
communicate in any way with the
outside world.
Precedent dictates that we must tolerate
some abrogation of constitutional rights
if Hamdi is, in fact, an enemy
combatant. However, a panel of this
court has held that a short hearsay
declaration by Mr. Michael Mobbs--an
unelected, otherwise unknown,
government "advisor,"--"standing alone"
(subject to no challenge by Hamdi or
court-ordered verification) is "sufficient
as a matter of law to allow meaningful
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judicial review" and approval of the
Executive's designation of Hamdi as an
enemy combatant. I cannot agree.
To justify forfeiture of a citizen's
constitutional rights, the Executive must
establish enemy combatant status with
more than hearsay. In holding to the
contrary, the panel allows appropriate
deference to the Executive's authority in
matters of war to eradicate the
Judiciary's own Constitutional role:
protection of the individual freedoms
guaranteed all citizens. With respect, I
believe the panel has seriously erred, and
I dissent from the court's refusal to
rehear this case en banc.
I.
The panel's decision marks the first time
in our history that a federal court has
approved the elimination of protections
afforded a citizen by the Constitution
solely on the basis of the Executive's
designation of that citizen as an enemy
combatant, without testing the accuracy
of the designation. Neither the
Constitution nor controlling precedent
sanction this holding,
The panel suggests that this conclusion
accords with precedent. In fact the
Supreme Court has never held that a
person designated by the Executive as an
enemy combatant cannot challenge that
designation or that a court cannot require
the Executive to substantiate it. In the
case on which the majority relies, Ex
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87
L.Ed. 3 (1942), the Court did hold that
for a violation of the laws of war, even
an American citizen could be treated as
an "enemy combatant" and held without
the full array of Constitutional rights, but
only because the citizen, after
consultation with legal counsel,
stipulated to the facts supporting the
enemy combatant designation.
Thus, in Quirin, a German-born soldier,
who claimed to be an American citizen,
stipulated that after receiving payment
by the German government and
instruction by the "German High
Command to destroy war industries and
war facilities in the United States," he
and six other German soldiers secretly
landed in the United States during World
War II with "a supply of explosives."
*** Critical to the case at hand, the
Court first expressly rejected the
Executive's argument that the soldiers,
"must be denied access to the courts
because they are enemy aliens who have
entered our territory." Instead, each of
the soldiers was permitted, with the
assistance of counsel, to file his own (not
a next friend) petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, which the courts
reviewed to ensure that each soldier was
in fact an enemy combatant.
None of the few other Supreme Court
cases addressing the rights of enemy
combatants involved American citizens.
But even when dealing with the claims
of German and Japanese citizens
detained by military authorities outside
the United States during World War II,
the Court has never suggested that an
enemy combatant is without recourse to
challenge that designation in court. On
the contrary, the Court has held that a
resident alien--who, the Court
specifically noted, has far less status
than those, like Hamdi, who enjoy the
"high privilege" of citizenship--can
challenge the Executive's designation of
him as an enemy. Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770, 775, 70
S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has
upheld the Executive's designation of a
person as an enemy alien or enemy
combatant only when presented with
facts supporting this designation--facts
stipulated by the petitioner with the
advice of counsel, as in Quirin, or facts
proved by the prosecution at a military
trial in which the petitioner was afforded
counsel, as in Yamashita. In the case at
hand, no facts have been presented to
support the Executive's designation. ***
Denied the most basic procedural
protections, Hamdi could not possibly
mount a challenge to the Executive's
designation of him as an enemy
combatant. Yet in Eisentrager, Ludecke,
and Yamashita the Supreme Court has
explained that even aliens are entitled to
precisely this right. Thus, far from
supporting the panel's position,
controlling precedent prohibits its
approach.
II.
Indeed, the panel offers only a single
justification for its unprecedented
decision to permit the Executive to
support its designation of Hamdi as an
enemy combatant with pure hearsay:
Hamdi's capture in a "zone of active
combat" was assertedly "undisputed."
[Judget Motz argues against relying on
Hamdi's next friend petition and the
Mobbs declaration.]
At the same time, I hasten to note that
the total inadequacy of the Executive's
proffer and the panel's review here does
not provide license for a searching
judicial inquiry into the factual
circumstances of every detainee's
capture, or require compliance with a
production order as demanding as that
called for by the district court. Such an
approach could hamper the Executive's
ability to wage war, as the panel explains
at length. But the possibility, no matter
how real, that an improperly conducted
judicial inquiry could impair the
Executive's ability to wage war cannot,
as the panel seems to believe, provide a
justification for holding that the
Executive can indefinitely detain an
American citizen (even one captured in a
zone of active hostilities) without
producing any credible evidence that the
citizen is an "enemy combatant." The
Constitution gives Congress, not the
Executive and not the courts, the power
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
when the public safety requires it.
Absent a suspension of the writ, the
Constitution demands that we strike the
proper balance between ensuring the
Executive's ability to wage war
effectively and protecting the individual
rights guaranteed to all American
citizens. Without such a balance, our
system of ordered liberty will indeed
ring hollow.
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Dissent on Detention
The Washington Post
July 19, 2003
Editorial
Until the war on terrorism began and the
military brought to American shores a
man named Yaser Esam Hamdi,
Americans had no cause to worry about
their government locking them up
without charge. It was thought that sort
of thing doesn't happen here; people
can't be held without access to lawyers,
and those arrested have access to the
courts. But Mr. Hamdi, the government
claimed, was not like other Americans;
he was an "enemy combatant."
Allegedly captured with a Taliban unit in
Afghanistan, he was brought to a Navy
brig in Virginia -- where he has been
held incommunicado ever since -- after
military interrogators learned that the
Louisiana-born Saudi was probably an
American citizen. Since his arrival, Mr.
Hamdi has not been charged and has not
seen a lawyer or his family. Earlier this
year a federal appeals court panel in
Richmond declared all of this legal. The
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit ruled that the military
owes the courts no more justification for
the indefinite detention of an American
than a two- page affidavit by a Pentagon
official. The president can, with a sweep
of the pen, designate individuals as
beyond the protection of the Bill of
Rights.
Last week, the full 4th Circuit Court, by
an 8 to 4 vote, declined to reconsider the
panel's ruling. This is no particular
surprise; few were expecting it to do so.
What was surprising was the vigor of the
dissents, which came from an
ideologically eclectic group of the
court's judges, unified less by their sense
of how the case should be resolved than
by a laudable insistence on
acknowledging the true stakes for liberty
that it presents.
Mr. Hamdi likely is the enemy fighter
the government alleges him to be. And
we do not claim -- as some civil
libertarians do -- that the government
may never hold an American citizen as
an enemy combatant. But the question is
whether the courts have any meaningful
role in overseeing such designations and
what, if any, right the accused has to
object to a designation. The panel held
that Mr. Hamdi has no right to respond
to the government's claims, because it is
"undisputed that he was captured in a
zone of active combat operations
abroad." Because of Mr. Hamdi's
purported concession of that fact, the
court simply signed off on the detention.
Yet the use of the word "undisputed" is
sleight of hand -- as Judges J. Michael
Luttig and Diana Gribbon Motz both
pointed out in separate dissents. Judge
Luttig wrote that "those circumstances
are neither conceded in fact nor
susceptible to concession in law, because
Hamdi has not been permitted to speak
for himself or even through counsel."
And Judge Motz warned additionally
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that under the panel's ruling, "any of the
,embedded' American journalists
covering the war in Iraq or any member
of a humanitarian organization working
in Afghanistan could be imprisoned
indefinitely without being charged with
a crime or provided access to counsel if
the Executive designated that person an
'enemy combatant."'
Unlike Judge Motz, who would insist
that Mr. Hamdi get to make his case,
Judge Luttig makes clear that he would
likely agree that the court need not hear
from Mr. Hamdi before okaying his
detention. What Judge Luttig would not
do, however, is dodge what he terms
"the admittedly difficult issue" the case
presents by pretending the courts have
heard the whole story when they have
heard only one side of it. By doing so, he
complains, the court "succeeded in
securing neither the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights nor the powers" of the
president to wage war without judicial
micromanagement. We disagree with
Judge Luttig's bottom line. But his point
is well taken: Some circles can't be
squared, and the courts must at some
point choose between deference to the
president's war powers and protecting
the liberty of Americans. Here's hoping
the Supreme Court makes a better
choice.
Copyright @ 2003, The Washington Post
Co. All Rights Reserved
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Jailing of Hamdi Upheld As Rehearing Is Denied
The Washington Post
July 10, 2003
Jerry Markon
A federal appeals court yesterday denied
a rehearing for a U.S. citizen captured
with Taliban soldiers in Afghanistan,
letting stand a ruling that the man can be
jailed indefinitely without an attorney.
The decision by the Richmond-based
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
came in the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi,
a Louisiana-born man designated an
"enemy combatant" by the military. In
January, a three-judge panel of the 4th
Circuit gave the government an
important victory in the war on terrorism
by ruling that the Constitution gives the
executive branch the responsibility to
wage war and the courts must yield to
the military in making such
determinations.
Hamdi's attorney and a coalition of more
than 100 law professors and legal
organizations asked for a rehearing. By
an 8 to 4 vote, the full slate of active
judges let the decision stand. Two judges
on each side of the rehearing issue wrote
strong opinions evoking centuries-old
constitutional issues.
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson II, who co-
wrote the original Hamdi decision, was
even more forceful yesterday. "The
ingredients essential to military success
its planning, tactics, and intelligence --
are beyond our ken, and the courtroom is
a poor vantage point for the breadth of
comprehension that is required to
conduct a military campaign on foreign
soil," he wrote in arguing that the
separation of powers in the Constitution
keeps the judiciary out of warmaking.
Judge Diana Gribbon Motz was just as
forceful in writing a dissent: "The
panel's decision marks the first time in
our history that a federal court has
approved the elimination of protections
afforded a citizen by the Constitution
solely on the basis of the Executive's
designation of that citizen as an enemy
combatant."
Frank W. Dunham Jr., the federal public
defender who represented Hamdi, said
last night he intends to ask the Supreme
Court to review the decision. "Because I
cannot talk to my client and because of
the extreme importance of the issue, I
have no choice but to pursue the matter
to the U.S. Supreme Court," he said.
While fighting with Taliban troops in
Afghanistan, Hamdi was captured by
Northern Alliance forces in November
2001. He was placed in the Navy brig in
Norfolk when it was learned that he was
born in Baton Rouge. His case entered
the legal system after Dunham saw
media reports of Hamdi's arrival in
Virginia and tried to see him.
The government objected and justified
Hamdi's detention with a declaration that
Hamdi had joined a Taliban military
unit, received training and
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acknowledged loyalty to the Taliban
when captured.
The 4th Circuit's decision in January was
not a total victory for the government
because it covered only Americans
captured on a battlefield overseas and
not citizens arrested in the United States.
As such, the decision would not apply to
Jose Padilla, an American declared an
enemy combatant for allegedly plotting
to detonate a dirty bomb, or Bradley
University graduate Ali Saleh Kahlah
Al-Marri, who was placed under military
control June 23 after President Bush said
he was an al-Qaeda sleeper agent. In
federal court in Illinois, Al- Marri's
attorneys this week challenged his
designation as an enemy combatant.
Douglas Kmiec, dean of Catholic
University Law School in Washington,
said the Hamdi decision is justified
because the nation is at war against
terrorism. "I think the government
received a necessary affirmation of its
position," said Kmiec, one of seven
people who filed pro-government briefs
in the case.
But Rosa Ehrenreich
associate professor of
University of Virginia,
decision as "chilling"
Wilkinson's concerns
overblown."
indefinitely without charge and without
access to counsel once you have gotten
him off the field of combat."
Judge William B. Traxier Jr. also filed
an opinion yesterday concurring with the
court's decision, and Judge J. Michael
Luttig dissented. Luttig called the
original panel decision "unpersuasive"
and called for the entire court to review
it because of "the significance of the
issue."
Copyright @ 2003, The Washington Post
Co. All Rights Reserved.
Brooks, an
law at the
blasted the
and called
"wildly
"What is at issue is not whether the
military has the authority on the
battlefield to temporarily detain someone
they believe to be a combatant. Nobody
is questioning that," said Ehrenreich
Brooks, one of the professors who
supported Hamdi. "The question is, Can
you then detain a U.S. citizen
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Padilla kept out of sight, but case is very visible;
Terror suspect at center of debate
Chicago Tribune
June 15, 2003
Stevenson Swanson
NEW YORK Jose Padilla must have no
idea how famous he has become in the
last year.
Padilla, the former Chicago gang
member who is suspected of plotting to
explode a radioactive "dirty bomb," is
being held incommunicado in a South
Carolina navy brig. Since last June, he
has had no contact with his family or his
attorneys, and an appellate court order
last week made it clear he faces several
more months of isolation.
But while intelligence officials have
been interrogating him to find out what
he knows about the Al Qaeda
organization, his case has become a
lightning rod in the government's
controversial crackdown on terrorist
groups and those suspected of having
terrorist ties.
Civil liberties advocates view Padilla, a
U.S. citizen whom President Bush
designated an "enemy combatant," as
one of the chief victims of an
overzealous administration ready to run
roughshod over the Constitution to score
victories against terrorism.
"I think it's the most extreme assertion of
unchecked executive authority in the war
on terrorism," said David Cole, a
Georgetown University law professor.
"The government asserts that they can
do this with respect to any person,
anywhere in the world, and the courts
have virtually no role to play in
reviewing that assertion."
Defenders of the administration's legal
tactics say the "enemy combatant"
category is a new weapon for a new kind
of war, where terrorists can exploit the
freedoms of an open society to cause the
deaths of thousands, as happened on
Sept. 11, 2001. And so far, they note,
only Padilla and one other person, Yaser
Esam Hamdi, also a U.S. citizen, have
been designated enemy combatants.
"We are capable of drawing lines, and
we do not need to presume bad
motivation and abuse" by the
government, said Paul Rosenzweig, a
senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation,
a conservative think tank. ***
These competing views of the enemy
combatant designation will be aired
before the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals here. Last week, the court said
it would review a federal judge's ruling
this year, which upheld the government's
right to hold Padilla as an enemy
combatant but ordered the government
to let him meet with his attorneys.
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Picked up at airport
Padilla, 32, was picked up on a material
witness warrant in May 2002 at O'Hare
International Airport after returning from
Pakistan. While abroad, he allegedly
discussed plans to explode a "dirty
bomb" somewhere in the U.S., possibly
Washington, according to a six-page
government document that contains the
only evidence that has been made public
in the case.
After his arrest, Padilla was transferred
to New York as part of a federal grand
jury investigation. During the next four
weeks, he met several times with his
court-appointed attorney, Donna
Newman, a New Jersey defense lawyer.
A day before a court appearance where
the government would have had to
explain the grounds on which Padilla
was being held, Newman received a call
from an assistant U.S. attorney.
"He tells me that my client has been
designated an enemy combatant,"
recalled Newman, who had prepared
motions demanding Padilla's release. "I
really thought he was kidding."
But the designation was no joking
matter.
The administration claims that a World
War II espionage case established the
precedent for declaring U.S. citizens as
enemy combatants and holding them
until hostilities cease. Hamdi was
captured on an Afghanistan battlefield,
fighting for the Taliban.
In January, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond, Va., said the
government was within its rights in the
Hamdi case, but its opinion was worded
to exclude Padilla, an unarmed man
arrested as he got off an airplane.
Attorneys denied access
Since Padilla was moved to the Naval
Consolidated Brig in Charleston, S.C.,
last June, the Justice Department has
argued in federal court that Newman and
her co-counsel, Andrew Patel, should
not be allowed to see Padilla because
their presence could impair Padilla's
interrogation.
"Anything that threatens the perceived
dependency and trust between the
subject and interrogator directly
threatens the value of interrogation,"
Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, the head of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in
a declaration filed this year in U.S.
District Court here. "Any insertion of
counsel into the subject-interrogator
relationship . . . can undo months of
work and may permanently shut down
the interrogation process."
In fact, Jacoby said, Padilla may prove
tougher to question than most terrorism
suspects because of his extensive
criminal record. Padilla, who was born
in Brooklyn but grew up in Chicago,
served jail sentences in Florida and
llinois.
"These experiences have likely
heightened his expectations that counsel
will assist him in the interrogation
process," Jacoby wrote. "Only after such
time as Padilla has perceived that help is
not on the way can the United States
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reasonably expect to obtain all possible
intelligence information from Padilla."
Intelligence officials in Washington have
competing views about Padilla's
significance in the war on terror.
One U.S. official, speaking on the
condition of anonymity, said the
potential intelligence value of Padilla,
like all captives with alleged Al Qaeda
ties who have been in extended
detention, has been diminished because
he's been out of commission for so long.
But another intelligence official said
Padilla "still has the potential to be of
high value" for counterterrorism
operations because of his alleged
involvement in "dirty bomb"
discussions.
According to administration officials,
enemy combatants can be held as long as
the war on terrorism continues. But
defeating terrorism, unlike vanquishing
Germany and Japan, is a far lcss tangible
goal.
"That point is never going to arrive,"
said Georgetown's Cole, author of
"Enemy Aliens," which examines the
war on terrorism and constitutional
rights. "This is a permanent condition."
But the Heritage Foundation's
Rosenzweig views that thinking as
alarmist, arguing that the government
has improved at not overreacting in
times of crisis.
"These are two guys we actually think
are terrorists," he said, referring to
Padilla and Hamdi. "I
accept the idea that
government acts perfectly,
all."
simply can't
unless the
it can't act at
A recent report by the Justice
Department's inspector general has
raised concerns among civil liberties
groups about the conditions under which
Padilla is being interrogated. The report
found that some of the 762 immigrants
who were detained after Sept. 11 were
abused before being deported or
released.
"Whether all kinds of deprivations are
happening, we don't know," said Barbara
Olshansky, deputy legal director of the
Center for Constitutional Rights, a New
York civil liberties group. "People who
were just being detained were badly
mistreated, subjected to patently
unconstitutional policies and practices."
Defense Department officials could not
be reached Friday.
Although Padilla's case is heading to
appellate court, he is destined to spend
several more months in the navy brig.
The court will not hear oral arguments
until mid-October at the earliest, and the
decision is likely to be appealed.
"They're going to succeed in having him
in detention for well over a year and a
half without his seeing an attorney, or
anyone else, for that matter," Cole said.
"Simply by asserting its authority, the
government has gotten much of what it
wants."
Copyright D 2003, Chicago Tribune. All
Rights Reserved,
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U.S. rebuked over Padilla; Judge says 'dirty bomb' suspect entitled to lawyer
Chicago Tribune
March 12, 2003
By Dan Mihalopoulos
NEW YORK -- In a sharply worded
rebuke to the Bush administration, a
Manhattan federal judge ruled Tuesday
that Jose Padilla, the former Chicago
street gang member held
incommunicado for nine months, can
meet with his lawyers.
Stung by U.S. District Judge Michael
Mukasey's December ruling in favor of
Padilla, who was accused of plotting a
radioactive "dirty bomb" attack, the
government had taken the unusual step
of asking Mukasey to reconsider his
decision.
U.S. officials argued that meetings
between Padilla, 31, and lawyers could
disrupt his interrogation and even allow
him to leak secret messages to Al Qaeda
operatives, using his lawyers as
unwitting conduits.
But Mukasey said Tuesday that if Padilla
does not receive all the legal protections
due defendants in criminal cases, "a
dictatorship will be upon us, the tanks
will have rolled."
President Bush classified Padilla, a U.S.
citizen, as an enemy combatant in June.
Since then Padilla has been held in a
Navy brig in Charleston, S.C., without
formal charges or access to a lawyer.
He was detained May 8, 2002, at O'Hare
International Airport after he got off an
international flight and was brought to
New York as a material witness in a
federal grand jury probe of the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks.
Although Mukasey has supported the
president's authority to jail U.S. citizens
as enemy combatants, he said Padilla has
the right to challenge that status by
having his lawyers present evidence.
Legal experts predicted the Bush
administration would appeal Mukasey's
ruling.
U.S. officials said Tuesday that they had
not decided their next move, but the
Justice Department's reaction to the
ruling echoed statements made before
the government challenged other
unfavorable opinions.
Barbara Comstock, a spokeswoman for
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, said officials
are reviewing the opinion "in light of our
duty to take all steps possible within the
law to protect the American people."
"In times of war, the president must have
the authority to act when an individual
associated with our nation's enemies
enters our country to endanger American
lives," she said.
Padilla is one of two American citizens
being held as enemy combatants after
the Sept. 11 attacks. The other is
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Louisiana native Yaser Esam Hamdi,
captured while fighting for the Taliban
in Afghanistan.
Hamdi's lawyers have argued
unsuccessfully for a meeting with him at
the Navy brig in Norfolk, Va., where he
is being held. But his status as a member
of an armed force fighting the U.S. is not
in dispute.
On Jan. 8, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond ruled Hamdi could
be held indefinitely. It refrained from
saying its ruling applied to an American
arrested on U.S. soil, a clear reference to
Padilla.
The detention of Padilla is seen as an
important test case of how well the
government can balance civil liberties
against concerns for national security.
The Justice Department has argued that
the president has wartime powers to hold
enemy combatants indefinitely. Padilla's
attorneys say that is unconstitutional.
"We are pleased with the judge's ruling,
and we think all citizens should be
pleased," said Donna Newman, one of
Padilla's court-appointed attorneys.
"This reaffirms that, even under these
circumstances, a defendant's access to
legal counsel is necessary."
Newman said she doesn't know when
she may meet with her client. The judge
ordered the government and Padilla's
lawyers to discuss the conditions for
meetings between Padilla and his
lawyers and to report back on March 27.
Padilla was born in Brooklyn and raised
in Chicago. He was once jailed as a
teenager for killing a rival gang member.
Out of jail at 18, he moved to Florida,
where he also served a prison sentence
and converted to Islam. He later traveled
to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, acquiring the name
Abdullah al-Muhajir.
In a six-page memo by a Pentagon
official, the government has alleged that
while in Afghanistan, Padilla discussed
plans with Abu Zubaydah, a senior
figure in Al Qaeda, to detonate a so-
called dirty bomb in the United States.
According to government officials, he
also researched the bomb plan and had
discussions with Al Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan.
In revealing Padilla's detention on June
10, 2002, Ashcroft called him a "known
terrorist" capable of causing "mass death
and injuries." But a top Pentagon official
later said Padilla's alleged plot was
nothing more than "some fairly loose
talk."
U.S. officials last week drew links
between the alleged dirty bomb plot
involving Padilla and Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, the mastermind of the Sept.
11 attacks apprehended in Pakistan this
month.
In arguing for not letting Padilla meet
with his lawyers, the government
contended such meetings could
"jeopardize the two core purposes of
detaining enemy combatants: gathering
intelligence about the enemy and
preventing the detainee from aiding in
any further attacks against Americans."
Mukasey rejected those arguments.
"Those to whom images of catastrophe
come that easily might take comfort in
recalling that it is a year and a half since
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Sept. 11, 2001, and Padilla's is not only
the first, but also the only case of its
kind," he wrote.
Mukasey suggested that if allowed to
meet with his lawyers, Padilla "might
then seek to better his lot by cooperating
with his captors."
Civil libertarians hailed Tuesday's
ruling.
"This is a good day for the Bill of
Rights," said Neal Sonnett, chair of the
American Bar Association's Task Force
on Treatment of Enemy Combatants.
"Padilla has to have an opportunity to
present facts relevant to his case and
respond. He has got to have a lawyer to
do that."
But some legal scholars said they fear
the ruling could make it more difficult
for the government to wage war on
terrorism. Douglas Kmiec, dean of the
Catholic University Law School, said
allowing enemy combatants to confer
with lawyers could prove "militarily
unworkable."
The courts should ultimately side with
the government, Kmiec said, noting that
the legal system customarily defers to
the government in wartime.
"In this individual case, the ruling may
do justice," Kmiec added. "In the long
term, it may do harm to U.S. interests in
preventing terrorist activity."
Copyright V 2003, Chicago Tribune. All
Rights Reserved.
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War On Terror
Who's Minding the Courts on Rights?
Los Angeles Times
February 23, 2003
Louis Fisher
WASHINGTON -- Times of war and
emergency jeopardize civil liberties.
Ironically, it is precisely at such
moments, when we most need
independent judges to check executive
abuse, that judicial safeguards are
weakest. Protections must therefore
come from outside the courts. That has
been the pattern in the past, and it
appears, thus far, to be the record after
the Sept. 11 terror attacks on New York
and the Pentagon. Whatever moxie
exists in the courts is likely to come
from district judges or circuit courts,
which are then typically reversed on
appeal.
The Justice Department has not adopted
consistent or even understandable
principles in its prosecution of "terrorist"
suspects.
* John Walker Lindh, born in California
but captured in Afghanistan among
Taliban forces, was tried and convicted
in civil court.
* Yasser Esam Hamdi, born in Louisiana
and captured in the same Afghan prison
rebellion as Lindh, is being detained at
the Norfolk Naval Station without being
charged.
* Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen
of Moroccan descent, was arrested in
Minnesota as the "20th hijacker." He has
been charged and is being tried in civil
court.
* Richard C. Reid, the British "shoe
bomber," was tried and convicted in civil
court.
* Jose Padilla, born in New York, was
held as a suspect in a plot to detonate a
"dirty bomb" in the United States.
Although arrested by the FBI on May 8,
2002, and incarcerated since then, he has
yet to be charged with a crime.
Whoever fits the category of "enemy
combatant," like Hamdi and Padilla, can
be held without charge and has no right
to an attorney, and, according to the
Justice Department, federal judges have
no right to interfere with executive
judgments. A Justice Department brief
for the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richmond, Va., argued: "The court may
not second-guess the military's enemy
combatant determination." The
administration applies the term "enemy
combatant" to a member, agent or
associate of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
In the Hamdi case, District Judge Robert
G. Doumar several times rejected the
broad arguments put forth by the Justice
Department, insisting that Hamdi had a
right of access to a public defender and
to confer with that lawyer without the
presence of military personnel.
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However, Doumar was regularly
reversed by the 4th Circuit.
In its most recent ruling -- Jan. 8, 2003 --
again overturning the district court, the
4th Circuit juggled two values: the
judiciary's duty to protect constitutional
rights versus the judiciary's need to defer
to military decisions by the president. It
came down squarely in favor of
presidential power.
The 4th Circuit arrived at its conclusion
through a strange reading of separation
of powers. It cites an opinion by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority (1991)
that the "ultimate purpose of this
separation of powers is to protect the
liberty and security of the governed."
Instead of reading this language as an
affirmation of the checks and balances
that prevent an accumulation of power in
a single branch, the 4th Circuit interprets
the sentence as a warning to the federal
judiciary not to interfere with powers
vested in another branch: "For the
judicial branch to trespass upon the
exercise of the war-making powers
would be an infringement of the right to
self-determination and self-governance
at a time when the care of the common
defense is most critical."
The reading is bizarre: Although the 4th
Circuit acquiesces wholly to the
president's judgment, the Supreme Court
expressly intervened in the 1991 case to
strike down a statutory procedure
adopted by Congress. No philosophy of
deference appears in that decision.
Compare the treatment of Hamdi with
that of Padilla. The FBI arrested Padilla
in Chicago on a material- witness
warrant, but after President Bush
designated him an enemy combatant, the
warrant was withdrawn and the
government moved Padilla to a Navy
brig in Charleston, S.C. On Dec. 4,
2002, District Judge Michael B.
Mukasey in New York ruled that Padilla
had a right to consult with counsel under
conditions that would minimize the
likelihood that he could use his lawyers
as "unwilling intermediaries for the
transmission of information to others."
The court held that Padilla had a right to
present facts, and the most convenient
way to do that was to present them
through counsel.
After Sept. 11, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service began to close
deportation proceedings to the press and
the public. Rabih Haddad, a co-founder
of a Muslim charity based in Illinois,
was held for nine months because the
government suspected that he had
supplied money to terrorist
organizations. He was finally able to
testify at an open hearing after District
Judge Nancy G. Edmunds ordered the
Justice Department to either give him an
open hearing or release him.
Her decision was affirmed by the 6th
Circuit, which found that the 1st
Amendment entitled the press and the
public access to deportation proceedings.
Judge Damon J. Keith explained why the
press had to watch executive branch
decisions: "Democracies die behind
closed doors."
In the one case that reached the Supreme
Court -- a district court decision in New
Jersey that supported open deportation
hearings -- justices stayed the decision
pending appeal. Chief Judge Edward R.
Becker of the 3rd Circuit Court of
Appeals in Philadelphia overturned the
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district court decision. He found that the
tradition of open hearings for criminal
and civil trials did not apply to the same
extent as to administrative hearings,
although, procedurally, "deportation
hearings and civil trials are practically
indistinguishable," and that openness in
deportation hearings offers all the
salutary values recognized in civil and
criminal trials.
Becker declined to "lightly second-
guess" the national security concerns of
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft. In a dissent,
Judge Anthony J. Scirica agreed with
Becker that judicial deference to the
executive branch is appropriate, but not
to the extent of "abdicating our
responsibilities under the 1st
Amendment."
With the likelihood of judicial relief for
litigants small, safeguards for civil
liberties will depend largely on the
efforts of citizens, organizations and the
media to challenge practices by the
executive branch. Public pressures could
compel Congress to hold oversight
hearings and adopt statutory protections.
Writing for the New York University
Law Review in 1962, Earl Warren, then-
chief justice of the United States, warned
that courts are unreliable in time of war
or emergency, and that "other agencies
of government must bear the primary
responsibility for determining whether
specific actions they are taking are
consonant with our Constitution." In a
democracy, "it is still the Legislature and
the elected executive who have the
primary responsibility for fashioning and
executing policy consistent with the
Constitution." Moreover, "the day-to-
day job of upholding the Constitution
really lies elsewhere. It
realistically, on the shoulders of
citizen," Warren said.
rests,
every
Warren's message reappears in the 6th
Circuit decision on deportation
proceedings. Although Keith opened the
proceedings, he cautioned: "In our
democracy, based on checks and
balances, neither the Bill of Rights nor
the judiciary can second-guess
government's choices. The only
safeguard on this extraordinary
governmental power is the public,
deputizing the press as the guardian of
their liberty."
Copyright © 2003 Los Angeles Times.
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Lawyers at War
The Wall Street Journal
February 18, 2003
Ruth Wedgwood
The American Bar Association has
entered the fray over the president's
detention of enemy combatants in the
war on terrorism. At its recent meeting
in Seattle, ABA delegates helpfully
urged the administration to do what it is
already doing -- namely, allowing
Americans captured with the Taliban or
al Qaeda to seek "meaningful judicial
review" of their legal status. In addition,
suggested the ABA, any U.S. citizens or
residents captured as combatants should
be granted access to defense counsel in a
way that "accommodates the needs of
the detainee and the requirements of
national security."
Unfortunately for the rest of us, this
second step involves a balancing act that
isn't so easy. Americans hold liberty
dear, but they also are acutely aware that
the need for intelligence on anticipated
attacks by al Qaeda is urgent, and the
supply is scarce. The prime source of
intelligence will be captured combatants;
and lawyers, alas, will inevitably turn off
that flow of time-critical information.
In the near term, we will have few
professional agents or informants
infiltrated into the al Qaeda network.
Recruitment takes time and is a deadly
game. But we have captured hundreds of
Taliban and al Qaeda field operatives --
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bosnia,
Indonesia and Yemen.
The president has employed his
constitutional power as commander-in-
chief to treat al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters as combatants, to keep them
from returning to the battlefield. Under
the established law of armed conflict, he
can civilly intern a captured combatant
until the end of active hostilities.
Military commanders are entitled to
interrogate all combatants at length, to
learn as much as possible about al
Qaeda's cells, weapons and future plans
for attack.
In a conventional war, a habeas corpus
petition by enemy soldiers would likely
be dismissed out-of-hand. With an
enemy who does not wear any
distinctive insignia or uniform (contrary
to the laws of war) and who makes the
world a 24/7 battlefield, the inquiry can
be more delicate. But not always.
Consider the situation in Virginia, where
the federal appeals court cut the Gordian
knot after three rounds of appeals related
to Yaser Hamdi, a Saudi- American
found on the Afghan battlefield carrying
an AK-47.
Hamdi, now in the Norfolk naval brig,
was born in Baton Rouge and raised in
Saudi Arabia. He traveled to
Afghanistan to take weapons training
with the Taliban and was captured by the
Northern Alliance "in a zone of active
combat in a foreign theater of conflict."
Hamdi admitted to military intelligence
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teams that he'd trained and deployed
with the Taliban, and carried an
automatic weapon until his capture.
The Fourth Circuit found no reason to
reject the factual or legal basis of the
president's decision to detain Hamdi as a
combatant, in light of his out- of-court
admissions and the recorded
circumstances of his capture. The
appellate court rebuffed the district
judge's hunting-call for more battlefield
details, including whether Hamdi had
actually fired his gun in battle or was
merely held in ready reserve.
The proposed "excavation" of battlefield
scenes from a half-world away might be
characteristic of a criminal investigation,
but wasn't adapted to the "rubble of
war," ruled Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson
and his colleagues. There are, after all,
no crime-lab investigators on an Afghan
battlefield ready to record whether a
combatant's clothing has powder residue.
So, too, the demand for review of all
classified screening criteria for the
transfer of combatants, all raw
intelligence interviews of Hamdi, and
the names and addresses of all
interviewers, was held to be an
unwarranted excursion into the
president's domain.
The principle of separation of powers
unavoidably has a large footprint in
wartime. It is the president who is
constitutionally charged with
successfully prosecuting a war and
protecting the American people against
renewed attacks.
The Fourth Circuit isn't alone in its view
of the president's power in wartime. A
highly-regarded district judge in
Manhattan has issued an equally blunt
opinion in the case of Jose Padilla, the
alleged al Qaeda "dirty bomber" arrested
last year at O'Hare airport. Judge
Michael Mukasey, sitting in a
courthouse near Ground Zero, recently
ruled that Padilla could be held as a
military combatant, even though he was
originally subpoenaed as a grand jury
material witness. The president's
decision was supported by Padilla's plan
to set off a radiological dispersal device
within the U.S.
Padilla presents the perfect dilemma of
apparent truth vs. admissible criminal
proof. Senior al Qaeda planner Abu
Sabaydah described Padilla's role in the
dirty bomb plot to intelligence officials
while under interrogation abroad, and
the description was corroborated. The
applicable test, ruled Judge Mukasey, is
whether "some evidence" supports the
president's designation of Padilla as a
combatant. The Abu Sabaydah treasure
trove appears to meet the standard.
Judge Mukasey's one doubtful step has
been challenged in a government
petition. Concluding that Padilla had no
constitutional right to consult defense
counsel in a wartime military
interrogation or even in habeas review,
Judge Mukasey nonetheless resorted to
the All Writs Act to appoint counsel
"only for purposes of presenting facts to
the court." This does not readily square
with the judge's chosen standard of
review, requiring only "some evidence"
to support the president's determination.
But more importantly, Judge Mukasey
was evidently unaware that inserting
defense counsel into the military brig as
a combatant's best friend can turn off an
essential spigot of intelligence
information on al Qaeda's existing plans
for attack. Habeas proceedings and
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appeals can drag on for months, if not
years. Any lawyer worth his salt will
deliver standard-form advice to a client:
Keep your mouth shut. Don't talk. Not in
court and not in military interviews.
Defense Intelligence Agency director
Lowell Jacoby, who heads the Humint
program for the Defense Department,
recently described the dilemma to the
court. Creating a psychological
relationship with a terrorist recruit is key
to a successful debriefing, he noted. The
process of gaining confidence can be
long. (The Kuwaiti informant Omar al-
Faruq, for example, didn't give up
information on the plot to bomb U.S.
embassies in Southeast Asia until his
third month in custody.) A defense
lawyer will displace the military
interviewer as the focus of the
combatant's hopes, and the questions
about al Qaeda's plans will meet a
studied silence.
The Fourth Circuit has noted that ping-
pong litigation does not easily coexist
with wartime intelligence-gathering. An
affidavit setting forth the government's
information may suffice to test the
president's authority, concluded Chief
Judge Wilkinson. That may hold true for
Padilla, a volunteer who supped with al
Qaeda in its Afghan redoubt and sought
to bring the war home.
Al Qaeda has learned quickly. Its
planners are smart enough to use
American "mules" once they realize that
stateside recruits are immune from
effective interrogation. The government
could create an expeditious surrogate
procedure, using military commissions
and counsel to establish the status of any
citizen combatants, thus simplifying the
federal courts' task of habeas review. But
in the meantime, the dilemma remains.
We have stationed anti-aircraft batteries
around government buildings. We have
tasked environmental clean-air sampling
stations around the country to watch for
biological reagents. Yet intelligence
remains a key to citizen safety.
The federal courts will take this issue
case-by-case and may vary their
procedure according to the clarity of the
government's affidavit. But journeys to
Afghanistan and planning sessions with
al Qaeda leave little room for doubt that
someone has signed up with the bad
guys.
[Ms. Wedgwood is a professor of
international law at Johns Hopkins.]
Copyright @ 2003, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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SCHOOL PRAYER AT THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE
Federal Court Upholds Its Ban on VMI Prayers
The Washington Post
August 14, 2003
Jerry Markon
An evenly split federal appeals court
yesterday upheld its decision striking
down the Virginia Military Institute's
suppertime prayers as unconstitutional,
refusing to reconsider an earlier ruling
that said the 50-year tradition violates
the First Amendment rights of cadets.
State Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore
(R) said he would seek a review of the
hotly contested issue by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Kilgore's office
defended VMI in the lawsuit. The case
was filed by the American Civil
Liberties Union in 2002 against the
state-financed school on behalf of two
cadets, Neil Mellen and Paul Knick.
By a vote of 6 to 6, the Richmond-based
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
declined to reconsider a ruling from a
three-judge panel in April. Seven votes,
a majority of the active judges, would
have been required for a rehearing. The
panel had said that VMI cadets are
'plainly coerced into participating' in
the prayers as part of an overall
atmosphere that emphasizes "obedience
and conformity."
Yesterday's decision marks the third
judicial rejection of the suppertime
prayers at VMI. In January, U.S. District
Judge Norman K. Moon in Lynchburg
called the ceremony a "state-sponsored
religious exercise" that violates the
separation of church and state.
And the prayers are the second of VMI's
hallowed traditions to be struck down as
unconstitutional by the federal courts.
The college did not accept women until
the Supreme Court mandated
coeducation in 1996.
Kent Willis, executive director of the
ACLU of Virginia, said he was
"delighted with the court's decision. We
believe it applied the correct legal
standard." But Willis added:
"Admittedly, the vote of the court
reveals this is a controversial case. You
can't get any closer than six to six."
Kilgore also cited the close vote in
explaining why he will seek further
review. "This case is one that should be
heard by the United States Supreme
Court," he said in a statement.
The three-judge panel of the 4th Circuit
painted the issue in the context of an
overall educational system at VMI that
the court said emphasizes "obedience
and conformity." "In this context," the
court said, "VMI's cadets are plainly
coerced into participating in a religious
exercise" in violation of the separation
of church and state.
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For nearly three generations, students at
VMI, based in Lexington, have been
required to stand at attention after
marching together into the mess hall.
Cadets must stand, hands at their sides,
while a "cadet chaplain" -- a student
picked by the chaplain's office -- recites
a prayer that invokes God, without any
mention of Jesus.
VMI students are not required to bow
their heads or actually recite the prayer
during the exercise.
Yesterday, three 4th Circuit judges -- J.
Harvie Wilkinson UL, H. Emory
Widener Jr. and Paul V. Niemeyer --
issued separate, strongly worded
dissents.
Niemeyer called the earlier panel
decision "a major abandonment of
values embraced by the founders and by
our society during the 18th and 19th
centuries . . . the panel opinion
regrettably treats religion as a virus that
somehow will infect the public square if
acknowledged in even the most
unobtrusive of circumstances."
Wilkinson called the prayers "the most
benign form of religious observance"
and expressed concern that the ruling is
bound to affect religious observances at
other military institutions, such as the
U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.
Although the 4th Circuit includes
Maryland, the ACLU has said it has no
plans to challenge prayers there, noting
the difference is that VMI is supported
by state funds.
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